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ABSTRACT
Part A of this dissertation tells the story of The Coca-Cola Company‟s trademark
registrations in Canada in order to illustrate the linguistic issues faced by trademark
administrators. A trademark‟s registrability depends on its distinctiveness, which is its ability to
can distinguish its trader‟s goods and services from those of another trader. Knowing how well a
trademark will function to distinguish means ascertaining first what has already been registered,
which is no easy task when the databases cannot administer foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized. Part A proposes the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized, so they can be filed/searched appropriately in databases.
Part B of this dissertation tells the story of two competing Chinese bakeries in Canada in
order to illustrate the linguistic struggles of the judiciary. These struggles are nothing new, as
academics have noted that “[l]ong before the introduction of the registration system [by what
was then England in 1875], owners of marks containing terms in foreign languages or scripts
could in certain circumstances prevent their use by trade rivals” and that by 1905 English and
North American case law “has been fruitful of conflicting holdings.” What is new in the 21st
Century is the increasing frequency of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as the
added complexity of foreign scripts makes it harder for courts to assess and compare trademarks
that they cannot even read or sound out, much less understand. Part B proposes the solution of
assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, so they can be assessed and
compared appropriately in the case law.
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INTRODUCTION
Law is a social construct that often features fictitious characters. Criminal law applies the
standard of the reasonable person to establish criminal negligence.1 Civil law applies the same
standard to establish tort liability for negligence. 2 Intellectual property law also has its legal
fictions. Patent law imagines a person skilled in the art to assess non-obviousness.3 Copyright
law imagines a similar person or a lay person to assess copying,4 as well as the author to assess
originality.5 Trademark law imagines the consumer to assess confusion.6
The trademark consumer is split into further fictitious characters, which is where the
social construct starts to fall apart because the fictitious characters are arbitrarily given
contradictory personalities. Examples include the sovereign versus the fool; 7 the passive

1

R v Hill, [1986] 1 SCR 313 at 324-325 (“The criminal law is concerned among other things with fixing standards
for human behavior. We seek to encourage conduct that complies with certain societal standards of reasonableness
and responsibility. In doing this, the law quite logically employs the objective standard of the reasonable person.”).
2
Vaughan v Menlove, (1937) 132 ER 490 (CP) (“The care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid
down; … Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of
each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to
the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe.”).
3
Beloit Canada Ltd v Valmet Oy (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 at 294 (“The question to be asked is whether this mythical
creature (the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in the light of the state of the art and of common
general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution
taught by the patent.”).
4
Cinar Corporation v Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, [2013] 3 SCR 1168 at para 51 (“However, the question remains
whether a substantial part of the plaintiff‟s work was copied. This question should be answered from the perspective
of a person whose senses and knowledge allow him or her to fully assess and appreciate all relevant aspects – patent
and latent – of the works at issue. In some cases, it may be necessary to go beyond the perspective of a lay person in
the intended audience for the work, and to call upon an expert to place the trial judge in the shoes of „someone
reasonably versed in the relevant art or technology‟: Vaver, at p. 187.”) [Cinar].
5
Jane Ginsburg, “The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law” (2003) Columbia Law School, Public
Law Research Paper No 03-51 at 4 (“Many of the latter contend that copyright, or droit d’auteur, obsoletely relies
on the Romantic figure – or perhaps fiction – of the genius “auteur.” But we know today, indeed we probably have
always known, that this character is neither so virtuosic, nor so individual, as the “Romantic” vision suggests.”).
6
Frank Schechter, “The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection” (1927) 40 Harv L Rev 813 at 818 (“The fact that
through his trademark the manufacturer or importer may “reach over the shoulder of the retailer” and across the
latter‟s counter straight to the consumer cannot be overemphasized, for therein lies the key to any effective scheme
of trademark protection.”) [Schechter].
7
Barton Beebe, “Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law” (2004) 103 Mich L Rev 2020 at 2025 (“The result is
that trademark apologists – and plaintiffs – tend to adduce the sovereign when they speak of the basis of protection
and the fool when they speak of the scope. Trademark restrictionists – and defendants – do the reverse. They adduce
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consumer versus the active co-creator of value;8 and, the illiterate consumer versus the fluent
consumer.9 Although the courts may find fictitious characters helpful in explaining and deciding
complex issues, it is important to develop such characters in a consistent manner or risk
undermining the credibility of the social construct.
I propose to look at the last aspect of trademark‟s fictitious character: what I call the
illiterate consumer versus the fluent consumer (i.e., someone who does not understand the
language used in the trademark being assessed versus someone who does). There is a gap in the
literature when it comes to the linguistic knowledge of the trademark consumer. Most articles
discussing the mind of the consumer make no mention of linguistic capability, as they focus on
how a consumer perceives a mark,10 differentiates one mark from another mark,11 or participates
in the development of a mark.12 The literature coupling linguistics and trademarks do not discuss
foreign languages, as they centre on how trademarks communicate meaning, 13 express ideas,14

the fool when they speak of the basis, and the sovereign when they speak of the scope. Both camps thus suffer from,
at the same time that they seek to exploit, what amounts to a dialectic in trademark theory, in which information and
persuasion each contain within themselves the countervailing force of the other.”) [Beebe].
8
Alex Kozinski, “Trademarks Unplugged” (1993) 68 NYUL Rev 960 at 960 (“The originator must understand that
the mark or symbol or image is no longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it also belongs to all those other
minds who have received and integrated it.”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, “We Are Symbols and Inhibit Symbols, So Should
We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity” (1996) 20 Colum J L & Arts 123 at
129 (“At the least, the purveyor and the audience should be considered co-creators of the value. If rights are
determined by the existence of value, then purveyors and audience should be treated as joint authors or coinventors.”); Jessica Litman, “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age” (1999) 108 Yale
LJ 1717 at 1730 (“If that‟s so, however, Warner Brothers, Anheuser-Busch, R.J. Reynolds, and L‟Oréal can hardly
take all the credit. They built up all the mystique with their customers‟ money and active collaboration.”).
9
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd v Living Realty Inc (1999), [2000] 2 FCR 501, 1999 CanlII 9394 (FCTD) at paras 5354 (“Counsel for Cheung Kong was able to refer me to no decision holding that, in determining the question of
confusion reasonably likely to be caused by a mark comprising foreign words or characters, the Registrar must
consider the question from the perspective of an average consumer who understands the language in which the mark
is expressed. Indeed, what authorities there are would seem to point in the opposite direction.”) [Cheung Kong].
10
Lionel Bently, “From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as
Property” (2007) University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No 07-31 in Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis,
eds, Trademarks Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2008) 3.
11
Beebe, supra note 7 at 2025.
12
Deborah Gerhardt, “Consumer Investment in Trademarks” (2010) 88:3 NCL Rev 427 [Gerhardt].
13
Graeme Dinwoodie, “What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law” in Lionel Bently et al, eds, Trade Marks and
Brands: An Interdisciplinary Critique (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
14
Laura Heymann, “The Grammar of Trademarks” (2011) William & Mary Law School Research Paper No 09-67
in 14:4 Lewis & Clark L Rev.
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identify source or provide information. 15 I propose to fill the gap regarding the linguistic
knowledge of the trademark consumer in order to develop a workable model for assessing and
comparing registered trademarks in a foreign language (i.e., any language that is not an official
language of the country assessing the trademark).
Part A of this dissertation tells the story of The Coca-Cola Company‟s trademark
registrations in Canada in order to illustrate the linguistic issues faced by trademark
administrators. A trademark‟s registrability depends on its distinctiveness, which is its ability to
can distinguish its trader‟s goods and services from those of another trader.16 Knowing how well
a trademark will function to distinguish means ascertaining first what has already been registered,
which is no easy task when the databases cannot administer foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized. Part A proposes the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized, so they can be filed/searched appropriately in databases.
Part B of this dissertation tells the story of two competing Chinese bakeries in Canada in
order to illustrate the linguistic struggles of the judiciary. These struggles are nothing new, as
academics have noted that “[l]ong before the introduction of the registration system [by what
was then England in 1875], owners of marks containing terms in foreign languages or scripts
could in certain circumstances prevent their use by trade rivals” and that by 1905 English and

15

Ariel Katz, “Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks” (2010) BYUL Rev 1555
[Katz].
16
This is different from sumptuary laws that distinguish a person‟s class, as the trader selling the goods owns the
trademark on the goods whereas the person buying the goods does not. Having said that, the distinguishing function
of trademarks can add social value not just to goods but also to persons according to Barton Beebe, “Intellectual
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code” (2010) 123:4 Harvard L Rev 809 at 813-814 (“Sumptuary law did not
disappear with industrialization and democratization, as is generally believed. Rather, it has taken on a new – though
still quite eccentric – form: intellectual property law. … We are thus increasingly relying on intellectual property
law not so much to enforce social hierarchy as simply to conserve – or in Pierre Bourdieau‟s terminology, to
„reproduce‟ – our system of consumption-based social distinction and the social structures and norms based upon
it.”).

3

North American case law “has been fruitful of conflicting holdings.”17 What is new in the 21st
Century is the increasing frequency of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as the
added complexity of foreign scripts makes it harder for courts to assess and compare trademarks
that they cannot even read or sound out, much less understand. Part B proposes the solution of
assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, so they can be assessed and
compared appropriately in the case law.
Readers may find it odd for a dissertation to start from the practical to the theoretical (or
from specific to general), but this approach seemed best in order to address factual assumptions
that might later impede an appreciation of the legal issues. This is why the discussion of case law
blatantly ignores cases comparing two foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. First, I
intentionally chose cases comparing “COCA-COLA to 可 口 可 樂” and “SAINT ANNA to 聖
安 娜” in order to illustrate how foreign-language marks that are not Romanized relate to those
that are. Second, I intentionally chose cases containing English-language marks in order to point
out linguistic assumptions or judicial errors because such marks do not blind and paralyze us
with their “foreign-ness”. This dissertation is replete with examples in order to familiarize a nonChinese reader18 with the language from as many angles as possible so that the non-Chinese
reader may be informed enough to assess the solutions being proposed (and to make counterproposals).
Readers may also notice that this dissertation focuses on registered trademarks. First,
there is no discussion of common law rights for unregistered trademarks. This ranges from the
17

Ellen Gredley, “Foreign-language Words as Trade Marks” in Norma Dawson & Alison Firth, eds, Trade marks
retrospective (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 85 at 85-86 [Gredley].
18
This dissertation apologizes in advance to any and all Chinese readers who are sure to criticize the examples by
pointing out that Mandarin can have a fifth tone that is neutral, PinYin is not the only phonetic system that is
Romanized, a generation name is not the same as a middle name technically, etc. Please understand that this
dissertation generalizes the examples in order to minimize the time spent on factual issues (Chinese) in order to
maximize the time for legal issues (trademarks).
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tort of passing off and its statutory version in Canada‟s Trademarks Act19 to other torts that cause
economic injury, even without deception or confusion, and their statutory versions in Canada‟s
Competition Act. 20 Second, there is no discussion of the copyright that may or may not be
attached to trademarks. A simple example is the possibility of a copyright claim in respect of
foreign-language marks that are automatically classified as design marks by the Canadian
Trademarks Database.21 A more complex example is claiming copyright for dead and obscure
languages that cannot be trademarked, just as copyright claims were made for constructed and
invented languages such as computer programming22 and Klingon.23
In conclusion, the proposed model for assessing and comparing registered trademarks in
a foreign language should be consistent with the purpose of trademark law:
“The purpose underlying any trademark statute was twofold. One was to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the wellestablished rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark owner.”24

19

Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [Trademarks Act].
Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34.
21
David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at
81 (“Even signatures such as Pablo Picasso‟s or those drawn or painted in Chinese or Japanese calligraphy may
qualify, although most people write, rather than do art, when they sign.”) discussed cases recognizing copyright in
Australian Chinese Newspapers Pty Ltd v Melbourne Chinese Pty Ltd, [2003] FCA 878 (Austl Fed Ct), aff‟d [2004]
FCAFC 201 (Austl Full Fed Ct); Picasso, succession v PRC Inc, [1996] FCJ No 969; Anne Frank TM, [1998] RPC
379 (UKTMO) [Vaver].
22
Oracle America, Inc v Google Inc, 750 F (3d) 1339 (Fed Cir 2014) [Oracle].
23
Paramount Pictures Corporation and CBS Studios Inc v Axanar Productions, Inc, Case No 2:15-cv-09938-RGKE, Document 1, Filed 12/29/15 [Paramount].
24
United States Senate Report No 79-1333 at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 USCCAN 1274, 1277.
20

5

Therefore, the administrative and judicial solutions proposed in the following chapters
are workable only to the extent that they support the paragraph quoted above. Their credibility
depends on how well they serve the dual purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer
from confusion and the trader from unfair competition.25

25

Frank Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks (New York: Columbia 1925) at
20-21 [Schechter on The Historical Foundations].
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1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM
It was 1975. The Internet did not exist. E-commerce was unheard of. The World Trade
Organization had not been established. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights was inconceivable. It would be another four years before the restoration of
Chinese-American foreign relations, when The Coca-Cola Company would became the first
international business to re-enter China as a result.26
Yet, 1975 was when The Coca-Cola Company started trademarking the Chinese
translations of its products. That was the year it filed Canadian applications for four trademarks
in Chinese, all of which were registered shortly thereafter. Alas! Although the business world
was ready to embrace the economic benefits of recognizing foreign languages, the administrative
and judicial systems were slower to identify and resolve the challenges related to doing so.
This chapter compares the trademark registrations in Canada for COCA-COLA and its
Chinese equivalent in order to illustrate the administrative challenge of classifying foreignlanguage marks (e.g., trademarks not in Canada‟s official languages of English or French) that
are not Romanized.

1.1

The Problem of Classifying Foreign-Language Marks that are not Romanized
The Canadian Trademarks Database classifies trademarks as either word marks or design

marks. Only trademarks consisting of letters, numerals, French accents and common punctuation

26

“Celebrating 35 Years of Coca-Cola in China”, The Coca-Cola Company (24 Nov 2014), online:
<http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/celebrating-35-years-of-coca-cola-in-china>. Although The Coca-Cola
Company signed its historic agreement with the Chinese government on December 13, 1978, its first shipment to
China was not until January 1979 [“Celebrating 35 Years”].
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marks are classified as word marks.27 All other trademarks are classified automatically as design
marks. This means any foreign-language mark that are not Romanized is deemed to be a design
mark, even if the trademark is actually a word in the foreign language. For example, the English
letters COCA-COLA would be considered a word mark, but the equivalent Chinese characters
可 口 可 樂 would be considered a design mark. This automatic classification of all foreignlanguage marks that are not Romanized as design marks has more than trivial administrative
consequences.
One serious consequence is how the automatic classification handicaps the protection of
the trademark. Word marks are protected even where used in a different font, size, and colour
from their registrations.28 The protection extended to design marks is more limited: they must be
registered as used, and they must be used as registered. This means that “with every variation the
owner of the trade mark is playing with fire. In the words of Maclean P., „the practice of
departing from the precise form of a trademark as registered is objectionable, and is very
dangerous to the registrant‟.” 29 Similarly, a competitor may use a design mark differently from
the one registered and so not infringe the trader‟s rights – or at least have a better argument that
he is not infringing those rights than in the comparable case of the use of a word mark.

27

Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Trademarks Examination Manual (Ottawa: Innovation, Science and
Economic Development Canada, 20 October 2016) at 2 of 5, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr03634.html#ii.3>. Section II.5.3 states, “A trademark is considered to be a word mark that is
not in special form if it consists of:
a. A word or words in upper case letter.
b. A word of words including lower case letters.
c. A word or words including numerals.
d. A word or words including French accents.
e. A word or words including any of the punctuation marks found on standard English or French keyboards.”
28
Bill C-31, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and
other measures (Economic Action Plan 2014, No. 1), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, cl 339 (assented to June 19, 2014)
(Sections 30 to 33 of the Act are replaced by the following: Standard characters – “31. An applicant who seeks
to register a trademark that consists only of letters, numerals, punctuation marks, diacritics or typographical symbols,
or any combination of them, without limiting the trademark to any particular font, size or colour shall …”) [Bill C31].
29
Promafil Canada Ltée v Munsingwear Inc (1992), 44 CPR (3d) 59 at 70, [1992] FCJ No 611 (QL) (FCA).
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The difference in protection afforded to word marks versus design marks is a handicap to
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, as many of them can be written in a variety of
ways. For example, the chart below shows how Chinese can be written in different directions,
different scripts, or different fonts. This leads to a discrepancy where the English letters COCACOLA need to be registered only once with minimal cost to receive full protection, but the
equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂 need to be registered multiple times with increased
costs to receive the equivalent protection. Failure to do so could lead to unfavourable findings of
lack of use in expungement proceedings30 or lack of confusion in infringement proceedings.31

1. Chinese was traditionally written in a vertical manner,
and read from right to left. The English equivalent is:
C
O
C
A
C
O
L
A

2. Chinese can still be read from right to left, even after it
became acceptable to write it in a horizontal manner.
The English equivalent is:
ALOC-ACOC

30

Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 45(3) (Effect of non-use – “Where, by reason of the evidence furnished to the
Registrar or the failure to furnish any evidence, it appears to the Registrar that a trade-mark, either with respect to all
of the goods or services specified in the registration or with respect to any of those goods or services, was not used
in Canada at any time during the three year period immediately preceding the date of the notice and that the absence
of use has not been due to special circumstances that excuse the absence of use, the registration of the trade-mark is
liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.”).
31
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20(1) (Infringement – “The right of the owner of a registered trademark to its
exclusive use is deemed to be infringed by any person who is not entitled to its use under this Act and who (a) sells,
distributes or advertises any goods or services in association with a confusing trademark or trade-name; (b)
manufactures, causes to be manufactured, posses, imports, exports or attempts to export any goods in association
with a confusing trademark or trade-name, …”).
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3. Chinese can now be read from left to right, in addition
to it being acceptable to write it in a horizontal manner.
The English equivalent is:
COCA-COLA
4. Chinese can also be written using traditional script or 可 口 可 樂
simplified script. The result is that many (but not all) (Traditional Script, as shown in
Chinese characters can now be written in two ways. the three pictures above)
While not equivalent, an English example is:
coca-cola
English can be written in capital letters or non-capital 可 口 可 乐
letters. The result is that many (but not all) English (Simplified Script, as shown in
letters can be written in two ways. A consumer with no the picture below)
understanding of English would not know that A=a or
that L=l.
5. Chinese can also be written using different fonts, in the
same way that English is written using different fonts.
This is a culture that writes auspicious Chinese
characters such as “Blessing” or “Longevity” in 100
different ways as a calligraphy exercise, and then
presents it as a gift to an esteemed recipient.

Another serious consequence is how the automatic classification impedes the
filing/searching of foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. A trademarks database
provides the public with information as to “what sign is protected and in which commercial
spheres it is to be protected” in order to reduce disputes and increase certainty for traders.32
However, this requires that the filing/searching functions of the database enable traders to
communicate the scope of their claims to the world, as “economic operators must, with clarity
and precision, be able to find out about registrations or applications for registration made by their

32

Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at
765 [Bently & Sherman].
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current or potential competitors and thus to receive relevant information about the rights of third
parties.”33
The Canadian database currently impedes the filing/searching foreign-language marks
that are not Romanized. For example, a search for the English letters COCA-COLA produces the
actual trademark along with other similarities. This enables The Coca-Cola Company to monitor
for applications that may infringe its trademark. It also enables other trademark applicants to find
out whether or not the English letters COCA-COLA are already claimed, by whom, since when,
in association with what goods and services, etc., in order to assess whether what they plan to do
may be legally objectionable and, if so, what alternative trademarks can be claimed instead.
Contrast the scenario above with a search for the equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂. The
Coca-Cola Company cannot monitor for applications without expertise or expense, as only an
experienced searcher would know how to find trademarks that cannot be filed alphabetically.
Other trademark applicants trying to find out whether or not the equivalent Chinese characters 可
口 可 樂 are already claimed will find themselves searching for a needle in a haystack, unless
they have the good fortune of narrowing the search by already knowing who might be the
registrant or what might be the goods and services claimed. This is because all Chinese-language
marks in the Canadian database are indexed under the unhelpful descriptive reference of
“CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN”.
The problem of classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized also impacts
the discussion in Part B, as the test for confusion depends on the similarity between a registered
trademark and a second trademark (instead of whether or not the second trader intended to create

33

Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent-Und Markenamt, [2003] RCP 38 in NG-LOY Wee Loon, “The IP Chapter in the
US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement” (2004) 16 Sing Ac LJ 42 at 50.
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confusion between the two). 34 Notwithstanding that the absence of intent is inconclusive, it
increasingly appears that the presence of intent is persuasive.35 This is all the more reason why
the second trader must exercise due diligence to avoid confusion with other trademarks by
searching the trademarks database. The chapter below explains why this problem is best
addressed with the solution of transcribing foreign-language marks that are not Romanized.

1.2

The Problem is Widespread in Canada
Although this chapter compares the trademark registrations for COCA-COLA and its

Chinese equivalent, it is important to remember that this is only one example to illustrate the
administrative challenge of classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. The
chart below illustrates how the problem is widespread in Canada, as Chinese is only one of many
non-Romanized languages.
Non-Romanized Languages

Number of Trademark Filings
in the Canadian Trademarks Database

Arabic36

549

Chinese37

6,449

34

Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd v Apotex Inc, [1992] 3 SCR 120, 1992 CanLII 33 (“… attention should be drawn to the
fact that the passing off rule is founded upon the tort of deceit, and while the original requirement of an intent to
deceive died out in the mid-1800‟s, there remains the requirement, at the very least, that confusion in the minds of
the public be a likely consequence by reason of the sale, or proffering for sale, by the defendant of a product not that
of the plaintiff‟s making, under the guise or implication that it was the plaintiff‟s product or the equivalent.”). And
see Mattel Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc, 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 SCR 772 at para 90 (“Mens rea is of little relevance
to the issue of confusion.”) [Mattel].
35
Mattel, supra note 34 at para 90 (“If, as the appellant says, the respondent‟s activities have trespassed on the
marketing territory fenced off by its BARBIE trade-marks, it would be no defence for the respondent that it did not
intend to trespass. Equally, however, if the respondent‟s activities did not in fact trespass, evidence that it may have
wished to do so does not constitute confusion: Fox, at p. 403. Historically, courts have been slow to conclude that a
demonstrated piratical intent has failed to achieve its purpose …”). And see United Airlines, Inc v Cooperstock,
2017 FC 616 at para 68 (“While intent is not determinative in that its absence is not a defence to trademark
infringement, its presence can be a relevant factor …”).
36
“Search Criteria „Arabic‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.

12

Greek38

230

Hebrew39

107

Inuktitut40
(as an example of an Aboriginal language)

26

Japanese41

1,204

Korean42

344

Russian43

126

Sanskrit44

114

Historically, Canada may not have felt the need to identify and resolve challenges arising
from foreign-language marks since its economy was driven by auto and manufacturing with
exports to the United States, its largest trading partner. Increasingly, however, Canada‟s
economy is driven by energy and resources with exports to China and other non-American
economies. Furthermore, Canada is doubling its visa offices in China in order to boost its
economy by increasing Chinese tourists, students, and immigrants.45 With China as the world‟s
largest spender in international tourism and the fastest-growing source of international students,
37

“Search Criteria „Chinese‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
38
“Search Criteria „Greek‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
39
“Search Criteria „Hebrew‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
40
“Search Criteria „Inuktitut‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
41
“Search Criteria „Japanese‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
42
“Search Criteria „Korean‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
43
“Search Criteria „Russian‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
44
“Search Criteria „Sanskrit‟ in Foreign Character Translation”, Canadian Trademarks Database (last modified 22
June 2017), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opic-cipo/trdmrks/srch/home?lang=eng>.
45
Susana Mas, “Canada seeks to double visa offices in China to attract more high-skilled workers”, CBC News (10
August 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-visa-offices-foreign-workers-1.3714991>.
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Canada is looking to attract a larger share of the $102 billion that 83 million Chinese tourists
spent in 2012 and to double the $8 billion that international students spent in 2010 by 2022.46
And just as China was convinced in 1978 that it needed to offer COCA-COLA if it wanted to
attract Western tourists,47 the West realizes now that it needs Chinese brands to attract Chinese
consumers. Although brand extension 48 or cross-branding 49 in order to access new untapped
markets is nothing new, what is new in the 21st Century is for Western businesses to try the same
with Chinese brands:50


In 1998, Torstar Corporation acquired an interest in Sing Tao. Canada‟s largest
daily newspaper targeted the advertising dollars to be made from the Chinese
readers.



In 2008, The Coca-Cola Company bid unsuccessfully to buy HuiYuan for $2.4
billion American. The world‟s most valuable brand coveted China‟s leading pure
juice brand.



In 2008, Hermès created Shang Xia. The French luxury brand hoped to pursue the
fastest-growing group of billionaires and millionaires in the world.



In 2009, Loblaws bought T&T Supermarket for $225 million Canadian. Canada‟s
largest grocery chain looked to expand into the country‟s fastest-growing market.

46

Canada, Minister of International Trade, International Education: A Key Driver of Canada’s Future Prosperity
(Ottawa:
Foreign
Affairs,
Trade
and
Development
Canada,
2012)
at
4,
online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/education/report-rapport/strategy-strategie/index.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>.
47
“Celebrating 35 Years”, supra note 26. The historic agreement signed with the Chinese government on December
13, 1978 permitted The Coca-Cola Company to sell its products only to tourists in international hotels and foreign
stores, but not to the local Chinese.
48
Brand extension is using the same trademark with new goods or services: The Coca-Cola Company decided to
add health drinks to its carbonated sodas, Ikea expanded from selling home decorations to making prefabricated
houses, and Oprah went from hosting a television talk show to publishing a lifestyle magazine.
49
Cross-branding is combining two trademarks: Dell uses INTEL chips in its computers, McDonald‟s includes
DISNEY toys with its meals, and KFC sells PEPSI drinks in its combos.
50
It is possible that there was brand extension and cross-branding in Asia before the 21st Century, and that the trend
is spreading to the West only now. After all, cosmopolitan cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong have long had
Chinese speakers mingling alongside English speakers.
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In 2010, AT&T collaborated on film projects with Wong Fu Productions. The
American telecommunications giant aimed for the film company‟s then 2 million
YouTube subscribers.



In 2011, the New York Knicks acquired Jeremy Lin. The move later led to soldout game tickets, increased merchandise sales, and higher stock prices due to the
“Linsanity” effect. Since then, Jeremy Lin has gone on to file trademark
applications for JLIN, JEREMY LIN, and LINSANITY in English and their
Chinese equivalents.



In 2012, Heineken bought the Tiger beer brand for €4.7 billion. The Dutch
brewing company paid top dollar for the Singaporean local beer because it
believed there would be high returns on a premium Chinese market expected to
grow by 12% annually through 2020.



In 2013, L‟Oréal bought Magic Holdings for $6.54 billion Hong Kong. The
world‟s largest cosmetic company also paid handsomely for the Chinese beauty
brand with double-digit annual growth.



In 2014, Canada Post partnered with China Post. The Canadian government learnt
from the Royal Canadian Mint‟s success in marketing coins and stamps with
auspicious Chinese words and zodiacs.



In 2015, Dentons merged with Dacheng. The merger established the world‟s
largest law firm, with more than 6,500 lawyers in more than 50 countries.
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1.3

The Problem is Widespread Internationally
Although this chapter compares trademark registrations in Canada, it is important to

remember that this is only one example to illustrate the administrative challenge of classifying
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. The problem is just as widespread
internationally, as illustrated by both Western and Asian countries with official languages that
are only Romanized (the United States), both Romanized and not Romanized (the European
Union and Singapore), and only not Romanized (China).
The United States has only one official language: English. Similar to Canada, it also
restricts word marks to the standard characters of letters, numerals, punctuation or diacritical
marks.

51

And just like Canada, the American database also requires translation and

transliteration52 for foreign-language marks that are not Romanized, but neither specifies that the
transliteration be based on international standards for consistency nor uses the transliteration as
index headings for filing/searching.53

51

Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 CFR §2.52 ((a) Standard character (typed) drawing –“Applicants
who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof without claim to any particular font style,
size, or color must submit a standard character drawing that shows the mark in black on a white background. An
applicant may submit a standard character drawing if:
(1) The applicant includes a statement that the mark is in standard characters and no claim is made to any particular
font style, size, or color;
(2) The mark does not include a design element;
(3) All letters and words in the mark are depicted in Latin characters;
(4) All numbers in the mark are depicted in Roman or Arabic numerals; and
(5) The marks includes only common punctuation or diacritical marks.”).
52
The Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed, sub verbo “Translation: The process of translating words or text from one
language into another.” Transliteration is a specific type of translation, in that a transliteration is a phonetic
translation based on sounds (instead of based on meaning). This dissertation will use the general term “translation”
unless referring specifically to transliterations.
53
Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 CFR §2.32 (Requirements for a complete trademark or service
mark application – (a) The application must be in English and include the following: …
(8) If the mark is not in standard characters, a description of the mark;
(9) If the mark includes non-English wording, an English translation of that wording; and
(10) If the mark includes non-Latin characters, a transliteration of those characters; and either a translation of the
transliterated term in English, or a statement that the transliterated term has no meaning in English.”).
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The European Union currently represents 28 member countries 54 and has 24 official
languages.55 There are fewer languages because some member countries share the same official
languages. Similar to Canada and the United States, the European Union also restricts word
marks to trademarks consisting of letters, numerals, keyboard signs and punctuation marks in
any official European Union language. 56 And just like Canada and the United States, the
European database also differentiates between words and designs in their protection.57 However,
its ability to classify word marks in its official languages of Bulgarian and Greek (which are not
Romanized) has not stopped it from classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized
as design marks. This inequality has a simple explanation: the European Union can classify
trademarks in non-Romanized languages properly as word marks only if the non-Romanized
language is an official language, as only then would it already have examiners who can read and
write the language.

54

“Member countries of the EU”, European Union (7 June 2016), online:
<https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en>. The 28 member countries are Austria 1995, Belgium
1958, Bulgaria 2007, Croatia 2013, Cyprus 2004, Czech Republic 2004, Denmark 1973, Estonia 2004, Finland 1995,
France 1958, Germany 1958, Greece 1981, Hungary 2004, Ireland 1973, Italy 1958, Latvia 2004, Lithuania 2004,
Luxembourg 1958, Malta 2004, Netherlands 1958, Poland 2004, Portugal 1986, Romania 2007, Slovakia 2004,
Slovenia 2004, Spain 1986, Sweden 1995, and the United Kingdom 1973.
55
“Official
EU
Languages”,
European
Commission
(7
June
2016),
online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/officiallanguages/index_en.htm>. The 24 official languages are
Bulgarian 2007, Croatian 2013, Czech 2004, Danish 1973, Dutch 1958, English 1973, Estonian 2004, Finnish 1995,
French 1958, German 1958, Greek 1981, Hungarian 2004, Irish 2007, Italian 1958, Latvian 2004, Lithuanian 2004,
Maltese 2004, Polish 2004, Portuguese 1986, Romanian 2007, Slovak 2004, Slovenian 2004, Spanish 1986, and
Swedish 1995.
56
Decision No EX-13-5 of the President of the Office of 4 December 2013 adopting the Guidelines for Examination
in the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) on Community Trade Marks and
on Registered Community Designs at para 9.1 (“A word mark is a typewritten mark with elements including letters
(either lowercase or uppercase), words (either in lowercase or uppercase letters), numerals, keyboard signs or
punctuation marks written across a single line. The Office accepts the alphabet from any official EU language as a
word mark.”).
57
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94
on the Community trade mark, Article 1, Rule 3(1) (“If the applicant does not wish to claim any special graphic
feature or colour, the mark shall be reproduced in normal script, as for example, by typing the letters, numerals and
signs in the application. The use of small letters and capital letters shall be permitted and shall be followed
accordingly in publications of the mark and in the registration by the Office.”).
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Singapore is similar to the European Union in that it has 4 official languages: Chinese,
English, Malay and Tamil. The reason why Singapore can classify trademarks in Chinese and
Tamil properly is the same as why the European Union can classify trademarks in Bulgarian and
Greek as word marks: they already have examiners who understand those official languages, and
their trademark databases are designed to accept those linguistic inputs. However, the
Singaporean database will not accept inputs in Bulgarian or Greek any more than the European
database will accept inputs in Chinese or Tamil.
China is similar to the United States in that it has only one official language: Chinese.
However, its special characteristic as a country with an official language that is not Romanized
has not resulted in it classifying foreign-language marks that are Romanized as design marks. So
why is it that China can classify English-language marks properly while the Western databases
above cannot reciprocate by classifying Chinese-language marks in the same manner? This
inequality has a simple explanation: a Chinese speaker who does not understand English only
needs to learn the 26 letters of the alphabet in order to file/search for such marks. However, it is
not as easy for Westerners who do not understand Chinese. The Chinese language breaks each
Chinese character down into components made up of radicals and strokes. For example, a search
for C-O-C-A C-O-L-A requires learning a simple alphabet system, but a search for a Chinese
character requires learning a complicated radical and stroke system. The pictures 58 below
illustrate the strokes for the second character (which only has one component, as the character
itself is a radical) in 可 口 可 樂:

58

Michael Hurwitz, “Top 9 Funniest Chinese Homophones”, YoYo Chinese Taught in Plain English (4 May, 2015),
online: <http://www.yoyochinese.com/blog/Top-9-Funniest-Chinese-Homophones-0>.
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Suffice it to say, China‟s ability to classify foreign-language marks that are Romanized
does not help it with respect to foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. This means that
China has the same administrative challenges as the Singaporean database has with Bulgarian or
Greek, and as the European database has with Tamil.
It is clear from this chapter that the trademark registrations in Canada for COCA-COLA
and its Chinese equivalent illustrate an administrative challenge of classifying foreign-language
marks that affect all countries with respect to all non-Romanized languages.

19

2 ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION
This chapter explains why the problem of classifying foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks. Although the solution
is illustrated through the specific example of trademark registrations in Canada for COCACOLA and its Chinese equivalent, the general principle can be applied in other countries and to
other non-Romanized languages.

2.1

The Solution of Transcribing Foreign-Language Marks that are not Romanized
The Canadian Trademarks Database can easily classify foreign-language marks as word

marks where appropriate. All it has to do is transcribe foreign-language marks that are not
Romanized, and use what is transcribed to file/search for them in the same manner as Englishlanguage marks. Transcribing foreign-language marks that are not Romanized can be done by
using the official phonetic system provided by the International Organization for
Standardization.59 For example, the official phonetic system adopted in 1982 for transcribing
Chinese would Romanize 可 口 可 樂 as KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4. Even though an English speaker
still cannot understand or pronounce the word mark, at least the person can now read and write
the letters and numerals in order to file/search for the word mark.
The section below will replicate three selected portions of the trademark registrations in
order to illustrate how this is all that the public needs in order to find out whether or not a
trademark is claimed already, by whom, since when, in association with what goods and services,
59

“Standards Catalogue, 01.140.10: Writing and Transliteration”, International Organization for Standardization
(undated), online:
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_ics_browse.htm?ICS1=1&ICS2=140&ICS3=10>.
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etc., in order to assess whether what they plan to do may be legally objectionable and, if so, what
alternative trademarks can be claimed instead.

2.2

The Solution as Illustrated by the Foreign-Language Marks for COCA-COLA
The first thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of

resemblance in appearance. The chart below shows how the trademark application in 1932 for
COCA-COLA already had the standard font, whereas the trademark application in 1975 for its
Chinese equivalent still failed to exemplify any such requirement. While this does not matter
when comparing COCA-COLA to its Chinese equivalent, it makes an important difference when
comparing two Chinese-language marks. Someone who does not understand Chinese can still
compare two Chinese-language marks for appearance in the same way he would have compared
two drawings of Disney‟s signature, but only if the comparisons were based on the same script
and font.
It is understandable that lawyers with little exposure to foreign languages might be
unaware that cellphones and computers can provide a standard font for the foreign characters.
The technology to do so already exists even with cellphones and computers that only have
English-language keyboards with QWERTY layouts. It is also reasonable for traders with little
understanding of the law to fail to realize the negative ramifications of registering a hand
scribble on a paper scrap. The Canadian database, however, can resolve this solicitor-client
miscommunication by requiring that foreign-language marks that are not Romanized be provided
in a standard font.
In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company is becoming savvier, as its two latest trademark
applications in 2013 for additional Chinese-language marks have evolved from hand scribbles to
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standard fonts. The Canadian database, however, continues to classify them automatically as
design marks.
TRADE MARK (Word):

COCA-COLA

TRADE MARK (Design):

The above is replicated and amended below in
order to match the standard font used for
English-language marks, such COCA-COLA
on the left. This amendment will make it easier
to compare for any resemblance in appearance.
TRADE MARK (Word):

可口可乐

The second thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of
resemblance in sound. The chart below shows how the trademark application for COCA-COLA
already had index headings to “identify all word components of the trademark”, 60 which enabled
English-language marks to be filed/searched for alphabetically; whereas, the trademark
application for its Chinese equivalent only had the descriptive reference of “CHINESE
CHARACTER DESIGN”, which was how Chinese-language marks were filed and why
searching for them were difficult.
Kaley Cuoco is an American actress who is popular with Asian fans. She had the Chinese
word for “faith” tattooed on her lower back. Imagine that she also decides to adopt a Chinese
name and to register it as a trademark for merchandise licensing. If she were to follow the
Chinese tradition of having the surname precede the given name, she would look for the Chinese

60

Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Searchable Fields – Index Headings” (Ottawa: Innovation, Science and
Economic Development Canada, 16 December 2015), online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr03106.html#ind>.

22

equivalent of CUOCO KALEY. One possibility is 口 口 可 樂, which sounds similar to the
English given its pronunciation of KOU3 KOU3 KE3 LE4. But how can this actress and her
lawyer exercise due diligence to avoid confusion with other trademarks when all Chineselanguage marks are given the unhelpful descriptive reference of “CHINESE CHARACTER
DESIGN”? It would be better if Chinese-language marks were indexed based on the official
phonetic system. Then a search for KOU3 KOU3 KE3 LE4 would bring up the similar-sounding
KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4, which would alert this actress to the existence of the Chinese-language
marks for COCA-COLA.
The reason for the numerals is that the Chinese language is spoken usually with four
standard tones: flat –, rising /, dipping \/, and falling \ (and there could be additional tones for
some dialects). Since the Canadian database is not set up to depict this, the four standard tones
can also be transcribed into numerals: 1, 2, 3, and 4. While non-Chinese speakers cannot
differentiate the tones, just as non-English speakers cannot hear the nuances between the names
JON, JONE/JOAN, or JOANNE, the multiple tones are significant because they result in giving
one sound multiple meanings. For example, KOU1 means “to dig”, KOU2 does not refer to any
character and has no meaning, KOU3 refers to the second character in 可 口 可 樂 and means
“mouth”, and KOU4 means “to knock”. It is recommended to transcribe both the sounds and the
tones in order to provide as much information as possible in order to compare trademarks for
their resemblance in sound. And it is recommended to require audio files for all foreign-language
marks in order to make the database as useful as possible. On the other hand, Canada might
decide that there is no need for too many details at the administrative level, as there will always
be an opportunity for opposing counsel and linguistic experts to provide detailed evidence if and
when there are opposition, expungement, or infringement proceedings.
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In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company‟s two latest trademark applications in 2013 have
evolved to the more helpful descriptive references of “PULPY ORANGE in Chinese” and
“MINUTE MAID in Chinese”. The good news is that the applications provided the transcribed
sounds, but the bad news is that the Canadian database still filed them under their translations
instead. Although it is understandable for the Canadian database to rely on the English
translations because they are more meaningful to an English speaker, such reliance is unwise
given that the English translations can be arbitrary and manipulated in order to avoid detection of
confusion. It would be more helpful to file/search for Chinese-language marks based on their
unique and immutable sounds instead of their multiple and variable translations. This is because
using the official phonetic system will result in consistent searches to catch confusing trademarks.
However, it is important to remember that the transcribed sounds are only being used as index
headings and that they are not being registered. Therefore, a trademark registration for 可 口 可
樂 is not the same thing as a trademark registration for KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4, even if a
trademark application for the former includes the latter for informational purposes.
TRADE MARK (Word):

TRADE MARK (Design):

INDEX HEADINGS:
COCA-COLA

MARK DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCE:
CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN

COCA-COLA

The above is replicated and amended below in
order to match the alphabetization used for
English-language marks, such as COCACOLA on the left. This amendment will make
it easier to compare for any resemblance in
sound.
INDEX HEADINGS:
KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4
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The third thing someone will notice when comparing trademarks is their degree of
resemblance in the ideas suggested by them. The chart below shows how the meaning of COCACOLA is understood inherently, whereas its Chinese equivalent needs to be translated. The
problem is that translations can vary, which means the resulting comparisons can differ.
If Kaley Cuoco were to translate her Chinese name 口 口 可 樂 literally as “mouth mouth
possible happy”, then it would obviously resemble Coca-Cola‟s literal translation for 可 口 可 樂
as “possible mouth possible happy”. This would be like finding a resemblance between JON and
JOHN as male names. Alternatively, if she were to translate it instead colloquially as “happiness
with every word” in reference to her bubbly personality as a comedian, then it would have less
resemblance to the soda‟s meaning of “delicious happiness”. This would be akin to
differentiating between JONATHAN and JACK, which a non-English speaker would not know
culturally refers to JON and JOHN respectively. Finally, she could argue there is no resemblance
in the meanings whatsoever by pointing out that her Chinese-language mark translates as
CUOCO KALEY while the other is the standard translation for COCA-COLA. The same
argument can be made that there is no resemblance between JON and JOHN, as the former has
the standard meaning of “God has given or a gift from God”, whereas the latter means “God is
gracious” or is slang for “a toilet or a prostitute‟s client”.61
It is recommended to provide both the literal translation of each character and the adopted
translation of the combined characters in order to provide as much information as possible in
order to compare trademarks for their resemblance in the ideas suggested by them. And it is

61

Although this argument seems unlikely in the abstract – but may be more likely depending on the nature of goods
or services with which the marks are associated – the point is that Chinese names can give rise to various literal,
colloquial, or cultural meanings in the same manner as English names can.
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recommended to require the simplified script if the trademark uses traditional script (or vice
versa) in order to make the database as useful as possible. On the other hand, Canada might
decide that there is no need to detail the adopted translation at the administrative level if
translations can be arbitrary and manipulated in order to avoid detection of confusion. 62 This
would be a mistake because the trademark application stage provides a better opportunity to
obtain direct and honest translations than during the opposition, expungement, or infringement
proceedings.
In this regard, The Coca-Cola Company‟s applications for “PULPY ORANGE in
Chinese” and “MINUTE MAID in Chinese” have improved by providing both literal and
adopted translations. These translations are relied upon to decide issues such as distinctiveness63
and confusion64 when assessing trademark registrability. However, such reliance is useless if the
Chinese font and the English translations can be arbitrary and manipulated. Requiring trademark
applicants to provide the literal translation of each character, the adopted translation of the
combined characters, as well as the simplified script if the trademark uses traditional script (or
vice versa) will help when it comes to considering the degree of resemblance between the
trademarks in the ideas suggested by them.

62

Vaver, supra note 21 at 678 (“The courts have meanwhile told the TMO not to waste time initially by examining
applications too closely anyway.”) And see Canadian Parking Equipment Ltd v Canada (Registrar of Trade Marks)
(1990), 34 CPR (3d) 154 at 160-161 (FCTD).
63
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 2 (Interpretation – “distinctive, in relation to a trade-mark, means a trademark that actually distinguishes the goods or services in association with which it is used by its owner from the
goods or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them; … trade-mark means (a) a mark that is used by a
person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish goods or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or
performed by him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by others, …”). Readers who are
unimpressed with this definition of “distinctive” can rest assured that Chapters 5 and 7 will shed more light through
their respective discussions on “Assessing for Distinctiveness” and the “Distinctiveness of Trademarks”.
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Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 6(1) (When mark or name confusing – “(1) For the purposes of this Act, a
trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first mentioned trademark or trade-name would cause confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and
circumstances described in this section.”).
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TRADE MARK (Word):

TRADE MARK (Design):

COCA-COLA
INDEX HEADINGS:
COCA-COLA

MARK DESCRIPTIVE REFERENCE:
CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN

N/A

FOREIGN CHARACTER TRANSLATION:
The translation of the Chinese characters is the
English words Possible Mouth Possible Happy.

The above is replicated and amended below in
order to match the meanings inherently
understood for English-language marks, such
as COCA-COLA on the left. This amendment
will make it easier to compare for any
resemblance in the ideas suggested by them.
FOREIGN CHARACTER TRANSLATION:
The literal translation of the first Chinese
character 可 is “possible”.
The literal translation of the second Chinese
character 口 is “mouth”.
The literal translation of the third Chinese
character 可 is “possible”.
The literal translation of the fourth Chinese
character 乐 is “happy”.
The adopted translation of the combined
Chinese characters is “COCA-COLA”.
The trademark uses simplified script, which can
also be written in traditional script: 可 口 可 樂.

It is clear from this chapter that the Canadian database can be improved in order
to assist in comparing trademarks for the degree of resemblance in their appearance,
sound, or in the ideas suggested by them. This improvement is essential to any database‟s
searchability “by the public and, in particular traders, for the purpose of obtaining
relevant information about the rights of the trade mark registered proprietors, as well as
by the competent authority (the Registrar of trade marks) for the purpose of fulfilling its
27

duty of examining trade mark applications. It is very important that an inspection of the
register, without more, will reveal to the public and to the competent authority
immediately the precise subject-matter of protection afforded by the registered mark to its
proprietor.”65
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NG-LOY Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual Property of Singapore (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2008) at para
[21.1.9] [NG-LOY].

28

3 ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES
This chapter explains several alternatives to the problem of classifying foreign-language
marks that are not Romanized. Each alternative is explored and its challenges are explained in
order to reinforce why the problem is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks.

3.1

Classify as Design Marks Because not in an Official Language
The first alternative is to differentiate between official languages and foreign languages.

This will enable the Canadian database to classify COCA-COLA as a word mark while
classifying its Chinese equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark.
One challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts itself by first
classifying foreign-language marks that are not Romanized as design marks, and then requiring
translations and transliterations for them as if they were word marks with meanings and to be
pronounced. 66 The Canadian database needs to make up its mind whether foreign-language
marks that are not Romanized are inarticulate designs, or whether such marks are meaningful
words to be read and sounded out. Resolving this contradiction is important because the
Canadian database should benefit all members of the public, and not just those with the means to
use it. The current contradiction adversely affects ordinary individuals, small businesses, as well
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Trade-marks Regulations, SOR/96-195, s 29 (“The Registrar may require an applicant for the registration of a
trade-mark to furnish to the Registrar, as applicable (a) a translation into English or French of any words in any
other language contained in the trademark, (b) where the trademark contains matter expressed in characters other
than Latin characters or in numerals other than Arabic or Roman numerals, a transliteration of the matter in Latin
characters and Arabic numerals, and (c) a specimen of the trademark as used.”).
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as more than 170,000 charities and non-profit organizations currently operating in Canada.67 This
voluntary sector is such a major contributor to Canada‟s economic activity that it employs almost
as many full-time workers as Canada‟s entire manufacturing industry and, when measured as a
share of the economically active population, it is the second largest in the world after the
Netherlands.68 These organizations are traders just as much as for-profit businesses. Gone are the
days of $1 bake sales or $20 donation requests. Instead, these organizations fund their activities
nowadays by licensing their trademarks. Unfortunately, many of these organizations cannot
afford the additional costs of protecting their trademarks in a foreign language. Even
organizations that are generously funded have difficulty justifying such legal expenses to their
donors because it means fewer dollars for their core activities. It is more palatable to the donors
if an organization can show that it minimized the costs by conducting free searches for direct hits
to eliminate as many trademark variations as possible before ordering paid searches for
trademarks that are likely available for registration. Donors are more accepting of paid searches
for trademarks that are filed because it is the industry standard to use searches to prove due
diligence in the future event of trademark oppositions. In this regard, resolving this contradiction
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“Pre-Budget Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance – Budget 2015”, The Calgary Chamber of
Voluntary
Organizations
(6
August
2014)
at
1,
online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/412/FINA/WebDoc/WD6615327/412_FINA_PBC2014_Briefs/C
algaryChamberOfVoluntaryOrganizations-e.pdf>. These include organizations that raise funds and awareness for
culture and recreation (media and communications, art and architecture, historical and literary societies, museums,
zoos and aquariums, sports, recreation and social clubs, etc.); education and research (vocational/technical schools,
adult/continuing education, etc.); health (hospitals, nursing homes, mental health treatment, etc.); social services
(income support and emergency relief for the handicapped, children, seniors, etc.); environment (pollution
abatement, natural resources conservation, animal protection, etc.); development and housing (community and
neighbourhood organizations, job training programs, etc.); law, advocacy and politics (civil rights associations,
victim support, consumer protection associations, etc.); philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion
(corporate foundations, lotteries, etc.); international (cultural programs, disaster relief, human rights, etc.); religion
(churches, monasteries, mosques, seminaries, shrines, synagogues, temples, etc.); as well as business and
professional associations such as unions, according to Statistics Canada, “The International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 27 November 2015), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13015-x/2009000/sect13-eng.htm>.
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Michael Hall et al, The Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: Imagine
Canada, 2005) at 7-9.
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matters to charities and non-profit organizations trying to meet the “heavy burden upon [their]
directors to ensure that all assets of the organization are properly identified, protected and
applied in fulfilment of the organization‟s objects, particularly if it is a charity. The assets of an
organization in this regard include the organization‟s intellectual property.”69 Examples include
the registrations of Chinese-language marks in Canada by an American charity responsible for
Chinese orphanages (Half The Sky Foundation) and by the largest Taiwanese humanitarian
organization (Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation). Canada‟s own Yee Hong
Centre for Geriatric Care must protect its marks from those trying to profit unfairly from the
stellar government review it receives annually for its nursing homes, the long list of seniors
waiting for its residences, and the large Dragon Ball fundraiser it hosts annually in Toronto.70
Another challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts the
recent development in the case law that recognizes foreign-language marks as meaningful words
instead of as inarticulate designs. Can a database classify a foreign-language mark as a design
mark when assessing for registrability, only to have a court later treat the foreign-language mark
as word mark when assessing for infringement (to be discussed in Part B)? Since both the
administrative and judicial findings are based on common issues such as distinctiveness and
confusion, how can they treat the same foreign-language mark inconsistently? Surely it would
not do to have an administrative assessment of distinctiveness for a “design mark” contradicted
by a judicial assessment of non-distinctiveness for a “word mark”. This contradiction is even
more serious in common law countries that usually have a first-to-use system for recognizing
trademark rights. First, it will be harder for a registered foreign-language mark to establish
confusion with, and freeze the geographical boundaries and association rights of, an unregistered
69

Terrance Carter & Shen Goh, Branding and Copyright for Charities and Non-Profit Organizations, 2nd ed
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2014) at 5.
70
Yee Hong Centre for Geriatric Care v Grace Christian Chapel, 2006 FC 650, 50 CPR (4th) 165 [Yee Hong].
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foreign-language mark. The registered mark‟s classification as an inarticulate design means that
a competitor may use a different design mark from the one registered and so not infringe the
trader‟s rights – or at least have a better argument that he is not infringing those rights than in the
comparable case of the use of a word mark. Conversely, it will be easier for an unregistered
foreign-language mark to establish similarity to, and claim prior use over, a registered foreignlanguage mark. The registered mark will no longer have the certainty of national protection, as
its risk of being limited by the prior use of the unregistered mark increases when the latter is
recognized as meaningful words.

3.2

Classify as Design Marks Because not in a Romanized Language
The second alternative is to differentiate between foreign languages that are Romanized

versus those that are not. This will enable the Canadian database to classify COCA-COLA in
Romanized languages such as German and Spanish as a word mark while classifying its Chinese
equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark.
The challenge with this alternative is that the Canadian database contradicts international
trade principles. International trade law aims to remove protectionist practices (quotas, tariffs,
subsidies, anti-dumping legislation, administrative barriers, etc.) in order to provide a level
playing-field for both local and foreign goods and services. And this aim is accomplished also
with international trade agreements that detail trademark registrability71 and rights.72 But this aim
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), (1994) 25 IIC 209, art. 15
(Protectable Subject Matter – “1. Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark. Such
signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of
colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as trademarks. Where signs are not
inherently capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may make registrability depend on
distinctiveness acquired through use. Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually
perceptible.”) [TRIPS].

32

is frustrated when the Canadian database permits and promotes differential treatment between
languages that are Romanized versus those that are not, as it affects the registrability and rights
of foreign-language marks.
First, the most-favoured nation principle requires that “[w]ith regard to the protection of
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nations
of all other Members.” 73 This principle prohibits a country from discriminating between its
trading partners by requiring it to extend automatically whatever privilege it grants one trading
party to all other parties without their having to negotiate for the privilege. The scenarios below
seem to violate this principle by classifying intellectual property from China less favourably than
intellectual property from the United States. This not only makes it difficult for international
businesses to manage their trademark portfolio globally, but also makes it difficult for them to
acquire foreign brands. Imagine that The Coca-Cola Company had succeeded in its attempt to
buy China‟s largest juice brand for $2.4 billion in 2008. The differential treatment that COCACOLA‟s Chinese translation had suffered would have been repeated with the Chinese brand
hypothetically acquired, since Chinese-language marks are classified automatically as design
marks while English-language marks are recognized as word marks, with the improved legal
protection that registration as a word mark brings over a design mark registration.
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TRIPS, supra note 71 at art. 16 (Rights Conferred – “1. The owner of a registered trademark shall have the
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner‟s consent from using in the course of trade identical
or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is
registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for
identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not
prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the
basis of use.”).
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TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 4. This principle has similar wording in Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, as well as Article 2 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
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Second, the national treatment principle requires that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the
national of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, …” 74 This principle prohibits a country
from discriminating against its trading partners by requiring it to extend automatically whatever
privilege it grants domestic goods and services to those of its trading partners without their
having to negotiate for the privilege. The scenarios below also seem to violate this principle by
classifying intellectual property from China less favourably than intellectual property in the
Canada. This creates a strange situation where an international business will find the same brand
receiving different protection depending on its language. For example, there is a strange
phenomenon in China where identical COCA-COLA products are sold side-by-side; one in
Chinese and the other in English. The juxtaposition does not cannibalize sales, but actually
creates a higher-paying clientele for “foreign” products in China. Although COCA-COLA
products by their nature are foreign since they are American, they can be made even more
foreign by being in English. The bizarre reason is that consumers are willing to pay a premium
for a “foreign” experience in China, which has resulted in everything from a “rent-a-foreigner”
business for birthday parties and commercial advertisements to a real estate bubble hyped by
promises of being the next international city where one can live next to “foreigners”. 75 This is
fine in China, which classifies trademarks in Chinese and English equally, but the same
phenomenon would be problematic in Canada. Imagine if The Coca-Cola Company were to label
its drinks in different languages in Canada in order to promote its global image of community,
for the same reason that its 1971 television commercial featured a multi-racial group singing “I‟d
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TRIPS, supra note 71, art. 3. This principle has similar wording in Article 3 of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, as well as Article 17 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
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David Borenstein, “Chinese Dreamland”, CBC The Passionate Eye (16 July 2016), online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/episodes/chinese-dreamland>.
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Like To Teach The World To Sing” and its 2014 Super Bowl advertisement had a multi-lingual
rendition of “America The Beautiful”. The Canadian database would classify COCA-COLA in
Romanized languages such as German and Spanish as a word mark while classifying its Chinese
equivalent 可 口 可 樂 as a design mark.
And although Canada is still in the process of becoming a member,76 the United States,
the European Union, Singapore, and China are already members of The Madrid Protocol: an
international trademark system which allows a trademark registered in one member country to
extend that registration to any or all of the other member countries. So imagine a trader‟s
surprise when a trademark classified as a word mark in one member country is re-classified as a
design mark in other member countries. For example, if The Coca-Cola Company were to
register the English letters COCA-COLA in the United States and extend the registration to
Canada, the same trademark is classified as a word mark in all countries. However, if The CocaCola Company were to register the equivalent Chinese characters 可 口 可 樂 in China and
extend that to Canada, the same trademark would be classified as a word mark by the Chinese
database and re-classified as a design mark by the Canadian database. And if The Coca-Cola
Company were to try to avoid this inconsistency by registering first with Canada and extending
the registration to China, the trademark could end up equally limited by being classified as a
design mark in all countries. This is because, even though the Chinese database can classify the
Chinese translation properly as a word mark, it would not do to provide the Chinese registration
with more protection than the Canadian registration upon which it is based.
Some may argue that there are no inconsistencies with international trade principles
because there is no differential treatment among countries, only languages; therefore, all
76

“Members of the Madrid Union”, World Intellectual Property Organization (30 August 2016), online:
<http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/members/>. There are 97 members, covering 113 countries.
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countries are treated equally with respect to those languages. This argument is overly simplistic
in light of the fact that some languages are known to have specific national or ethnic (and,
therefore, geographical) origins,77 and ignores the reality that indirect discrimination can have
the same effect as direct discrimination.78 Some may argue that the believability of a country
suing for language-based discriminatory trade practices is unfathomable when there is neither
authoritative writing nor precedential cases to support this possibility. But who would have
fathomed, much less believed, that Canada would find two Chinese trademarks to be distinctive
in a 1992 decision, only to contradict itself in a 2011 decision by finding the same two Chinese
trademarks to be confusing (to be discussed in Part B)?

3.3

Classify as Word Marks by Transcribing Every Dialect
The third alternative is to transcribe a Chinese-language mark into every dialect, instead

of basing the transcribing only in Mandarin (which is what was done throughout this
dissertation). This will promote equality by advocating cultural respect for and equal recognition
of all classical and natural languages, including minority dialects. Although this alternative is
illustrated through the specific example of Chinese dialects, the general principle can be applied
to other foreign languages such as Punjabi, which is written usually in one script by Muslims and
another script by Sikhs and Hindus.
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Both the highest courts of the United States and of Canada have linked language to prohibited
grounds of discrimination in Lau v Nichols, 414 US 563 (1974) and Forget v AG Quebec, [1988]
2 SCR 90 respectively. And see how language is linked to race, ancestry, place of origin, colour,
ethnic origin in Welen v Gladmer Developments Ltd, 11 CHRR D/348 (Sask 1990); Gajecki v
Surrey School District, 11 CHRR D/326 (BC 1990); Cornejo v Opus Building Corp, 14 CHRR
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The challenge with transcribing the Chinese language into every dialect is that it is
unnecessary and impractical to do so. Unnecessary because none of the Chinese databases in
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan currently distinguish between dialects, so why must
the Canadian database? Impractical because the purpose of transcribing foreign-language marks
that are not Romanized in the first place is to assist in filing/searching for them. Transcribing in
different dialects makes it impossible to find the actual Chinese characters that are the subject
matter of the registration. For example, searching the Canadian database for HO2 HAU2 HO2
LOK6 (based on the Cantonese dialect) will not produce the trademark registration for 可 口 可
樂 that is filed under KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4 (based on Mandarin). Once a search for KE3 KOU3
KE3 LE4 produces the trademark registration for 可 口 可 樂, the interested parties can explain
through evidence to the examiner that this trademark is actually being used in a different dialect,
which results in a different pronunciation and meaning unique to that dialect. The reality is that
something needs to be the standard and Mandarin is an official language in Singapore, as well as
the sole official language of Taiwan and China (to which Hong Kong was repatriated). 79 All this
makes it the most common language in the world, with twice the number of speakers of the
second most common language (Spanish), and almost three times the number of speakers of the
third most common language (English).80 It naturally make sense for the Canadian database to
use Mandarin, as Canadian diplomats are already learning Mandarin on account of its being one
of the six official languages of the United Nations.
79

After Hong Kong was colonized by the United Kingdom in 1842, it had no official language laws and English was
the sole language used in the colonial government. It was not until the 1974 Official Languages Ordinance that the
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“People and Society: WORLD”, Central Intelligence Agency (undated), online:
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The third alternative can also be rephrased from the aspect of transcribing the Chinese
language into every phonetic system, instead of basing the transcribing only in the PinYin
phonetic system (which is what was done throughout this dissertation). So why did the
International Organization for Standardization choose Mandarin and adopt PinYin as the official
phonetic system in 1982 for transcribing Chinese?
The challenge with transcribing the Chinese language into every phonetic system can be
illustrated with just one example. Taiwan uses a phonetic system called ZhuYin, which sounds
out Chinese characters by using another set of 37 linguistic symbols. This phonetic system
deciphers 可 口 可 樂 as “ㄎㄜˇㄎㄡˇㄎ is ㄜˇㄌㄜˋ”. This would be akin to sounding out
English words by using another set of linguistic symbols. For example, the dictionary deciphers
COCA-COLA as “kəʊkəˈkəʊlə”. 81 Suffice it to say, this phonetic system is unhelpful to
someone who is unfamiliar with the language. This is why PinYin is more helpful, as its phonetic
system is Romanized. And although there were other phonetic systems that were Romanized,
PinYin became the most popular one. But why didn‟t the International Organization for
Standardization choose alternative phonetic systems that are even more helpful than PinYin?
Consider the alternative of designing a trademark database that recognizes most
languages in the world by using The Unicode Standard. 82 Unicode is the official system for
implementing the International Organization of Standardization‟s encoding of languages. 83 It
assigns a specific number to every character, which can be used for all languages available in
computer programs, operating systems, modern browsers, etc. This is why Microsoft‟s word
processing software already has capabilities for reading and writing most languages in the world.
81
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Unicode would decipher 可 口 可 樂 as a set of numbers, in the same manner that it deciphers
COCA-COLA as “0043-004F-0043-0041 (the hyphen is 002D) 0043-004F-004C-0041”. 84
Although some might consider this the most comprehensive solution, which nears perfection
when augmented by an audio filing system, this system is too technical for someone who is
unfamiliar with “the language” of computer coding. In fact, this solution complicates matters by
creating a two-step process that requires knowledge of the language used in the trademark and an
understanding of computer coding. This would be as impractical as requiring someone to know
not only the title of a book but also the numbers assigned to it under the Dewey Decimal
Classification understood by librarians.85 The less-than-perfect PinYin phonetic system is still a
better solution because it requires only the first step.

3.4

Classify as Word Marks by Having Fluent Examiners
The fourth alternative is to have a fluent examiner for every foreign language, instead of

an English-speaking examiner who must rely on transcribing for non-Romanized languages. This
will promote equality by advocating cultural respect for and equal recognition of all classical and
natural languages.
One challenge with this alternative is that having fluent examiners does not help the
illiterate lawyers or illiterate traders trying to search the Canadian database.
Another challenge with this alternative is that being fluent in a language is not the same
thing as being qualified to translate the language. Instead of expecting examiners to be fluent or
to act as translators, the burden should remain on trademark applicants to communicate the scope
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“Unicode® character table”, The Unicode Consortium (undated), online:
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of their claims to the world. The reality is that we cannot assume what the translation for a
foreign-language mark is supposed to be. In fact, we cannot even assume that a foreign-language
mark is intended to be translated:
“… there is abundant evidence that American manufacturers are themselves
unaware of the linguistic issues involved. Chevrolet‟s South American fiasco with
an automobile named NOVA (translated: “it will not go”) is a poignant example,
as was Ford‟s problem with its PINTO in Brazil (translated: “tiny male genitals”).
And one can only imagine what English speakers thought when they saw
advertisements for Japan‟s KINKI Nippon Tourist Company, the Cypriot soft
drink called ZIT, the Swedish toilet paper called KRAPP, the Finnish product for
unfreezing car doors called SUPER PISS …”86

The quote above illustrate that translations are independent of foreign-language marks.
For example, COCA-COLA is a combination of two words with meanings. COCA referred to
the leaf extracts which had the botanical term 古 柯 (GU3 KE1), while COLA originally referred
to the bean extracts which had the botanical term 可 拉 (KE3 LA1) and later referred to any
carbonated drink which had the equivalent term 汽 水 (QI4 SHUI3 means “air water”). But
neither lackluster translation was adopted for the trademark. One reason was because The CocaCola Company did not bother in 1927 to translate its trademark when it opened its first bottling
plant in China.87 Another reason was because Chinese locals did not understand English and
were translating the trademark into Chinese based on the sound (instead of the meaning) of
86
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COCA-COLA, which resulted in random Chinese meanings such as “female horse stuffed with
wax” or “bite the wax tadpole”.88 Before such unflattering translations caught on or, even worse,
before a desirable translation was claimed by a Chinese local, The Coca-Cola Company held an
international competition in 1933 and awarded Professor Chiang Yee from the School of
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for the winning translation: 可 口 可 樂
(KE3 KOU3 KE3 LE4).89 The meaning of “possible mouth possible happy” is a branding dream
because the specific combination of Chinese characters suggests that the product is “delicious
happiness” or “happiness in the mouth”. Perhaps it was fortuitous that Chinese locals did not
understand English, or they might have translated COCA-COLA literally, and the world would
now be using the lacklustre translation of “coca – air water” instead of a creative translation. The
catchy rhythm of this translation was an instant success that others would try to copy but never
successfully duplicate. For example, the translation of PEPSI-COLA is 百 事 可 樂 (BAI3 SHI3
KE3 LE4). The meaning “hundred things possible happy” suggests the consumer is “happy with
everything”, but the translation lacks a reference to the taste and has no memorable sound
repetition. The power of a catchy translation cannot be underestimated.
The reality that translations are independent of foreign-language marks becomes even
more obvious when we consider the number of traders who continued to use the same translation
even after changing their trademarks. PEPSI-COLA did not shorten its translation 百 事 可 樂
(BAI3 SHI3 KE3 LE4) when shortening its name to PEPSI. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN
translated only the first word in its name as 肯 德 基 (KEN3 DE2 JI1), and did not change the
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translation when abbreviating its name to KFC. The reverse can also happen: MCDONALD‟S
continued to use the same trademark even after changing its translations from 麥 當 勞 (MAI4
DANG1 LAO2) to 金 供 门 (JIN1 GONG1 MEN2). The former translation was based on the
sound of MCDONALD‟S, whereas the latter translation was based on the meaning of the
“Golden Arches”. This is confusing and leave consumers wondering what translation should
refer to the “Golden Arches” when the latter translation is referring instead to MCDONALD‟S.
Even though translations are independent of foreign-language marks, a translation that
catches on is priceless and likely to fall victim to trademark squatters. For example, VIAGRA
became known in China as 偉 哥 (WEI3 GE1) after the public dubbed it so based on its sound
(since VIAGRA has no meaning). The Chinese meaning of “great brother” is an ego boost. The
fun-and-cheeky translation became widespread and was registered by a pharmaceutical company
in China. Failing to cancel the registration in China, Pfizer had to settle for an alternative
translation which nobody remembers. Canada‟s anticipated removal of use90 as a requirement to
apply for trademark registration will open the door for the same type of trademark squatting to
happen in Canada. This will increase the frequency with which traders need to oppose
applications or cancel registrations for translations of their trademarks in Canada. Canadian
traders looking to protect themselves can thank a recent development in the case law that
recognizes foreign-language marks as meaningful words instead of as inarticulate designs, which
will help them to prove the association between a translation and their trademarks (to be
discussed in Part B). Time will tell whether this solution to trademark squatting will result in a
problem with trademark monopoly: will traders rush to register any and all translations of their
90

Bill C-31, supra note 28 (Sections 30 to 33 of the Act are replaced by the following: Requirements for
applications – “30. (1) A person may file with the Registrar an application for the registration of a trademark in
respect of goods or services if they are using or propose to use, and are entitled to use, the trademark in Canada in
association with those goods or services.”). Clause 339 of Bill C-31 goes on to list the “Contents of application”,
which removes the current requirement for a date of use or an affidavit of use.
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trademarks, resulting in their monopolizing trademarks in both official and foreign languages?
Consider how The Coca-Cola Company has filed over 1,000 trademark applications in China,
some of which are multiple translations based on the sound of the same trademark: 芬 搭 (FEN1
DA2) and 芬 达 (FEN1 DA2) and 发 达 (FA1 DA2) for FANTA.
It is clear from this chapter that there are several alternatives to the problem of classifying
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized. However, the challenges associated with each
alternative means that the problem is best addressed with the solution of transcribing such marks.
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4 JUDICIAL PROBLEM
It was 1992. The Federal Court of Canada had specifically rejected the American doctrine
of foreign equivalents. That meant refusing to affirm that a trader could use a trademark
registration for an English word to exclude others from registering its translations. The four
Chinese-language marks that were registered in Canada by The Coca-Cola Company were up for
renewal.
Yet, 1992 was when The Coca-Cola Company abandoned the Chinese translations of its
products. That was the year it failed to renew all four registrations for its Chinese-language
marks in Canada. Why? Although the business world was ready to embrace the economic
benefits of recognizing foreign languages, the administrative and judicial systems were sending
it the message that trademark registrations were not necessary to do so.
This chapter reviews a set of trademark cases in Canada involving two Chinese bakeries
in order to illustrate the judicial challenge of proving linguistic knowledge for foreign-language
marks.

4.1

The Problem as Illustrated by Two Chinese Bakeries in Canada
There are at least 16 Canadian court cases involving Chinese-language marks to date, 11

of which were decide in the 21st Century. 91 As cases involving Chinese-language marks are

91

Pacific Produce Co Ltd v Metro Trading Co (1986), 15 CPR (3d) 44, 1986 CanLII 1244 (BC SC) (TIENTSIN is
an English-language mark used by the defendant‟s Chinese-language importer); Coin Stars Ltd v KK Court Chili &
Pepper Restaurant Ltd (1990), 33 CPR 3(d) 186, 1990 CanLII 684 (BC SC); Lookin Trading Co Ltd v Honey House
Beddings & Housewares Ltd (1997), 72 CPR (3d) 297, 1997 CanLII 2050 (BC SC); Pagolac Restaurants Ltd v
404305 Alberta Ltd, 1999 ABQB 423; Cheung Kong, supra note 9; Ten Ren Tea Co v Van Cheong Tea Inc, 2003
FC 819; The House of Kwong Sang Hong International Ltd v Gervais, 2004 FC 554; Telus Corp v Orange Personal
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expected to increase in the future in Canada, it is important to develop a workable model now for
assessing the notional consumer in cases of confusion involving foreign-language marks. This
need is illustrated by a protracted trademark dispute between two Chinese bakeries in Canada.
As far back as 1974, Cheung‟s Bakery had a bakery in the City of Vancouver. Although
it used an English-Chinese trademark with the words ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE, it was most
definitely a Chinese bakery where the owner spoke Chinese and sold coconut buns, egg tarts and
moon cakes. It was nothing like the typical local bakery, where consumers expected to speak
English and bought bread, cookies and muffins. Little thought was given to registering foreignlanguage marks in those days, so Cheung‟s Bakery registered only its English-language marks
(see the left side of the chart below) and did not register its Chinese-language mark (see the right
side of the chart below).
Trademarks registered
by Cheung’s Bakery
(“English-language marks”)

Trademark used but not registered
by Cheung’s Bakery
(“Chinese-language mark”)

ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE92
93

Communications Services Ltd, 2005 FC 590; Brilliant Trading Inc v Wong, 2005 FC 1214; Yee Hong, supra note 70;
Café do Brasil SPA v Walong Marketing Inc, 2006 FC 1063; College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners
and Acupuncturists of British Columbia v Council of Natural Medicine College of Canada, 2009 FC 1110; Pioko
International Imports Inc v BOT International Ltd, 2009 CanLII 64819, [2009] CarswellOnt 7247 (QL) (ON SC)
(COTTON GINNY is an English-language mark used by the defendant‟s Chinese-language manufacturer); Target
Event Production Ltd v Paul Cheung and Lions Communications Inc, 2010 FC 27, rev‟d in part 2010 FCA 225; JAG
Flocomponents NA v Archmetal Industries Corporation, 2010 FC 627; Cheah v McDonald’s Corporation, 2013 FC
774 (MACDIMSUM is an English-language mark reproduced by the defendant‟s Chinese-language restaurant);
Saint Honore Cake Shop Limited v Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd, 2013 FC 935, aff‟d 2015 FCA 12 [Saint Honore];
Council of Natural Medicine College of Canada v College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and
Acupuncturists of British Columbia, 2013 FC 287; Source Media Group Corp v Black Press Group Ltd, 2014 FC
2014 (NEW HOME LIVING is an English-language mark reproduced by the defendant‟s Chinese-language
magazine); and Times Group Corporation v Time Development Group Inc, 2016 FC 1075.
92
Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE, Registered, 0598133, TMA354194
93
Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506
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N/A

94

In 1988, Saint Anna Bakery applied to register a competing trademark on the basis of
proposed use. Although it had not used the trademark, it was setting itself up as a competing
bakery in the City of Toronto by incorporating the word ANNA and all four Chinese characters
from the English-Chinese trademark of Cheung‟s Bakery. This competition between a bakery in
Toronto and the bakery in Vancouver may seem hypothetical until we realize how lucrative the
Chinese pastry business can be:95 pastries are consumed daily; specific pastries are required for
important holidays such as Autumn Moon Festival and Chinese New Year; and specialized
pastries are required for formal occasions such as wedding announcements. This is a community
that has payment plans for moon cakes (the way Canada has mortgage plans for houses), and
asks friends and relatives to bring wedding pastries back to Toronto from Vancouver (the way
Canada orders products online from the United States). Saint Anna Bakery applied to register the
Competing Mark (see the left side of the chart below), and Cheung‟s Bakery responded by
finally applying to register the Original Mark (see the right side of the chart below).
Trademark applied for
by Saint Anna Bakery
(“Competing Mark”)

Trademark applied for
by Cheung’s Bakery
(“Original Mark”)

94

Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & DESIGN, Registered, 0598131, TMA354193
This background information does not appear in the cases themselves but would be common knowledge within
the Chinese community.
95

46

97
96

The result was that the two parties ended up opposing each other‟s trademark
applications. The Trademarks Opposition Board decided in both oppositions that the trademarks
were not confusing and, therefore, were both registrable. 98 How could this be when the
Competing Mark incorporated all four Chinese characters from the Original Mark? The answer
lies in the fact that the test for confusion did not consider the linguistic knowledge of the
consumer.
Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion by providing that consideration
must be given to “all the surrounding circumstances including:
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trademarks or trade names and the extent to
which they have become known;
(b) the length of time the trademarks or trade names have been in use;
(c) the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature of the trade; and
(e) the degree of resemblance between the trademarks or trade names in
appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.”99

96

Trademarks: SAINT ANNA BAKERY LTD. & DESIGN, Expunged, 0614373, TMA493100
Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506
98
Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Anna Bakery Ltd (1992), 46 CPR (3d) 261 (TMOB) [Saint Anna TMOB]
and Saint Anna Bakery Ltd v Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd 1996 CanLII 11366 (TMOB).
99
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 6(5). This test applies to both opposition proceedings and trademark
infringements, and the onus remains on whoever is in petitorio. Opposition proceedings require applicants to prove
there is no likelihood of confusion, according to Mattel, supra note 34 at para 6 (“In opposition proceedings,
trademark law will afford protection that transcends the traditional product lines unless the applicant shows the
likelihood that registration of its mark will not create confusion in the marketplace within the meaning of s. 6 of the
Trademarks Act.”). Infringement claims require plaintiffs to prove that there is likelihood of confusion, according to
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 SCR 824 at para 14 (“Whether or not
97
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The Supreme Court of Canada applies the test for confusion as a matter of first
impression and imperfect recollection:
“The test to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual
consumer somewhat in a hurry who sees the [mark], at a time when he or she has
no more than an imperfect recollection of the [previous] trademarks, and does not
pause to give the matter any detailed consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine
closely the similarities and differences between the marks.”100

The Trademarks Opposition Board interpreted the quote above – and applied the test for
confusion accordingly in 1992 – by imagining the illiterate consumer when considering all the
surrounding circumstances. I use the term “illiterate” not to mean that the consumer cannot read
or write in any language, but rather that the consumer does not understand the foreign language
used in the trademark in question. While the term “illiterate” may be a pejorative adjective, it
sums up how consumers feel when their linguistic knowledge is not considered to be relevant:
“In my view, the average Canadian would not, as a matter of first impression and
imperfect recollection, recognize that the [Original Mark] appears in the
[Competing Mark], especially when the Chinese characters in the [Competing
there exists a likelihood of confusion is largely a question of fact. As this is an infringement claim (rather than an
opposition proceeding before the Trademarks Opposition Board), the onus is on the appellant to prove such
likelihood on a balance of probabilities.”) [Veuve Clicquot]. The fact that the test for confusion was identical for
both registration and infringement was confirmed in an expungement case in Masterpiece Inc v Alavida Lifestyles
Inc, 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 SCR 387 at para 33 (“Whether in assessing trademark infringement under s. 19 or
entitlement under s. 16, the test for likelihood of confusion is the same.”) [Masterpiece]. The fact that there is a
pragmatic element for placing the onus on whoever is in petitorio was explained in a copyright case in Harmony
Consulting Ltd v GA Foss Transport Ltd, 2012 FCA 226 at para 32 (“Burden of proof rules allocate the costs and
risks of gathering and presenting evidence, and help filter good cases from the bad. They should not be “impractical
and unduly burdensome” on plaintiffs and should advance the purposes of the law involved. … [See] David Vaver,
“Consent or No Consent: The Burden of Proof in Intellectual Property Infringement Suits”, (2001) 23 IPJ 147 at
148-149.”).
100
Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 40.
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Mark] run together and appear in a stylized form. The average Canadian would
focus on the English language components of the [Competing Mark], but might
guess from the Chinese script that the baked goods sold under the mark were in
some type of Chinese style. I can take judicial notice that there are some
Canadians who would be fluent in Chinese, and who would immediately
recognize the [Original Mark] as a component of the [Competing Mark]. However,
in the absence of any evidence on point, I cannot conclude that the number of
Canadians fluent in Chinese would be significant … ”101 [emphasis added]

The Trademarks Opposition Board decided that there was no confusion, “especially when
the Chinese characters in the [Competing Mark] run together and appear in a stylized form.” This
would not have been an acceptable argument if the trademark in question had been COCACOLA. Since the Original Mark is filed in standard font, just as COCA-COLA was registered in
standard font, it should have been designated as a word mark that bars competitors from using it
in a different font, size, and colour. Instead, its designation as a design mark enabled a
competitor to avoid infringement simply by changing its “stylized form”, which was the very
argument made when assessing COCA-COLA as a design mark.102
However, the Trademarks Opposition Board‟s focus on the Supreme Court of Canada‟s
explanation of how a consumer perceives a trademark (as a matter of first impression and
imperfect recollection) seems to ignore the Federal Court of Canada‟s explanation below as to

101

Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268.
Coca-Cola Company of Canada Limited v Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Limited, [1942] 1 All ER 615 at 618
(“If it be viewed as a design mark, the same result follows. The only resemblance lies in the fact that both contain
the word “Cola”, and neither is written in block letters, but in script with flourishes. The letters and flourishes in fact
differ very considerably, notwithstanding the tendency of words written in script with flourishes to bear a general
resemblance to each other.”) [emphasis added] [Pepsi-Cola].
102
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who the consumer is (the target consumer of the product, instead of the general public), even
though the two explanations do not contradict each other and both are relevant to the test for
confusion:
“To determine whether two trademarks are confusing one with the other it is the
persons who are likely to buy the wares who are to be considered, that is those
persons who normally comprise the market, the ultimate consumer.”103

Perhaps it was a coincidence, but the year that the Trademarks Opposition Board issued
its decision was the same year that The Coca-Cola Company decided to abandon the Chinese
translations of its products. All four Chinese-language marks that had been applied for in 1975
were not renewed in 1992. The business world got the message that trademark registrations were
not necessary in order to embrace the economic benefits of recognizing foreign languages.

4.2

The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge
The Trademarks Opposition Board‟s decision resulted in both trademarks being

registered in 1997-1998. To avoid what it still considered confusion nonetheless, Cheung‟s
Bakery purchased the Competing Mark from Saint Anna Bakery so that there would only be one
source of the Competing and Original Marks.104 Then to avoid having its Original Mark diluted,
Cheung‟s Bakery ignored the Competing Mark it had purchased and continued to use its Original

103

Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd v Canada’s Manitoba Distillery Ltd (1975), 25 CPR (2d) 1 at 5 (FCTD).
Instead of purchasing the Competing Mark, Cheung‟s Bakery could have appealed and brought further evidence
of the widespread use of the Chinese language on the theory that the test for confusion requires “all” circumstances
to be considered. This means that linguistic knowledge or anything else that creates likely confusion is a relevant
circumstance to consider. Perhaps Cheung‟s Bakery did not do so because the Trademarks Opposition Board‟s
decision on November 30, 1992 was rendered after and consistent with the earlier Federal Court of Canada‟s
decision on October 27, 1992 in Krazy Glue, Inc v Grupo Cyanomex, SA de CV (1992), (sub nom B Jadow and Sons,
Inc v Grupo Cyanomex, SA de CV) 45 CPR (3d) 161, [1992] FCJ No 957 (QL) (FCTD) [Krazy Glue].
104
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Mark only. Finally, it seemed that the pastry world was restored to its original position with the
Original Mark in use and the Competing Mark hidden away.
Unfortunately, peace was not to last in the pastry world. Upon realizing that Cheung‟s
Bakery had abandoned the Competing Mark it had purchased, Saint Anna Bakery had the
Competing Mark expunged for lack of use in 2004.105 This did not concern Cheung‟s Bakery.
But it did become concerned when Saint Anna Bakery re-named itself Saint Honore Cake Shop
and, once again, applied to register competing trademarks on the basis of proposed use in 2006.
Why didn‟t the solicitor for Cheung‟s Bakery insert a non-competition clause into the purchase
agreement to prevent the expungement and the re-naming? It is understandable that lawyers with
little exposure to foreign languages might be unaware of the linguistic issues discussed in Part A
and, as a result, might assume erroneously that there is only one translation for the Original
Marks. It is also reasonable for a trader with little understanding of the law to fail to draw such
linguistic facts to the lawyer‟s attention. Why didn‟t Saint Honore also change its Chinese name
when it changed its English name? This persistence in retaining the same Chinese name may
seem strange, especially to a non-Chinese speaker, until we realize that the Chinese name is as
well-known in the Chinese community as TIM HORTONS is in Canada or STARBUCKS is in
the United States. Saint Honore applied to register the SAINT HONORE marks (see the left side
of the chart below), which Cheung‟s Bakery opposed on the basis of its two registrations for the
ANNA marks (see the right side of the chart below).

105

Since it purchased the Competing Mark from Saint Anna Bakery, Cheung‟s Bakery could have argued that
“[Saint Anna Bakery], having assigned the trade marks to [Cheung‟s Bakery], cannot derogate from its own grants
and is, therefore, estopped as between itself and [Cheung‟s Bakery] from disputing the validity of the trade marks;”
based on Cheerio Toys & Games Ltd v Dubiner, [1966] SCR 206, 48 CPR 266 at para 33. The rationale for an
invalidation by the court under section 18(1) of the Trademarks Act could have worked for an expungement by the
Registrar under section 45(3) of the Trademarks Act.
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Trademarks applied for
by Saint Honore Cake Shop
(“SAINT HONORE marks”)

Trademarks registered already
by Cheung’s Bakery
(“ANNA marks”)

106
107

109
108

This time, however, the Trademarks Opposition Board decided in both oppositions to the
SAINT HONORE marks that they were confusing and, therefore, were not registrable. 110 What
led to this inconsistency from the previous decisions? The answer lies in the fact that, by then,
the Trademarks Opposition Board interpreted the case law – and applied the test for confusion
differently as a result in 2011 – by imagining the fluent consumer when considering all the
surrounding circumstances. Although there is a spectrum from illiteracy to fluency in a language,
I use the term “fluent” to mean a complete understanding of the foreign language in the same
way that it is assumed for English or French:
“The Opponent submits, and I agree for the reasons that follow, that this is a
situation in which it would be appropriate to consider the impression of the

106

Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTER DESIGN, Opposed, 1329118
Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0639045, TMA480506
108
Trademarks: SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP LIMITED & CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Opposed,
1329117
109
Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & Chinese Characters Design, Registered, 1235030, TMA667403
110
Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 94 (with minor correction in
Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd ,2011 TMOB 152) and Cheung’s Bakery Products
Ltd v Saint Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 95 (with minor correction in Cheung’s Bakery Products Ltd v Saint
Honore Cake Shop Ltd, 2011 TMOB 153), aff‟d 2013 FC 935, aff‟d 2015 FCA 12 [Saint Honore TMOB].
107
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average Canadian consumer who can read and understand Chinese characters
when determining the likelihood of confusion between the parties‟ marks.”111

Perhaps the Trademarks Opposition Board could have – and should have – imagined the
fluent consumer when the parties first appeared before it in its 1992 decision, instead of waiting
until its 2011 decision to do so. Although this time period coincided with the 1997 handover of
Hong Kong from Britain to China, which resulted in a huge influx of Chinese immigrants to
Canada, there is no evidence that the bakeries were marketing to the general public in 1992 and
had restricted their marketing to Chinese-Canadians by 2011. Nor is there evidence that the
average Canadian consumer of these bakeries were mostly non-Chinese in 1992 and mostly
Chinese in 2011. Thus, it is unclear what change in circumstances led to the statement above that
this is an appropriate situation to consider the average Canadian consumer who understands
Chinese. It would appear that this inconsistency from the previous decisions was due not to any
change in facts, but due to the Federal Court of Canada‟s decision in 2000 in the Cheung Kong
case.112
In the Cheung Kong case, the court valiantly tries to reconcile past administrative and
judicial cases that had ignored prior judicial explanation of who the consumer is – the target
consumer of the product, instead of the general public – in their application of the test for
confusion to foreign-language marks. First, a past decision had held that the Spanish language
mark KOLA LOKA was not confusing with the English-language mark KRAZY GLUE, even
though “kola loka” in Spanish means “crazy glue” in English, because less than 1% of the

111
112

Saint Honore TMOB, supra note 110 at para 85.
Cheung Kong, supra note 9.
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Canadian population understood Spanish.113 Cheung Kong explained that this was referring to
the fact that the product seemed to be marketed on a national scale. 114 Second, another past
decision had held that the German language mark BLAUPUNKT was not confusing with the
English-language mark BLUE POINT, even though “blaupunkt” in German means “blue point”
in English, because there was no evidence that any Canadians understood German.115 Cheung
Kong explained that this was referring to the fact that the average consumer of the product did
not understand German.116 Third, the 1992 decision involving the two Chinese bakeries had held
that the Competing Mark was not confusing with the Original Mark because there was no
evidence to conclude that the number of consumers fluent in Chinese would be significant. This
means that linguistic knowledge could be deemed to be irrelevant not just when comparing a
foreign-language mark with an English-language mark, but even when comparing two
trademarks in the same foreign language.117 Cheung Kong explained that this was referring to the
fact that the average consumer of the product would not recognize the similarity in the Chinese113

Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 171 (“However, I have found as a fact that only a minimal proportion of the
Canadian population speaks Spanish as a mother tongue or understands Spanish sufficiently to be capable of making
the translation. I therefore conclude, on the basis of the facts established by the evidence, that the average consumer,
having a vague or imperfect recollection of the registered trade mark KRAZY GLUE, would find no degree of
resemblance whatsoever in the ideas suggested by KOLA LOKA and KRAZY GLUE.”).
114
Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 55 (On closer examination of this passage, however, I do not think that
McGillis J. is categorically ruling out the possibility that, on the appropriate evidence, the existence of a substantial
number of Spanish speakers among the consumers of the ware could not displace the linguistic knowledge that can
be attributed to the population as a whole. She had adopted the finding of the Registrar that less than 1% of the
population understands Spanish, and there was no indication that the applicant‟s product was not marketed on a
national scale. Thus, the facts of the case did not justify departing from the normal rule about the linguistic
knowledge of the „average consumer‟.”).
115
Robert Bosch GmbH v Grupo Bler de Mexico, SA de CV (1997), 76 CPR (3d) 397 (TMOB) at 403 (“The
opponent argues that the average person would either know, or guess, that [BLUE POINT] is the translation of
BLAUPUNKT. However, no evidence has been presented to show that any Canadians understand German and no
evidence such as survey evidence has been presented to substantiate the claim that the average consumer would
guess at the meaning.”) [Blaupunkt].
116
Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 60, 68 (“Like the Krazy Glue case, supra, the Blaupunkt decision also
appears to turn on the absence of any evidence that the average consumer of the wares concerned had any
knowledge of German. … Both turned ultimately on the absence of evidence about the number of consumers able to
translate the foreign language marks into English.”).
117
Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268 (“I can take judicial notice that there are some Canadian who would be
fluent in Chinese, and who would immediately recognize the opponent‟s CHINESE CHARACTERS mark as a
component of the applied-for mark. However, in the absence of any evidence on point, I cannot conclude that the
number of Canadians fluent in Chinese would be significant.”).
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language marks. In doing so, it confirmed that the prior judicial explanation of who the consumer
is – the target consumer of the product, instead of the general public – remains the same whether
the court is applying the test for confusion generally or with respect to foreign-language marks
specifically:
“I do not think that the Registrar is saying that, for the purpose of determining the
likelihood of confusion, the “average Canadian” could never be a person who
understood the relevant foreign language and that as a matter of law the language
understood by the “average consumer” of particular wares or services is not
capable of being one of the “surrounding circumstances” to which the Registrar
must have regard. … Thus, in Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd. v. Canada‟s
Manitoba Distillery Ltd. (1975), 25 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.) Cattanach J. said (at
page 5): “To determine whether two trademarks are confusing one with the other
it is the persons who are likely to buy the wares who are to be considered, that is
those persons who normally comprise the market, the ultimate consumer.” A
similar proposition can be found in McDonald‟s Corp. v. Coffee Hut Stores Ltd.
(1994), 55 C.P.R. (3d) 463 (F.C.T.D.), at page 475; affd by (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d)
168 (F.C.A.), where it was said that the likelihood of confusion should be
assessed, not from the perspective of the “average person, but from that of the
“average person” who is likely to consume the wares or services in question”.”118

118

Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 62, 64. The Federal Court of Appeal recently confirmed this in MC Imports
Inc v AFOD Ltd, 2016 FCA 60 at paras 59, 61 (“Further, where such an inquiry is necessary, the relevant ordinary
consumer from whose perspective this question ought to be considered is the ordinary consumer of the products or
services with which the Mark is associated. … I note that even authorities citing Parma have tended not to adopt the
view that the “general public” is the relevant consumer perspective, referring instead to the ordinary consumer of the
wares or services with which the trademark is used”). MC Imports also emphasized at para 76 that even evidence of
secondary meaning must be “from the perspective of the relevant public – that is, people who actually use the
product or service in question –”).
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Therefore, linguistic knowledge is considered a relevant circumstance if there is evidence
to prove that the target consumer of the product understands the foreign language used in the
trademark.119 The leading case of Cheung Kong found proof of linguistic knowledge because the
business targeted the Chinese community in Toronto, where a substantial number of consumers
understood the Chinese-language mark.120 And the succeeding case of Saint Honore found proof
of linguistic knowledge because the business targeted the Chinese community in Vancouver,
where a substantial portion of the target consumers understood the Chinese language.121 It is
important to note that the last two cases do not mean that the test for confusion can be applied
regionally. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the test for confusion needs to be

119

Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 65 (“An application of this principle to the particular issue in dispute in this
case would indicate that, if it could be inferred from the evidence that a significant portion of the likely consumers
of Living Realty‟s clients were familiar with Chinese characters, the Registrar should take this into consideration as
part of the “surrounding circumstances” when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion with Cheung
Kong‟s mark.”).
120
Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 57-58 (“Indeed, the facts suggest that a substantial number of consumers of
Living Realty‟s service understand the meaning of the Chinese characters that comprise its proposed mark. First,
Living Realty‟s business has been centred on the sale of real estate in Toronto, although it has also included
properties in the surrounding area. I am prepared to take judicial notice of the existence of a significant Chinese
community in Greater Toronto. Second, Mr. Chan stated that Living Realty “targeted” the Chinese community,
although not to the exclusion of non-Chinese clients. In the light of these facts, it would be hard to maintain that a
substantial number of actual consumers were not reasonably likely to confuse Living Realty‟s mark with Cheung
Kong‟s as a result of the identical and distinctive nature of the idea conveyed by the mark, particularly given the
similarities of the services offered by the parties.”).
121
Saint Honore, supra note 91 at paras 47-48 (“In the present case, the Court is of the opinion that it was open to
the Board to find that a substantial portion of the respondent‟s actual consumers would be able to read and
understand Chinese characters. As noted by the Board, the Cheung Jr. and Sr. affidavits establish that the
respondents target the Chinese community in the Greater Vancouver area. The respondent has prominently
displayed the Chinese characters of its trademarks for decades in the Greater Vancouver area, including in the
exterior signage of the bakeries of the respondent and its licensee, as well as in letterhead, envelopes, business cards,
promotional wedding pastry cards, and an entry with a directory of businesses listed under their Chinese character
names. The Cheung Jr. affidavit also demonstrates that the Chinese characters of the respondent‟s trademarks are
displayed prominently on its cake boxes, plastic bags and disposable paper pastry cup used to package the bakery
products. The fact that the respondent uses Chinese characters consistently and in so many of its materials suggests
that it believes many of its customers will be able to read and understand them (see Cheung Kong, above at para 77).
Moreover, the 2012 Cheung Jr. affidavit mentions a 2010 survey conducted by the respondent in June and July 2010
in which the respondent distributed customer survey forms available either in English or in Chinese. The respondent
received 2,259 survey forms in return, of which 1,905 were in Chinese and 354 were in English. The fact that 84%
of the customers who filled out a survey could read and understand written Chinese lends further support to the
Board‟s finding that a substantial portion of the respondent‟s actual customers would be able to read and understand
Chinese characters.”).
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applied nationally because trademark registration is nationwide. 122 The last two cases only took
the linguistic demographics of specific geographic territories into account because such evidence
proved the linguistic knowledge of the target market, which happened to be limited to Toronto
and Vancouver.
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge as a relevant circumstance is a purposive
interpretation that is valid statutorily. Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion by
requiring that “all” circumstances that are relevant to the issue of confusion be considered, not
just those specified in the non-exhaustive list. More importantly, linguistic knowledge is not just
relevant to the general issue of confusion but is also relevant to the specific factor of
resemblance.123 Not only was the Federal Court of Canada‟s interpretation correct in 2000 in the
Cheung Kong case, the wisdom of such an interpretation became clear in 2011 in the Saint
Honore case. Applying the test for confusion to foreign-language marks by imagining the fluent
consumer resulted in the SAINT HONORE marks being declared to be confusing. Failing to do
so would have allowed a competitor to continue copying the Original Mark ad infinitum by
adding a different English translation each time. Once again, it seemed that the pastry world was
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Masterpiece, supra note 99 at paras 30-31, 33 (“It is immediately apparent from these words, “if the use of
both … in the same area”, that the test for confusion is based upon the hypothetical assumption that both tradenames and trademarks are used “in the same area”, irrespective of whether this is actually the case. As a result,
geographical separation of otherwise confusingly similar trade-names and trademarks does not play a role in this
hypothetical test. This must be the case, because, pursuant to s. 19, subject to exceptions not relevant here,
registration gives the owner the exclusive right to the use of the trademark throughout Canada. In order for the
owner of a registered trademark to have exclusive use of the trademark throughout Canada, there cannot be a
likelihood of confusion with another trademark anywhere in the country. … Whether in assessing trademark
infringement under s. 19 or entitlement under s. 16, the test for likelihood of confusion is the same. The application
of the hypothetical test reflects the legislative intent to provide a national scope of protection for registered
trademarks in Canada (see David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks (2nd ed 2011)
at 526.”).
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Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 49 (“As Professor Vaver points out, if the marks or names do not resemble
one another, it is unlikely that even a strong finding on the remaining factors would lead to a likelihood of confusion.
The other factors become significant only once the marks are found to be identical or very similar (Vaver, at p. 532).
As a result, it has been suggested that a consideration of resemblance is where most confusion analyses should start
(Vaver, at p. 532).”).
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restored to its original position with the ANNA marks registered and the SAINT HONORE
marks denied registration.

4.3

The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge Creates Inequality in Canada
Since the test for confusion originally ignored the linguistic knowledge of the consumer,

all foreign-language marks were equally ignored with respect to their meanings. Now that the
test for confusion considers linguistic knowledge as part of the surrounding circumstances, the
result is a discrepancy in the treatment of different foreign-language marks. For example, the
Spanish language mark KOLA LOKA was not confusing with the English-language mark
because less than 1% of the Canadian population being targeted understood Spanish. It is not
clear what percentage will be deemed to be significant, but 4.8% has been the lowest cited to
date for a trademark confusion case. 124 Nor is it clear what the actual number is behind the
phrase “less than 1%”. But an estimate of 30 million for the Canadian population back then
might have meant a Spanish linguistic population of around 300,000, which is a significant
number of people to ignore. Contrast that with the two cases involving Chinese-language marks
where confusion was found because judicial notice was taken of the existence of significant
Chinese communities in the Toronto and Vancouver cities being targeted. A discrepancy in the
treatment of different foreign-language marks in Canada is undesirable for two reasons.
First, it is inconsistent with equality principles reflected in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and other human rights legislation.125 While the test for confusion is to be
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Diageo Canada Inc v Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc, 2017 FC 571 at para 94 (“Indeed, the rate of confusion Courts
have previously found to be sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion ranges from: 4.8% to 8.2% in Walt
Disney Productions v Triple Five Corp, 1994 ABCA 120 …; 11% in New Balance Athletic Shoes Inc v Matthews,
[1992] TMOB No 358 …; and 13.5% in Kirkbi AG v Ritvik Holdings Inc, 2002 FC 585 [affirmed by the FCA and
the SCC without any discussion of the percentage issue].”) [Diageo].
125
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15 (Equality Rights – “Every individual is equal before and under the law without
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applauded for recognizing the linguistic diversity of Canada, it should lead to equality for all and
not favouritism for some (e.g., the economic clout, political influence, or simple visibility of
Chinese consumers). Canada has a multicultural population that uses many foreign languages,
including all six official languages of the United Nations: English, French, Spanish, Chinese,
Russian, and Arabic. It is incongruous that the first Romanized three languages receive more
protection than the last three non-Romanized languages. In the same manner, the test for
confusion must not take judicial notice of linguistic knowledge for Chinese-language marks
while continuing to treat other foreign-language marks as inarticulate designs. This is because
the decision to recognize the Chinese language is supported by the statistical evidence rather than
the commitment to substantive equality, which would not require such evidence to assess the
relative worth of a language. The emphasis on statistics and the “reality” of Chinese consumers
vis-à-vis other foreign-language consumers does not adequately reflect the multicultural values
of Canadian society. The resulting stratified system is unacceptable in light of the fact that
reliance on these statistics is arbitrary: there is neither statutory authority nor a judicial basis for
why the linguistic populations for the Spanish-language mark KOLA LOKA and the Germanlanguage mark BLAUPUNKT are insufficient, while the linguistic population for Chineselanguage marks is worthy of recognition. Such a system gives the impression that some linguistic
populations have more value than others. The courts should not be encouraging a two-tier system
that could perpetuate an injustice,126 as such a system is contrary to Charter values based on a

discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.”). Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 3(1) (Prohibited grounds
of discrimination – “For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for
an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.”).
There are similar legislation at the provincial level [Charter].
126
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2 at para 5
(“The Court did not seek to create a parallel system of legal aid or a court-managed comprehensive program to
supplement any of the other programs designed to assist various groups in taking legal action, and its decision
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speculative assessment of linguistic knowledge. Even if a perfect assessment were created, with
accurate statistics and clear percentages as to when a linguistic population is deserving of
protection, the courts should still question the equality of relying on such evidence and should
also attempt to remedy the differential treatment. Failing to identify the existence and
undesirability of the status quo casts doubt on the commitment to substantive equality and to
ensuring that the common law reflects Charter values.127
Second, it ignores Aboriginal linguistic populations. With the certainty that less than 1%
of the Canadian population is insignificant, and the uncertainty of knowing what percentage will
be deemed to be significant, Canada‟s Aboriginal people may never be able to prove the
significance of their linguistic populations in their home and native land. For example, Statistics
Canada indicates that the entire Aboriginal population (1,400,685) makes up 4.3% of the total
Canadian population. Even if all Aboriginals shared the same language, and even if every
Aboriginal understood that common language, the entire Aboriginal percentage of the population
is still lower than 4.8%, the lowest percentage cited to date for a trademark confusion case.128
The entire Aboriginal population can be broken down into the following groups: the Inuit
population (59,445) represents 0.2% of the Canadian population; the Métis population (451,795)
represents 1.4% of the total Canadian population; and the First Nations population (851,560)
represents 2.6% of the total Canadian population. Depending on how we define a language, these

should not be used to do so. The decision did not introduce a new financing method for self-appointed
representatives of the public interest. This Court‟s ratio in Okanagan applies only to those few situations where a
court would be participating in an injustice – against the litigant personally and against the public generally – if it
did not order advance costs to allow the litigant to proceed.”). Although this was about the SCC allowing
alternatives in order to avoid an injustice, an argument can be made that the principle equally applies in that the SCC
should not allow alternatives that perpetuate an injustice.
127
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury Claims Through FemaleSpecific Contingencies” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 309 at 342 (“Whitmann J.A., speaking for a unanimous court,
acknowledged the suggestion of the Supreme Court of Canada that the common law, and therefore tort law, must be
interpreted in a manner consistent with Charter values.”).
128
Diageo, supra note 124 at para 94.
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groups can be broken down again into different linguistic populations, which will only further
reduce their percentage and their significance according to the test for confusion.129 Requiring
evidence of linguistic knowledge of the target consumers may seem to support substantive
equality; however, it shows that such judicial notice is based on statistics rather than a desire for
substantive equality. Although the evidence required for judicial notice may appear to rely on
statistics and reflect “reality”, this approach perpetuates racial and ethnic inequalities. The
court‟s discretionary acceptance of evidence not only maintains these disparities, but also carries
them into the future. To ignore Aboriginal linguistic populations on the principle of de minimis
non curat lex would be contrary to the frequency and intensity with which the law has meddled
historically in their lives.130 This is unacceptable in light of the fact that Aboriginal linguistic
populations were reduced significantly due to a Canadian policy of forced assimilation for nearly
200 years131 through cultural genocide and language prohibition,132 whereby residential schools
“regularly reported on their success in suppressing Aboriginal languages”133 even though many
of the students were originally “fluent in an Aboriginal language, with little or no understanding
of French or English.”134 Until Aboriginal language rights are acknowledged in the same manner
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Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Metis and Inuit, Catalogue No 99-011-X
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 8 May 2013), online: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/99011-x2011001-eng.cfm>.
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In addition to at least 10 Acts for which it shares responsibility with a provincial government, Parliament has the
sole responsibility for at least 78 Acts. The fact is that Parliament busies itself with governing Aboriginal peoples in
areas including, but not limited to, condominium, water, family homes and matrimonial interests, commercial and
industrial development, financial transparency, fiscal management, education, land management, minerals revenue
sharing, gender equity, soldier settlement, and even elections and self-government! See Indigenous and Northern
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Canada,
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of
Acts,
27
June
2017),
online:
<http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032317/1100100032318>.
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of
the Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services of Canada, 23 July 2015) at 134, online:
<http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2
015.pdf> [TRC Report].
132
TRC Report, supra note 131 at 1.
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TRC Report, supra note 131 at 83.
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TRC Report, supra note 131 at 85.
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that Aboriginal rights 135 are acknowledged in the Charter of the French Language, 136 or
Aboriginal languages are recognized in an Aboriginal Languages Act 137 in the same way that the
Inuit language is recognized in the Consolidation of Inuit Language Protection Act,138 the current
application of the test for confusion means that Aboriginal people will continue to receive less
protection for their language in their own country than an American company has always
received for its English-language marks – and a Chinese company now receives for its Chineselanguage marks – in Canada. At a minimum, Aboriginal businesses should not be worse off than
foreign businesses from the United States or China. Even though the two statutes above must
receive judicial notice, they are still insufficient because their recognition of Aboriginal rights in
Quebec or the Inuit language in the Nunavut does not guarantee recognition of an Aboriginallanguage mark that targets a national or international market.
Perhaps it appears reasonable in theory that the case law should continue to require proof
of linguistic knowledge for foreign-language marks, but it is not realistic in practice. One
example is COCA-COLA commercials with Olympic greetings or Christmas wishes. These
commercials display COCA-COLA in multiple languages and are advertised to the AmericanCanadian public at large during Olympic games or Christmas movies.139 In such a situation, it
would be difficult to prove that the ordinary purchaser understood the foreign-language marks
since no average consumer would understand so many languages. While an easy solution would
be to customize the commercials for specific linguistic groups and advertise only in specific
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TRC Report, supra note 131 at 202.
Charter of the French Language, CQLR c C-11.
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TRC Report, supra note 131 at 204.
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Consolidation of Inuit Language Protection Act, SNu 2008, c 17 [Inuit Act]. A territory‟s statute must receive
judicial notice.
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Dinwoodie, International IP, supra note 86 at 113 (“By developing its ads for global consumption, Coca-Cola
has acknowledged that it is targeting the world market, where it dominates Pepsi, rather than the United States,
where it still heatedly competes with its rival. Over the past decade, Coke has made an aggressive push
overseas …”).
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target markets, doing so would defeat the global spirit of community which the multilingual
commercials sought to foster. Just as the common law is developed to accommodate new
reasonable commercial practice, why should statutory interpretation not mirror such a
development where the statute is capable of bearing such a construction (because of the canon of
statutory interpretation that the law is always speaking)?140 At the opposite end of the spectrum
is the example of small start-ups like Aboriginal businesses that become successful enough to
expand from a local market to a national or international market. Given their small linguistic
populations, such businesses will lose the ability to prove that a significant number or percentage
of their expanded market understand their Aboriginal-language marks.141 In other words, any
economic gains for Aboriginal businesses would mean linguistic losses for Aboriginal-language
marks. Such examples will only increase as businesses continue to engage in brand extension or
cross-branding with foreign-language marks in order to access new untapped markets.
It is important to note that this dissertation is advocating cultural respect for and equal
recognition of classical and natural languages only, including obscure languages such as
Aboriginal languages. We must remember the historical example of how Hebrew became an
obscure language around the 2nd Century, only to be revived for regular usage around the 19th
Century and to become a national language with the creation of Israel in 1948. 142 This
dissertation is not advocating on behalf of constructed and invented languages such as Dothraki
140

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 10 (Law always speaking – “The law shall be considered as always
speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as
they arise, so that effect may be given to the enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.”).
141
Canada found that a 1986 census of Spanish-speaking population of 83,130 was insufficient evidence of
linguistic knowledge in Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 4. Australia found likewise with a 2001 census of Italianspeaking population of 350,000 in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd, [2014] HCA 48 at paras 7576, 103 [Cantarella].
142
Angel Saenz-Badillos, A History of the Hebrew Language, translated by John Elwolde (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) at 170-171, 267-269. See Michael Mandel, The Jewish Hour: The Golden Age of a Toronto
Yiddish Radio Show and Newspaper (Toronto: Now and Then Books, 2016) at 14, 211, and 265 for how Yiddish
and Ladino (the Jewish languages spoken by the Polish and Spanish Jews respectively) declined after “the deliberate
murder of two-thirds of the Jews of Europe, ninety per cent of the Jews of Poland and about one-third of the Jews of
the whole world” during the Second World War.
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from Games of Throne, Elvin from Lord of the Rings, Klingon from Star Trek, and Na‟v from
Avatar. This is notwithstanding the fact that the number of speakers and dollars for obscure
languages are miniscule compared to those for languages popularized by television series and
movies. For example, CBS and Paramount are currently suing a fan who raised one million
dollars to film a documentary based on Star Trek.143 The lawsuit claims copyright infringement
on the basis that Klingon was created for the television series and, therefore, copyrightable in the
same manner as computer programming.144 Canada‟s world reputation historically has been one
of peaceful pluralism, ranging from Prime Minister Lester Pearson‟s creation of peacekeepers
(awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957) to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau‟s creation of the
Multiculturalism Act (passed in 1988). Canada can promote this multicultural heritage by
reforming its trademark law to recognize foreign- and aboriginal-language marks in a way that
eliminates disparities by valuing all languages equally. While other countries seek to harmonize
international trademark laws, expand protection for well-known marks, and create new rights for
unconventional marks for the benefit of corporations, Canada ought first to recognize the
languages and cultures of its people.

4.4

The Problem of Proving Linguistic Knowledge Lacks Statutory Basis in Canada
Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion without making any reference to

languages: it neither differentiates between official languages and foreign languages nor requires
evidence as to the existence of a linguistic population in order to assess foreign-language marks.
So how did these differentiation and requirement appear in the Canadian case law? They first
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Paramount, supra note 23.
Oracle, supra note 22.
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appeared in 1992, when the court rejected and proposed its own alternative to the American
doctrine of foreign equivalents:
“In relation to the enumerated circumstances in s. 6(5) of the Act, the main issue
to be determined on this appeal is the degree of resemblance in the ideas
suggested by the two trade-marks. Even accepting the evidence of the appellant
that “kola loka” is the phonetic equivalent of “cola loca” which means “crazy glue”
in Spanish, it would be necessary for the average consumer, having a vague or
imperfect recollection of the registered trade-mark KRAZY GLUE, to be capable
of making this translation from Spanish to English in order to be confused by the
ideas suggested by KRAZY GLUE and KOLA LOKA. However, I have found as
a fact that only a minimal proportion of the Canadian population speaks Spanish
as a mother tongue or understands Spanish sufficiently to be capable of making
the translation. I therefore conclude, on the basis of the facts, as established by
the evidence, that the average consumer, having a vague or imperfect recollection
of the registered trade-mark KRAZY GLUE, would find no degree of
resemblance whatsoever in the ideas suggested by KOLA LOKA and KRAZY
GLUE.”145 [emphasis added]

These differentiation and requirement were repeated in the succeeding Trademarks
Opposition Board decisions involving the BLAUPUNKT and SAINT ANNA marks, which
found respectively that “no evidence has been presented to show that any Canadians understand
German”146 and “I cannot conclude that the number of Canadians fluent in Chinese would be
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Blaupunkt, supra note 115 at 403.
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significant”. 147 Although the later court decisions on the CHEUNG KONG and SAINT
HONORE marks clarified that the test for confusion focuses on the target consumer of the
product, and not the general public, they still continued to perpetuate these differentiation and
requirement:
“If [the examiner] based his conclusion on the fact that the “average Canadian”
cannot read Chinese characters, without regard to whether the evidence in this
case indicated that a significant number of the actual consumers of Living
Realty’s services were likely to transliterate the first two characters of the
proposed mark into CHEUNG KONG, or translate it into “long river”, then with
respect I think he erred in law. Neither KRAZY GLUE, supra, nor the
BLAUPUNKT case, supra, goes this far. Both turned ultimately on the absence of
evidence about the number of consumers able to translate the foreign language
marks into English.”148 [emphasis added]

More important than the question of origin is the question of correctness. Just because
these differentiation and requirement appear in the Canadian case law do not mean that they
should be there. On the contrary, they incorrectly read into and improperly add a layer of
complexity that was never in Canada‟s Trademarks Act. The statutory permission to prove the
confusion arising from linguistic knowledge cannot necessarily be interpreted as a statutory
requirement to prove the existence of linguistic knowledge. There is a difference between simply
considering linguistic knowledge while assessing how a consumer perceives a trademark and
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Saint Anna TMOB, supra note 98 at 268.
Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at paras 67-68. And see Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 47 (“In the present case,
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actually requiring evidence of linguistic knowledge before assessing a consumer‟s perception of
a trademark.
It is clear from this chapter that the trademark litigation involving two Chinese bakeries
in Canada illustrate a judicial challenge of proving linguistic knowledge for foreign-language
marks affect traders and consumers from all countries with respect to all foreign languages.
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5 JUDICIAL SOLUTION
This chapter explains why the problem of proving linguistic knowledge is best addressed
with the solution of assuming such knowledge, as the evidence required to prove linguistic
knowledge changes constantly depending on international trade, multicultural consumers, brand
extension and cross-branding in order to access untapped markets. Although the solution is
illustrated through the specific example of a set of trademark cases in Canada involving two
Chinese bakeries, the general issue is also relevant in other countries and to other foreign
languages.

5.1

The Solution of Assuming Linguistic Knowledge
It is questionable whether the case law should continue to require proof of linguistic

knowledge for foreign-language marks, instead of assuming it so that their distinctiveness and
confusion can be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in English or French.149
Even with English-language marks containing antique or rare words, or with Frenchlanguage marks in areas of Canada where no French is spoken, it is never considered that the
Canadian consumer might have little cultural exposure, limited vocabulary, no French skills, etc.
For example, linguistic knowledge is assumed even with novel use of French words such as
MAISON. The word was found to be descriptive of orange juice since MAISON had acquired a
new meaning in France of “that which is made at home” or “of good quality”. The fact that the
average French Canadian had not caught on to this new meaning did not change the court‟s
149

Gredley, supra note 17 at 85 (“No English trade marks statute has ever made specific provision for marks in
languages other than English, which have always been subject to the same legal principles as any others.”).
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assumption of linguistic knowledge. 150

Likewise, an Australian court assumed linguistic

knowledge even with uncommon English words such as EUTECTIC. The word was found to be
descriptive of goods for welding, soldering and brazing because EUTECTIC meant “melting at
low temperature” or “melting readily”. The fact that “most users of the applicant‟s goods did not
know, or had forgotten its meaning” did not change the court‟s opinion that the technical term
should remain in the public domain.151
Of course, the difference between foreign-language marks and those trademarks lies in
the fact that English and French have official language status in Canada. There is no reason why
this difference should matter. Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out the test for confusion without
making any reference to languages: it does not differentiate between official languages and
foreign languages. This means that there is no statutory authority for why linguistic knowledge
needs to be proven instead of being assumed for foreign languages, just as there is no judicial
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Home Juice Co v Orange Maison Ltée, [1970] SCR 942 at 944-945 (“Respondent has contended that the current
meaning in France is not to be considered, that regard must be had only to the meaning current in Canada … . This
contention would have serious consequences if it was accepted. One result would be that a shrewd trader could
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Cantarella, supra note 141 at para 91, discussing Eutectic Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks, (1980) 32
ALR 211 (“It was not in ordinary use by members of the community; most users of the applicant‟s goods did not
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basis for why official-language marks are more deserving of protection than foreign-language
marks.
The subsections below illustrate how the test for confusion can be applied consistently to
all trademarks, regardless of the languages in which they are expressed, if linguistic knowledge
were assumed for foreign-language marks.

5.1.1 Assessing for Distinctiveness
Since an English-language mark is registrable only if it is distinctive or capable of
becoming so, it follows that foreign-language marks that are generic or clearly descriptive should
not be registrable.152
Generic marks are prohibited without any differentiation between official languages and
foreign languages because their unregistrability applies to “the name in any language of any of
the goods or services”. 153 In this regard, Chapter 6 discusses how the American doctrine of
foreign equivalents protests the registration in foreign countries of product names in English, as
well as prohibits the registration in the United States of generic words in a foreign language.154
Descriptive marks, however, are prohibited differently because their unregistrability is
restricted to those which are “clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or
French language of the character or quality of the goods or services”.155 The restriction to the
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English or French language is so specific that language combinations that are not translations
may be clearly descriptive and still registrable:156 LE JUICE for fruit juices is permitted even
though the individual words are descriptive,157 and WOLAINE for textile and fabric is permitted
because the combination as a whole is not the name of anything in either language. 158 This
restriction to the English or French language also means that a foreign-language mark may also
be clearly descriptive: TAM TAM for crackers and biscuits is permitted even though the
Hebrew-language mark means “tasty”,159 both MORINDA and TAHITIAN NONI are permitted
for skin products and dietary supplements derived from trees with the Polynesian names
“morinda” and “noni”.160 Canada‟s Trademarks Act should remove the restriction to the English
or French language, and apply the prohibition to any language, for two reasons.
First, Home Juice suggests that the purpose of prohibiting clearly descriptive marks is to
ensure that “a shrewd trader [does not] monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a
trade mark as soon as it started being used in France or in another French-speaking country and
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before it could be shown to have begun being used in Canada.” 161 This purpose is important
enough for the courts to extend the prohibition even to clearly descriptive words used as a
compound mark, as an ellipse, or with corrupted spelling.162 Therefore, this rationale should also
apply to foreign-language marks now that the courts include linguistic knowledge in the test for
confusion. It is important that traders be prohibited from doing in a foreign language what they
cannot do in the English or French language; namely, monopolize common words and prohibit
others from their generic or clearly descriptive use.163
Second, Canada‟s abandonment of the use requirement for trademark applications will
open the door for trademark squatting in Canada. Trademark applicants may try to circumvent
the prohibition against registering a mark which is clearly descriptive in English or French by
adding a Chinese translation of the trademark, just as a Chinese bakery kept trying to circumvent
its competitor‟s Chinese-language mark by copying it and adding a different English translation
each time. 164 This danger is real now that the courts have taken judicial notice of linguistic
knowledge for Chinese-language marks, as China is suspected of being the largest nation of
trademark squatters in the world.165 Removing the restriction to the English or French language
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Home Juice, supra note 150 at 944-945.
English-language marks are unregistrable in Canada even if the clearly descriptive word is used in a compound
mark (COCA-COLA for “soda drinks” in Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102; as an ellipse (OFF! for “insect repellent” in
SC Johnson & Son Ltd v Marketing Int’l Ltd, [1980] 1 SCR 99; FRIGIDAIRE for “refrigerators” in General Motors
Corp v Bellows, [1949] SCR 678; O CEDAR for “polishing oil” in Channel Co v Rombough, [1924] SCR 600); or
with corrupted spelling (SHUR-ON and STAY-ZON for “eye-glass frames” in Kirstein Sons & Co v Cohen Bros
(1907), 39 SCR 286).
163
Cantarella, supra note 141 at para 44 (“The requirement that a proposed trade mark be examined from the point
of view of the possible impairment of the rights of honest traders to do that which, apart from the grant of a
monopoly, would be their natural mode of conducting business …, and from the wider point of view of the public …,
has been applied to words proposed as trade marks for at least a century, irrespective of whether the words are
English or foreign.”). The High Court of Australia, however, went on to find that ORO and CINQUE STELLE
(Italian for “gold” and “five stars” respectively) were not descriptive of coffee products because at least 350,000
Italian speakers in Australia were insufficient to prove linguistic knowledge.
164
Saint Honore TMOB, supra note 110.
165
Daniel Chow, “Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks Doctrine in China” (2014) 47:1 Geo
Wash Intl L Rev 57 at 60 (“The prevalence of trademark squatting in China has led to the accusation that China is
among the largest, if not the largest, nation of squatters.”).
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will enable Canada to follow other countries in prohibiting foreign-language marks that are
clearly descriptive even if they are used in a varied form, as slang, or with phonetic spelling. 166
The chart below shows that the prohibition against generic and descriptive marks should
apply not just to foreign words but also to their English transliterations, which can become
standardized and accepted English words. This is why it is necessary for trademark applications
to require translations of foreign-language marks, in order to determine whether the equivalent
English-language marks would be registrable, so as to avoid accidentally registering generic or
clearly descriptive words in other languages. Therefore, foreign-language marks should be
assessed for distinctiveness based on their translation(s) into the official language(s) of the
country assessing the trademark (which would include French in Canada).
Foreign Words

English Transliterations that became
standardized and accepted English words

ال ج بر ع لم
Arabic for “reunion of broken parts”

ALGEBRA

豆 腐
Chinese for “bean curd”

TOFU

Αγορά
Greek for “gathering place”

AGORA

אמן
Hebrew for “verily” or “so be it”

AMEN

Pronounced “ka-na-ta”
Huron-Iroquois for “village” or “settlement”

CANADA

166

Foreign-language marks are unregistrable in other countries even if used in a varied form (DIABOLO from the
Italian DIAVOLO for a type of game called “the devil on two sticks” in Philippart v William Whiteley Ltd, [1908] 2
Ch 274); as a slang (CHUPA in Spanish for “lollipop” in Enrique Bernat F SA v Guadalajara, Inc, 210 F (3d) 439
(5th Cir 2000) [Enrique Bernat]; or with phonetic spelling (SHORINJI KEMPO from the Japanese characters for a
type of “martial arts” such as Judo, Karate and TaeKwonDo in British Shorinji Kempo Fed v Shorinji Kempo Unity,
[2014] EWHC 285 (Ch)).
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カラオケ
Japanese for “empty orchestra”

KARAOKE

김 치
Korean for “soaked vegetable”

KIMCHI

Кремль
Russian for “castle” or “fortress”

KREMLIN

योग
Sanskrit for “to unite”

YOGA

5.1.2 Comparing for Confusion
Contrary to assessing for distinctiveness, foreign-language marks should not be compared
for confusion based only on their translations. Since English-language marks are compared for
confusion by considering the target consumers of the goods and services, it follows that the
foreign-language marks should not be compared for confusion by considering only the general
public.167
Confusing marks are prohibited without making any reference to languages. 168 This is
consistent with how the test for confusion does not differentiate between official languages and
foreign languages. In this regard, judicial application of the test for confusion initially errs in
requiring evidence of linguistic knowledge instead of assuming it, and further errs (and

167

Confusion is an absolute bar to registration according to Vaver, supra note 21 at 479. Contrast that with the
European Union, which treats confusion as a relative ground for refusal, according to (EC) No 207/2009, supra note
152 at 8 (Relative grounds for refusal – “1. Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade
mark applied for shall not be registered: (b) if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and
the identity or similarity of the goods and services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion
on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected, the likelihood of confusion
includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark;”).
168
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 12(1)(d).
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contradicts itself) in basing the comparison on the English translation instead of on the foreignlanguage mark for two reasons.
First, consumers who understand the foreign language used in the trademark have no
need to translate it into English. The translation problems discussed in Chapter 3 – the
unflattering translations for COLA-COLA; as well as the name changes for PEPSI, KFC, and
MCDONALD‟S without corresponding changes in the translations – all suggest that courts
cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the translation
will be. It is only Canadian examiners and the judiciary who need to translate the trademarks in
order to understand and discuss the ideas suggested by the trademarks, but it is misleading then
to base the comparison on the translation instead of the foreign-language mark in question.169 An
example is how COLA lacked distinctiveness since it meant “carbonated drink, soft drink, soda,
or pop”. If it had been translated based on its meaning, then its Chinese equivalent would have
been 氣 水 (QI4 SHUI3 means “air water”). However, it was translated based on its sound
instead as 可 樂 (KE3 LE4 was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933). This meant
that although PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA in English,170 百
事 可 樂 would have been confusing with and should have been stopped by the previous use of
可 口 可 樂 in Chinese. This was not done and, as a result, 可 樂 became a generic word in the
Chinese lexicon (just like COLA in English). Another example of how comparing for confusion
in different languages could produce different results comes from the discussion earlier of how
Canada found two Chinese trademarks to be distinctive in a 1992 decision, only to contradict
itself in a 2011 decision by finding the same two Chinese trademarks to be confusing.
169

This becomes even more obvious when we remember that even if particular examincers or judges were to know
the language, they may not be entitled to take judicial knowledge of this specialization because other examiners or
judges cannot be assumed to have it.
170
Pepsi-Cola, supra note 102 at 617-618.
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Comparing only the English translations in the 1992 decision resulted in no confusion between
ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE and SAINT ANNA BAKERY, but comparing the actual Chineselanguage marks in the 2011 decision resulted in confusion even with the attached English
translations of ANNA‟S CAKE HOUSE and SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP. 171 Failing to
assume linguistic knowledge would have allowed competitors to copy the Chinese-language
mark ad infinitum by adding a different English translation each time.
Second, consumers who do not understand the foreign language in the trademark would
simply see it as a design and could still be confused (or not), just as with any other design. In this
regard, Canadian examiner and the judiciary wrongly assume that a finding of linguistic
knowledge (or lack thereof) results in a finding of confusion (or lack thereof) when the two
issues are actually independent of each other. This is why the test for confusion should not
require the additional evidence of linguistic knowledge but should remain focused on the original
evidence of confusion, regardless of whether the said confusion arose from fluent consumers
confused by the actual foreign “words” or from illiterate consumers confused by what they see
as “designs”.
Therefore, a foreign-language mark should not be compared for confusion based only on
its translation. This applies whether comparing with another trademark in the same foreign
language, with another trademark in a different foreign language, or with another trademark in an
official language of the country doing the assessment. The principles set out herein also apply to
the subsections below, which are more specific illustrations of the same. The subsections below
may seem counterintuitive at first, as they take the position that COCA-COLA should not bar
competitors from registering the translation 可 口 可 樂 or the pronunciation KE3 KOU3 KE3

171

Saint Honore, supra note 91.
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LE4. Before we assume that the right to COCA-COLA also means a right to its foreign-language
equivalents, we should remember that not even CLICQUOT had an automatic right to the 99%
similar CLIQUOT for clothing, and not even BARBIE could stop the 100% similar BARBIE for
restaurants.172 If consumers can differentiate such similar English-language marks in order to
associate them with different goods and services, then surely they can distinguish between an
English-language mark and its foreign-language equivalents in order to correlate them with
different traders.

5.1.2A Comparing for Confusion with Translations
Since a claim in an English-language mark does not necessarily mean a monopoly on its
synonyms,173 subject to evidence of confusion,174 it follows that a claim for a foreign-language
mark should not encompass claims for its translations without similar evidence.

172

Veuve Clicquot, supra note 99. Mattel, supra note 99.
Synonyms include everything ranging from slang and nicknames (COKE for COCA-COLA worldwide;
MACCA‟S for MCDONALD‟S in Australia) to acronyms and abbreviations (KFC for KENTUCKY FRIED
CHICKEN and IBM for INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES; MAC for MCDONALD‟S hamburger or
MACTINOSH computers).
174
No confusion was found between DAWN and DAYLIGHT for donuts in Dawn Donut Co v Day, 450 F (2d) 332
(10th Cir 1971); or HEAVEN and CELESTE for orbs and pendants in Orb Factory, Ltd v Design Science Toys, Ltd,
6 F Supp2d 203 (SDNY 1998). Confusion, however, was found between TORNADO and CYCLONE for wire
fencing in Hancock v American Steel & Wire Co of New Jersey, 203 F (2d) 737 (CCPA 1953); PLEDGE and
PROMISE for cleaning products in SC Johnson & Son, Inc v Drop Dead Co, 326 F (2d) 87 (9th Cir 1963); ALPINE
and MOUNTAIN for artificial Christmas trees in Masterpiece of Pennsylvania, Inc v Consolidated Novelty Co, 368
F Supp 550 (SDNY 1973); ROACH MOTEL and ROACH INN for pest products in Am Home Product Corp v
Johnson Chemical Co, 589 F (2d) 103 (2d Cir 1978); as well as SLICKCRAFT and SLEEKCRAFT for boats in
AMF Inc v Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F (2d) 341 (9th Cir 1979). And see Mary LaFrance, “Initial Impressions:
Trademark Protection for Abbreviations of Generic or Descriptive Terms” (2012) 45:201 Akron L Rev at 202, 239
(comparing the different approaches of the federal courts and discussing the inconsistency across the circuits in the
United States). Contrast that with Bayuk Cigars, Inc v Schwartz, DC, 1 F Supp 283 (DNJ 1932) (finding no
confusion between two cigar companies using PHILLIES because the public nickname did not enure to anyone)
with Coca-Cola Co v Busch, 44 F Supp 405 (ED Pa 1942) (finding confusion between KOKE and COKE because
the latter was a public nickname that enured to the plaintiff) [Coca-Cola v Busch]. Oddly, both the United States and
Canada are consistent in holding confectionary-related names to be confusing. And see Jellibeans Inc v Skating
Clubs of Georgia Inc, 716 F (2d) 833 (11th Cir 1983) at paras 20-21 (finding that JELLIBEANS and LOLLIPOPS,
though not synonymous, were confusing for skating rinks) and Rowntree Co Ltd v Paulin Chambers Co Ltd et al,
[1968] SCR 134 at 137, 139 (finding that SMARTIES and SMOOTHIES were synonymous and confusing for
candy).
173
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For example, a review of the SAINT HONORE and ANNA marks indicates that at issue
was the confusion between the three Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 in one party‟s marks and the
same two Chinese characters 安 娜 in the other party‟s marks. One party asserted that the ideas
suggested by the trademarks are different because it translated the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 as
SAINT HONORE while the other party translated the same Chinese characters 安 娜 as
ANNA.175 The court said nothing in response directly, but indirectly seemed to agree when it
stated that the Chinese characters 安 娜 translated as ANNA gave one party‟s marks a greater
degree of inherent distinctiveness than the other party‟s marks.176 This is a mistake because both
marks included the same Chinese characters and were translated arbitrarily by traders, which has
no bearing on how consumers would translate them. Consumers who translate one party‟s marks
as SAINT HONORE will do the same for the other party‟s marks, and vice versa for consumers
who translate them as ANNA. This means that consumers who translate the Chinese characters
聖 安 娜 as SAINT HONORE will also translate the Chinese characters 安 娜 as HONORE, and
consumers who translate the Chinese characters 安 娜 as ANNA will also translate the Chinese
characters 聖 安 娜 as SAINT ANNA. Consumers are not going to switch translation from one
mark to another mark, and the court should have explained and decided that the ideas suggested
by the trademarks are the same. This becomes even more obvious when we remember that Saint
Honore Cake Shop used to be called Saint Anna Bakery, and that a previous translation of the
SAINT HONORE mark (see the left side of the chart below) used to be called the SAINT
ANNA mark (see the left side of the chart below). The chart below also provides another
example of how the same Chinese characters can be translated arbitrarily by traders, which has

175
176

Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 35.
Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 49.
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no bearing on how consumers would translate them: the last two Chinese characters literally
mean “cake house” (the translation used by Cheung‟s Bakery), which were interpreted as “cake
shop” or “bakery” (the two translations used by Saint Honore Cake Shop).
Trademark for

Trademark for
Previous name of Saint Anna Bakery

Current name of Saint Honore Cake Shop

178

177

An example of this mistake using English is the acronym LOL. A new acquaintance may
think LOL translates as “laughing out loud” and send you the message: “Wasn‟t yesterday‟s
party hilarious? LOL!” Meanwhile, a best friend may think LOL translates as “lots of love” and
send you the message: “Is it true you‟re in the hospital? LOL!” What either sender of the
messages thinks LOL means has no bearing on the ideas suggested by the texts, as that actually
depends on what the receiver thinks LOL means. If you translate LOL as “laughing out loud”,
you will do the same for both messages and think the best friend is inappropriately mean. If you
translate LOL as “lots of love”, you will also do the same for both messages and think the new
acquaintance is inappropriately forward. Since the court correctly concluded that the trademarks
were confusing based on other elements, this linguistic mistake did not affect the outcome in the
end. Nonetheless, such a linguistic mistake must be avoided in future cases in order to remain
consistent with the consumer imagined by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court
of Canada. Whether it be a matter of first impression and imperfect recollection, or the average
consumer of the product, both courts are clear that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of
177

Trademarks: SAINT HONORE CAKE SHOP LIMITED & CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Opposed,
1329117
178
Trademarks: ANNA'S CAKE HOUSE & Chinese Characters Design, Registered, 1235030, TMA667403
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the consumer (the receiver of the message) and not the mind of the trader (the sender of the
message). It is a mystery why the linguistic mistakes were not drawn to the attention of the court.
The court could not be expected to know that the same Chinese characters would have multiple
translations, especially if the parties do not challenge the arbitrariness of the translations.
As a general rule, without evidence connecting the two, it is dangerous to equate a
foreign-language mark with a translation because translations can be multiple and arbitrary. For
example, SAINT HONORE could also have meant SAINT ANNA. To allow a foreign-language
mark to expand into claims for translations is to go beyond the metes and bounds of the
registration, in light of the fact that a foreign-language mark can mean different things literally,
colloquially, or culturally.
Therefore, a trader who chooses a specific English-language mark (COCA-COLA) must
accept the consequences of the scope of its claim, which will not necessarily include other
meanings (COCA-POP, COCA-SODA, etc.). Any such inclusion should first require evidence
that there is likelihood of confusion. The same rationale should apply to traders who choose a
specific Chinese-language mark, instead of its possible translations, as consumers may not find
that the Chinese-language mark is meaningfully interchangeable with its translations.

5.1.2B Comparing for Confusion with Transliterations
The arguments against equating foreign-language marks to translations also apply to
transliterations. Since a claim in an English-language mark does not automatically expand into
claims for its homophones,179 subject to evidence of confusion,180 it follows that a claim for a
foreign-language mark should not include claims for its transliterations without similar evidence.

179

Homophones share the same pronunciation but different spelling: BEAU – BOW and BOUGH – BOW;
DESSERT – DESERT; LED – LEAD; WHINED – WINED – WIND. Conversely, homographs share the same

80

For example, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited has been using the English-language
mark CHEUNG KONG and the Chinese-language mark 長 江 since the 1950‟s in Hong Kong
and the 1980‟s in Toronto for real estate services. Due to a series of events leading up to 1984, it
retained the English-language mark and a Toronto competitor ended up with the Chineselanguage mark. It registered the English-language mark, which it used as the basis to oppose the
Toronto competitor‟s application for the Chinese-language mark. The Federal Court of Canada
took judicial notice of the existence of a significant Chinese community as the potential target
market and, as a result, found that the Chinese-language mark was confusing with the Englishlanguage mark. This was strange in light of the fact that the registration for CHEUNG KONG
gave the impression that it was an invented English term, as it failed to mention that it was a
transliteration for certain Chinese characters.181 This meant that it had no evidence to connect to
and, thereby, oppose the competing application for 長 江.182 Fortunately for the registration, the
application implicated itself by mentioning that its transliteration was CHEUNG KONG.

spelling but different pronunciation: If you BOW when picking up the BOWS, we will DESERT you in the
DESERT and you will have to rely on a piece of LEAD to LEAD you back, unless you wish to WIND up forgotten
and blowing in the WIND. Homonyms are both homophones and homographs simultaneously: Please ADDRESS
everyone at this street ADDRESS as to why their dogs BARK at the tree BARK, and ask if they CAN remove the
garbage CAN by noon.
180
No confusion was found in between BREWSKY‟S bars and BREWSKI BROTHERS clothing in Brewski Beer
Co v Brewski Brothers, Inc, 47 USPQ2d 1281 (TTAB 1998); or PHIFTY-50 music albums and 50-50 movie titles in
Eastland Music Group, LLC v Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc, Appeal No 12-2928 (7th Cir 2013), presumably because of the
differences in goods and services. Confusion, however, was found between ESSO and SO for petroleum products in
Esso, Inc v Standard Oil Co, 98 F (2d) 1 (8th Cir 1938); COMSAT for a satellite communications system and
COMCET for computer communications engineering technology in Communications Satellite Corp v Comcet, Inc,
429 F (2d) 1245 (4th Cir 1970); as well as AUXIGRO and OXYGROW for fertilizer products in Emerald
Bioagriculture Corp v Biosafe Systems, LLC, Cancellation No 92042503 (TTAB Feb 9, 2006). Contrast that with
Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd v AG of Canada, [1980] 1 SCR 914 at 928 (stating in the dictum of a constitutional
case that SPECIAL LITE would likely be mistaken for LIGHT BEER, as defined then under the repealed Food &
Drug Act, RSC 1970, c F-27, s 6).
181
Trademarks: CHEUNG KONG, Expunged, 0618425, TMA385395; and Trademarks: CHEUNG KONG,
Registered, 1052787, TMA605043.
182
Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS; DESIGN, Expunged, 0530067, TMA310471; Trademarks: CHINESE
CHARACTERS & DESIGN, Expunged, 0683560, TMA433298; and Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS &
DESIGN, Refused - Section 38(8), 0692232.
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As a general rule, unless there is evidence to support connecting the two, it is inadvisable
to equate a foreign-language mark with a transliteration as transliterations can be multiple and
arbitrary. For example, the transliteration CHEUNG KONG can also be spelled CHEON GONE,
CHIONG KUNG, etc. To allow a foreign-language mark to expand into claims for
transliterations could quickly turn into a “grabfest”, especially when we remember that a
Chinese-language mark can be read in many dialects with different pronunciations. The two
transliterations above were based on how the Cantonese dialect pronounces the Chinese
characters, whereas Mandarin pronounces the same Chinese characters as CHANG2 JIANG1.183
Given that transliterations can be arbitrary in the same way that spellings can be varied, it is
important that Western databases adopt the official phonetic system in order to ensure that
transliterations are consistent in order to be compared.
Therefore, a trader who chooses to spell an English-language mark a specific way
(COCA-COLA) cannot rely upon the law to act automatically as an insurer against other
spellings that were not chosen (KOKAH KOLAH, GO GA GOAL AH, etc.). Any such reliance
should first require evidence that there is likelihood of confusion. The same rationale should
apply to traders who decide to use a specific Chinese-language mark, instead of its possible
transliterations, as consumers may not intuitively correlate the Chinese-language mark with its
transliterations.
A concluding reason to hold traders to their chosen translation (or transliteration) is
simply the fact that the trademark application stage provides a better opportunity to obtain direct
and honest translations (or transliterations) than during the opposition, expungement, or
183

Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0748168, TMA554984 contained the Chinese
characters 長 江, which it transliterated as CHANG JIANG and translated as CHEUNG KONG. The latter illustrates
that traders are unaware of what is required for a translation, as CHEUNG KONG is not a translation. It also
illustrates that lawyers and examiners are unaware of what to ask in order to obtain a proper translation, as they
probably assume that “Cheung Kong” is akin to the English words “Chop Suey” or “Chow Mein”.
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infringement proceedings. Consider how the registration for CHEUNG KONG was used
successfully to oppose the competing application for 長 江 . Despite their difference in
appearance, the Federal Court of Canada found that they were similar in sound and in the ideas
suggested by them since they both meant “long river”.184 This finding could not have been based
on the registration for CHEUNG KONG, which gave the impression that it was an invented
English term by failing to mention that it was a transliteration for Chinese characters that mean
“long river”. Instead, this finding was based on the competing application for 長 江, which
implicated itself by mentioning that its transliteration was CHEUNG KONG and its meaning
was “long river”. If the competing application had not been so direct and honest, it could have
argued conveniently at trial that its transliteration was CHANG2 JIANG1 (instead of CHEUNG
KONG) and its meaning was the “Yangtze River” (instead of “long river”).185
What is interesting to note is that neither the registration nor the competing application
mentions that both are standard references to the “Yanztze River”: Asia‟s longest river is to
China what South America‟s Amazon is to Brazil, or Africa‟s Nile is to Egypt. This means that
neither have helpful evidence to oppose future competing applications for YANGTZE, the
cultural subject of Chinese diaspora‟s nostalgia and a popular song that became an anthem of
Chinese pride.186 This result is desirable because it is likely that both traders failed to provide the
colloquial translation in order to avoid a descriptiveness objection from the Canadian examiner.
Although both terms had been in use since the 1950‟s in Hong Kong and the 1980‟s in Toronto

184

Cheung Kong, supra note 9.
Trademarks: CHINESE CHARACTERS DESIGN, Registered, 0748168, TMA554984 contained the Chinese
characters 長 江, which it transliterated as CHANG JIANG and translated as CHEUNG KONG. The latter illustrates
that traders are unaware of what is required for a translation, which should have been “long river” and “Yangtze
River”. It also illustrates that lawyers and examiners are unaware of what to ask in order to obtain a proper
translation, due to the blinding and paralyzing fear of what is “foreign”.
186
Jonathan Stock, “Four recurring themes in histories of Chinese music” in Philip V Bohlman, ed, The Cambridge
History of World Music (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 397.
185
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for real estate services, they probably had not acquired secondary meaning in Canada at the time
of their trademark applications. If traders benefit from having examiners think that CHEUNG
KONG is an invented English term, or that 長 江 is an arbitrary combination that means “long
river”, then such traders must accept the corollary difficulty of showing evidence of confusion
with YANGTZE.
Professor Craig writes in the copyright context about how the “powerful and
mesmerizing badge of „property‟ … takes over our understanding and distorts our policy
decisions.”187 We see in this chapter how the blinding and paralyzing fear of what is “foreign”
can have the same effects. First, it takes over our understanding of basic laws in that
administrative and judicial cases ignored prior judicial explanation of who the consumer is – the
target consumer of the product, instead of the general public – in their application of the test for
confusion to foreign-language marks. Second, it distorts our policy decisions in that the case law
still requires evidence that the foreign language used in a trademark is understood by the target
consumer, even though the statutory permission to prove the confusion arising from linguistic
knowledge cannot necessarily be interpreted as a statutory requirement to prove the existence of
linguistic knowledge.
It is clear from this chapter that the Canadian test for confusion can be improved through
an understanding of what is “foreign”. This should be done by including linguistic knowledge as
part of “all” the circumstances that are relevant to the test for confusion, and by remembering
that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of the consumer instead of the trader. In the words

187

Carys Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author‟s Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to
Copyright Law” (2002) 28 Queen‟s LJ 1 at 57.
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of the two-time Nobel Prize winner Marie Curie: “Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be
understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less.”188

188

Marie Curie in Melvin Bernarde, Our Precarious Habitat, 2nd ed (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1973) at

v.
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6 JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES
This chapter explains several alternatives in response to the problem of proving linguistic
knowledge, as the evidence required to prove such knowledge changes constantly depending on
international trade, multicultural consumers, brand extension and cross-branding in order to
access untapped markets. Each alternative is explored and its challenges are explained in order to
reinforce why the problem is best addressed with the solution of assuming linguistic knowledge.

6.1

American Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents
The first alternative is the American doctrine of foreign equivalents. However, it was

rejected as early as 1992 by the same Federal Court of Canada which later included linguistic
knowledge as part of the Canadian test for confusion. One reason was because the American
doctrine is only a guideline and not law in the United States.189 The guideline was developed by
the common law, is not always applied consistently, and has even resulted in contradictory cases.
All this has led some scholars to suggest that at best it is unreliable and should be abolished at
worst.190 Another reason was because the purpose of the American doctrine diverges from that of
189

Krazy Glue, supra note 104 at 172 (“The Appellant further submitted that it would be useful in the context of the
facts of this case to consider the doctrine of foreign equivalents as applied in the United States of America, since that
country is a party to the Paris Convention. The doctrine of foreign equivalents in the United States of America
essentially provides that foreign words or terms may not be registered as a trade mark if the English language
equivalent has been previously registered for products which might reasonably be assumed to come from the same
source. This doctrine is not based on any statutory provision, but rather is merely a principle to be applied in
determining the registrability of a trade mark. I see no basis for importing this American doctrine into our law in
view of the statutory scheme in the Act pertaining to the determination of confusion.”).
190
Shuy, supra note 86 at 36 (“McCarthy is surely correct when he states that application of the doctrine of foreign
equivalents can result in a finding quite out of phase with reality.”); Elizabeth Rest, “Lost in Translation: A Critical
Examination of Conflicting Decisions Applying the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents” (2006) 96 INTA Trademark
Reporter 1211 at 1223 (“there is little agreement among courts regarding what the doctrine actually dictates, and
there is disagreements as to when and how the doctrine should be applied”); Serge Krimnus, “The Doctrine of
Foreign Equivalents at Death‟s Door” (2010) 12:1 NCJL & Tech.
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the Canadian test. The Canadian test is in accordance with the dual purposes of trademark law –
protecting consumers from confusion and owners from unfair competition – and remains the
same for both official-language marks and foreign-language marks. 191 When Home Juice
prohibited clearly descriptive marks from foreign countries, before they have begun to be used in
Canada, it was to protect Canadians and not to obtain a quid pro quo from foreign countries. By
contrast, the American doctrine extends beyond the purpose of trademark law for the purpose of
international comity:192
“The international trade foundation for the rule is significant from the standpoint
of the protection of the United States trading interests in foreign countries. Since
prior to the Lanham Act, the United States, through its Departments of State and
Commerce, has protested the registration in foreign countries of terms considered
to be generic names in the English language of products sold in the United States
and sold or intended to be sold in export trade. The rationale of these protests is
that registration of generic terms as trademarks would interfere with the free flow
of international trade in products known by that generic term. … Obviously, to
permit registration here of terms in a foreign language which are generic for
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products sold in a foreign country would be inconsistent with the rationale
supporting these international protests.”193

Perhaps the Canadian test should also expand to include the purpose of international
comity for three reasons. First, Canada‟s Trademarks Act deems trademark use on exported
products to be use in Canada. 194 Second, other jurisdictions have held that passing off on
exported products is actionable locally even if the confusion occurs abroad.195 Third, Canada‟s
membership in the World Trade Organization as of January 1, 1995 and its anticipated accession
to the Nice Agreement, Singapore Treaty and Madrid Protocol – which allow a trademark
registered in one member country to extend that registration to any or all of the other member
countries – would discourage permitting the registration of foreign-language marks which are
generic for products sold in the member countries of these international trade agreements. If
extra-territoriality is not an issue for specific trademarks in the examples above, then it should
not be an issue for trademarks that are generic terms of products.
Perhaps the policy of international comity should apply to all countries and not just to
some countries. This would mean that the Holy See (Vatican City) can protest generic terms in
193

Re Le Sorbet, supra note 154. Contrast that with Re Spirits International, NV, 86 USPQ 2d 1078 (TTAB 2008) at
13 (“The purpose of the Trademark Act is two-fold: to protect business and to protect the consumer. … The doctrine
of foreign equivalents is fundamental to this protection. It extends the protection of the Act to those consumers in
this country who speak other languages in addition to English.”) [Re Spirits TTAB].
194
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 4(3) (Use by export – “A trademark that is marked in Canada on wares or on
the packages in which they are contained is, when the wares are exported from Canada, deemed to be used in
Canada in association with those wares.”).
195
William Grant & Sons Ltd & Ors v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd & Ors [2001] ScotCS 116 at para 66
(“[We reject the ground of appeal] that the Lord Ordinary had erred in holding that interdict should apply in respect
of export of the defendant‟s products bearing the name Grant‟s to all countries, since the evidence did not warrant a
view that exports to all overseas markets were unlawful. In dealing with the matter, I proceed on the basis that the
Lord Ordinary‟s findings are more than ample to demonstrate that the defenders are liable to pass off their products
as the pursuers‟ in many overseas markets and that consumers and others in those markets are likely to experience
confusion as a result.”). Lord Clarke supported this position at para 17 of his own opinion (“As is said in Burn
Murdoch Law of Interdict at para. 348: “Defenders whose residences or business lies within Scottish jurisdiction can
by interdict, operating in personam, be restrained from making infringing use of the pursuers‟ marks anywhere
throughout the world.”).

88

the Latin language. The world‟s smallest sovereignty currently uses an official language (even its
ATM uses Latin) that the United States generally has deemed to be a dead language and
irrelevant to the issue of distinctiveness.196 However, it is uncertain what this would mean for
Aboriginal and minority languages that are not the official language of any country (including
the Inuit language, which is recognized as an official language only in a subdivision of a
country).197 Either way, it is incorrect for the quote above to apply the policy of international
comity only to countries with which the United States has trading interests significant enough to
protest their registration of generic names in the English language. And it is also incorrect for the
cases below to apply the American doctrine only to languages for which the United States has a
linguistic population significant enough to translate.
Despite their divergence in purpose, the American doctrine takes the same approach as
the Canadian test by translating foreign-language marks into English in order to decide issues
such as trademark distinctiveness198 and likelihood of confusion199:
“Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words from common
languages are translated into English to determine genericness, descriptiveness, as
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Trademark Manual of Examining Procedures, § 12.09.03(g) s (Considerations Relevant to Determination of
Descriptiveness or Genericness – Foreign Equivalents – “Latin is generally considered a dead language. However,
if evidence exists that the relevant purchasing public still uses a Latin term (e.g., if the term appears in current
dictionaries or news articles, then that Latin term is not considered dead. The same analysis should be applied to
other uncommon languages.”).
197
Inuit Act, supra note 138, c 17. A territory‟s statute must receive judicial notice.
198
Lanham Act 1946, 15 USC, c 22, § 1052(e) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature
unless it – (e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them,”).
199
Lanham Act 1946, 15 USC, c 22, § 1052(d) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature
unless it – (d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive: …”).

89

well as similarity of connotation in order to ascertain confusing similarity with
English word marks”200

The doctrine applies if “it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would „stop and
translate [the word] into its English equivalent‟.” 201 This sentence alone resulted in uncertainty
as courts tried to reconcile two major contradictions.
First, the ordinary American purchaser was clarified to mean only those “familiar with
the foreign language”202 until a later case contradicted it by claiming that “the term includes all
American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily
be expected to translate words into English.”203 The cases can supposedly be reconciled to mean
that the ordinary American purchaser should be restricted to the fluent consumer in general cases,
but expanded to both the fluent and illiterate consumers in the specific case of geographic
deceptiveness and descriptiveness.
Second, “translate” was clarified to exclude transliterations. When a trademark
application for VITAMILK was opposed due to prior use, the applicant tried to predate the
opponent‟s prior use by tacking on its earlier use of the original Chinese-language mark 維 他 奶
(WEI2 TA1 NAI3). 204 The tacking was not allowed because the Chinese-language mark was
rejected as a legal equivalent to VITAMILK. The two marks were not considered to continue the
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same commercial impression because the American doctrine applies to translations of meanings,
not transliterations of sounds. However, this clarification has been contradicted since then. When
the trademark use of HANA BANK resulted in a lawsuit for trademark infringement, the user
tried to predate the registrant‟s prior use by tacking on its earlier use of the original Koreanlanguage mark 하 나 은 행 (HA NA EUN HAENG).205 The tacking was allowed even though
the first two characters were transliterated as HANA, which had no meaning in English. The
Korean-language mark was accepted as a legal equivalent to HANA BANK even though the first
two characters could have been transliterated as HA NA, ANA or HANNAH. The trademarks
were considered to continue the same commercial impression even though the first two
characters were not literally translated as “one” to mean “united” or “whole”. As a result, the
trademark registration for HANA FINANCIAL was not infringed by the later use of HANA
BANK due to an earlier use of the original Korean-language mark. It is interesting to note that if
the disputing parties had translated instead of transliterated their original Korean-language marks,
the comparison would not have been between HANA BANK and HANA FINANCIAL, but
between ONE BANK and ONE FINANCIAL. Such a comparison would have led to a finding
that the trademarks lacked distinctiveness. This would have been consistent with a court finding
that there was no confusion between SUN BANK and SUN FEDERAL for banking services.
Although similar in sight, sound and meaning, the court found that the word SUN lacked
distinctiveness.206
The uncertainty described above continues in the actual application of the doctrine, as the
subsections below try to illustrate where the ordinary American purchaser is likely to “stop and
translate” the foreign-language mark. In this regard, the American doctrine is even less
205
206

Hana Financial, Inc v Hana Bank et al, 735 F (3d) 1158 (9th Cir 2013), aff‟d 135 US 907 (2015).
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satisfactory than the Canadian test and can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for
all foreign-language marks.

6.1.1 Comparing English to a Foreign Language
When comparing an English-language mark to a foreign-language mark, the foreignlanguage mark is translated into English since one of the trademarks needs to be translated and
English is the only official language of the United States. Examples include applying the
American doctrine and finding confusion between the French-language mark CHAT NOIR and
BLACK CAT;207 the Spanish language mark EL SOL and SUN; 208 the Italian language mark
LUPO and WOLF;209 the Spanish language mark BUENOS DIAS and GOOD MORNING;210
the Spanish language mark KRIPTONITA and KRYPTONITE; 211 the French-language mark
MARCHÉ NOIR and BLACK MARKET MINERALS;212 as well as the Spanish language mark
LA PEREGRINA and PILGRIM.213 In the same way, the American doctrine can be applied but
find that there is no confusion between marks that lack distinctiveness (such as the Frenchlanguage mark HAUTE MODE and HI-FASHION SAMPLER, 214 as well as the Frenchlanguage mark LABONTÉ and GOOD-NESS215) or have other distinguishing features (such as
the French-language mark DECI DELÀ and HERE & THERE & Design216).
The Canadian test would consider whether there is evidence that the target consumer is
familiar with the foreign language used in the trademarks. This means that the French-language
207
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marks would automatically be compared with their English translations, and vice versa, because
both French and English are official languages of Canada. This also means that the Spanish and
Italian language marks will not be compared with their English translations if their products were
marketed on a national scale.

6.1.2 Comparing the Same Foreign Language
When comparing two marks in the same foreign language, the comparison is still based
on the English translations and not on the foreign language. This can lead to interesting but
presumably reconcilable results. For example, the American doctrine was applied to the Frenchlanguage marks BON JOLIE and TRÈS JOLIE since the ordinary American purchaser would
have enough basic French to translate them as “quite pretty” and “very pretty”, but found that
there was no confusion because the trademarks lacked distinctiveness.217 Contrast that with a
similar but presumably reconcilable example where the American doctrine was not applied to the
French-language marks VEUVE ROYALE and VEUVE CLICQUOT since the ordinary
American purchaser would not have enough advanced French to translate them as “royal widow”
and “widow Clicquot”, but still found that there was confusion based on other grounds. 218 This
point was driven home when the American doctrine was applied and confusion was found with
the Spanish language marks CHUPA CHUPS and CHUPA GURTS. Even though the literal
translation for “chupa” was “to lick” or “to suck”, the ordinary American purchaser was deemed
to have enough Spanish to understand that “chupa” was slang for “lollipop”.219 Presumably it
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was the presence of a large Spanish-speaking population in the United States that was
responsible for the result that the ordinary American purchaser is presumed not to understand an
actual French word but can understand Spanish slang.
The Canadian test is clearest in this scenario because French and Spanish have the
opposite status in Canada from that in the United States. First, the French-language marks would
be compared as is without translating into English because French is an official language in
Canada. Second, the Spanish language mark would still be compared as is without translating
into English if the product is known to be marketed nationally and the percentage of Spanish
speakers was still deemed to be insignificant. 220 Third, the Spanish language mark would be
treated differently in Canada because Canadian courts have not espoused the international comity
purpose of the American doctrine:
“Moreover, the policy of international comity has substantial weight in this
situation. If we permit Chupa Chups to monopolize the term „chupa‟, we will
impede other Mexican candy makers‟ ability to compete effectively in the U.S.
lollipop market. Just as we do not expect Mexico to interfere with Tootsie‟s
ability to market its product in Mexico by granting trademark protection to the
word „pop‟ to another American confectioner, so we cannot justify debilitating
Dulces Vero‟s attempts to market „Chupa Gurts‟ in the United States by
sanctioning Chupa Chups‟ bid for trademark protection in the word „Chupa.‟”221
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The policy of international comity appears to have been adopted as a purpose of the
American doctrine after 1985, as it was ignored multiple times in prior cases. The generic term
GREENGROCER for a British retailer of fruits and vegetables was refused protection in the
United States even though “[t]the parties agree that the term is generic in Britain. Since we deal
here with American trademark law, and thus American consumers, neither British usage nor the
dictionary definition indicating such usage are determinative.” 222 The United States rejected
generic terms from Britain, even though Britain had already gone as far as to accept colloquial
slang from the United States with the reasoning that failing to do so would be to ignore the
influence of the American film industry in England.223 Likewise, the generic term SEIKO for a
Japanese sporting store was refused protection in the United States because “[w]hile the plaintiff
has sought to show that Seiko is a generic term in Japanese, it is not so recognized in this country.
Accordingly, the trademark must still be regarded as arbitrary and fanciful in the United
States.”224 It became apparent that this case would have been decided differently in later years
when the generic term OTOKOYAMA for a Japanese sake was granted protection in the United
States because “[if] one United States merchant were given the exclusive right to use that word
to designate its brand of sake, competing merchants would be prevented from calling their
product by the word which designates that product in Japanese.”225

6.1.3 Comparing Different Foreign Languages
When comparing two marks in different foreign languages, the comparison may be based
on the English translations or may be based on the foreign languages, as decided on a case-by-
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case basis. This can lead to contradictory results. The general rule is that the doctrine does not
apply because the ordinary American purchaser would probably be unfamiliar with multiple
foreign languages:226 the Italian language mark BEL ARIA and the French-language mark BEL
AIR were compared as is, which meant that there was no confusion because the former mark had
an Italian connotation and the latter mark had a geographical connotation.227 Contrast that with a
contradictory example where the doctrine was applied because the ordinary American purchaser
familiar with one foreign language was deemed to be capable of deciphering the other foreign
language: the Italian language mark DUE TORRI and the Spanish language marks TORRES and
TRES TORRES were compared in English, which resulted in the finding of confusion among the
translations of “two towers”, “towers” and “three towers”.228 Perhaps the discrepancy arises from
the fact that the latter case involved a Spanish language mark, since the ordinary American
purchaser was deemed to understand even Spanish slang.
The Canadian test has not produced any cases involving different foreign languages.
While it is unclear how Canada would compare the Italian language mark to the Spanish
language mark if each targeted its respective linguistic population, it is clear that Canada would
compare them as is without translation if each were marketed on a national scale and less than 1%
of the Canadian population spoke each language. And if a translation was warranted, Canada
would translate the Italian language mark BEL ARIA into French for comparison with the
French-language mark BEL AIR, whereas the United States would have translated both language
marks into English for comparison. The uncertainty of the American doctrine is more
pronounced with the Canadian test in this situation because Canadians – “presumably” fluent in
both English and French – are more likely to be confused with other Romance languages. Even if
226
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such Canadians are not fluent in Italian or Spanish, their bilingual knowledge increases the
possibility of their understanding such languages. The need to establish evidence as to the
existence of multi-linguists, their numbers, and how well they understand other Romance
languages can be avoided by assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks.

The uncertainty described above is also found in cases where the doctrine does not apply,
such as in the subsections below where the ordinary American purchaser is unlikely to “stop and
translate” the foreign-language mark.

6.1.4 Multiple Meanings Discourage Translation
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark has no literal
translation in English. An example is the French-language mark REPECHAGE and SECOND
CHANCE, since the French-language mark could mean “to recover” or “to fish out”.229 Another
example is the Spanish language mark PALOMA and DOVE, since the Spanish language mark
could mean “dove” or “pigeon”. 230 Some might find this rationale weak since a dove is a
domesticated breed or whiter version of a pigeon, but the same rationale was applied when
comparing marks in the same foreign language, as in the case of the Spanish language marks for
PALOMA and PALOMITA.231 Trying to decide whether an English translation is literal enough
can lead to interesting but presumably reconcilable results. Contrast the two PALOMA cases
with a similar example involving the Spanish language mark EL GALLO and ROOSTER:
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although the Spanish language mark had multiple meanings, the American doctrine was applied
because evidence showed that its use focused on the English translation of “rooster”.232

6.1.5 Marketplace Meaning Discourages Translation
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark is used in a
marketplace setting that discourages translation into English. An example is the Spanish
language mark LA POSADA being used with the words “motor hotel”, which discouraged the
actual translation of “the inn”.233 Another example is the Spanish language mark TIA MARIA
being used in a Mexican restaurant with Mexican interior and Mexican food, which discouraged
translation and avoided confusion with the English-language mark AUNT MARY‟S for canned
produce.234 The same rationale applies if the marketplace meaning is different from the translated
meaning in English. An example is not translating the French-language mark CORDON BLEU
because the marketplace recognizes it “as is” without translation.235

6.1.6 Language Combination Discourages Translation
The American doctrine does not apply if a foreign-language mark contains multiple
languages, including English, because the ordinary American purchaser is not going to translate
only part of a mark. This enabled the following generic English words to become distinctive
trademarks that were registrable: LA YOGURT for yogurt, 236 LE CASE for jewellery and gift
boxes,237 and LE CRYSTAL NATUREL for deodorant crystals.238 This point was driven home
232
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when an applicant tried to register LE SORBET for ices by arguing that LE was French and
SORBET was English. The court disagreed and deemed the entire phrase to be French, translated
it into English, then found it to be generic and unregistrable.239

The three scenarios above where the American doctrine was not applied have no similar
counterparts in the Canadian test. 240 This is because Canadian courts translate the foreignlanguage mark upon taking judicial notice of linguistic knowledge, as illustrated most clearly by
the different results in the Saint Anna and the Saint Honore cases. The Saint Anna case ignored
the Chinese-language marks when it concluded that the number of Canadians fluent in Chinese
was insignificant. Conversely, the Saint Honore case translated the Chinese-language marks
even though they had multiple meanings (they could have been transliterated but were translated
arbitrarily); they had marketplace meanings that discouraged translations (they were used in
Chinese bakeries where the owners spoke Chinese and sold coconut buns, egg tarts and moon
cakes); and they were used in a language combination (albeit they are just Chinese-language
marks with the English translations attached).
In this regard, the American doctrine is even less satisfactory than the Canadian test
because it is inconsistent with regard to whom it applies (is the ordinary American purchaser
fluent in the foreign language?), to what it applies (are transliterations excluded?), to when it
applies (can a foreign equivalent be tacked on as a legal equivalent?), to where it applies (is the
ordinary American purchaser likely to stop and translate?), and to why it applies (is international
comity a purpose only after 1985?). Even if these inconsistencies were reconciled miraculously,
it is still uncertain whether traders actually intend for consumers to stop and translate their
239
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foreign-language marks in light of the translation problems discussed in Chapter 3. The
unflattering translations for COLA-COLA – as well as the name changes for PEPSI, KFC, and
MCDONALD‟S without corresponding changes in the translations – all suggest that courts
cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the translation
will be. The American doctrine can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all
foreign-language marks, as doing so focuses the evidence on the trademarks as they are and the
association between them, which allows their distinctiveness and confusion to be assessed in the
same manner as trademarks in the official languages.

6.2

European Approach
The second alternative is to consider the European approach.
While the purpose of the American doctrine of foreign equivalent is international comity,

the purpose of the European approach is the harmonization of its internal market. 241 This is
because the European Union is an economic and political union that was created after the Second
World War with “the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically
interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.”242 This was the reasoning behind awarding
the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union in honour of its six decades of contributions
“to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” by
which “historical enemies can become close partners.” 243 International trade provides a great
incentive to keep the peace. It is also no secret that the current island dispute between China and
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Japan has been mitigated by $345 billion of trade, proving that “trade partners” might just lead to
“peace partners”.
This harmonization has resulted in the following legal system for registering trademarks:
(1) a national system to register trademarks in one member country; (2) a regional system to
register trademarks in the member countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg; (3) a
collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office to register
European Union Trade Marks in all member countries; and (4) an international system to register
trademarks in any country that is a signatory to the Madrid Protocol.244 Although the four tiers
are supposed to complement each other, the subsections below reveal how the stratified system
has resulted in inequality in assessing foreign-language marks for distinctiveness 245 and
confusion246 under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property
Office. In this regard, the European approach is just as unsatisfactory as the Canadian test for
confusion and can also benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language
marks.

6.2.1 Official & Working Languages
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office,
these 24 languages receive the highest level of protection because they are officially recognized
by the 28 member countries of the European Union.247
A trademark in an official language is unregistrable because it lacks distinctiveness if it is
the generic term for a good or service, or if it describes the characteristic of a good or service, in
244
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any of the official languages. This is true even if the official language has a small linguistic
population or generates little economic activity. As a result, an examiner must translate a
trademark into all of the official languages to ensure that it is not generic or descriptive in any of
them.248 This means that the collective system must be consistent with “the national system to
register trademarks in one member country”, but the reverse is not guaranteed. For example, the
national system in Spain allowed the registration of MATRATZEN even though it meant
“mattress” in German, the second most common official language in the European Union. Spain
did so because its population did not understand German and, therefore, the trademark was not
generic as far as Spanish consumers were concerned.249
A trademark in an official language is unregistrable because it is confusing with an earlier
mark if the relevant public makes an association between the marks in the territory where the
earlier mark is protected. For example, BIMBO DOUGHNUTS for pastry and bakery products
was confusing with an earlier registration in Spain for DOGHNUTS for confectionary and pastry
products. Although English was the most common official language in the European Union, it
was not understood by the relevant public in Spain. The fact that both trademarks had no
meaning to the relevant public in Spain increased their distinctiveness,250 but not enough to avoid
the likelihood of confusion.251
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6.2.2 Indigenous Regional & Minority Languages
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office,
these 79 languages receive special protection because they are used by the 203 national
minorities or linguistic groups that promote Europe‟s cultural heritage. 252 These languages
originate from a certain region (such as Catalan and Welsh) or from a certain minority
community (such as Romani and Yiddish) that are indigenous to the European Union.253
A trademark in a non-official language lacks distinctiveness if it is understood in at least
a part of the European Union. This is true only if the relevant public in that “part of the European
Union” understands the non-official language, because a trademark‟s registrability at the national
level in a member country should be consistent with its registrability at the collective level
throughout the European Union. As a result, ESPETEC for raw meat sausages and dried pork
cannot be registered because it means “a type of sausage that is not cooked but left to dry in
order to be eaten” in the Catalan language, which is used in a part of Spain.254
A trademark in a non-official language is confusing with an earlier mark if it is
understood by the relevant public in the territory where the earlier mark is protected. For
example, the Turkish-language mark HELLIM for milk products was confusing with the earlier
Greek-language mark HALLOUMI for cheese. Although Turkish was not an official language of
the European Union, it was understood by the relevant public in Cyprus, where the earlier mark
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was protected. The fact that both Turkish and Greek were official languages in Cyprus certainly
increased the likelihood of the relevant public confusing the two trademarks.255

6.2.3 Foreign Languages
Under the collective system managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office,
these languages receive the least legal protection because they do not have any formal status as
the languages of immigrant communities (such as Arabic and Chinese) that are not indigenous to
the European Union.256
A trademark in a foreign language lacks distinctiveness or is confusing in the same
manner as an indigenous regional & minority language. This is worrisome because the two
groups of languages are being treated equally when the latter group is supposed to receive
special protection to protect and promote Europe‟s cultural heritage. As a result, a foreign
language – which is supposed to receive less legal protection – could actually receive more
trademark recognition than an indigenous language such as Catalan, especially if the immigrant
population increases in significance while the local population decreases. Another worry is the
differential treatment between foreign languages themselves. For example, a registration for the
Arab-language mark EL BAINA for halal food was enough to block another confusing
application, because the courts found that halal food was only consumed by Arabic consumers
who understood the language.257 Compare this to the opposite finding for four registrations for
the Chinese-language marks WANG LAO JI for traditional medicine. The four registrations
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were not enough to block another confusing application, because the courts found that traditional
medicine were also consumed by the average European consumers who were not Chinese and
did not understand the language. 258
In this regard, the European approach is just as unsatisfactory as the Canadian test
because it results in a stratified system. Trademark distinctiveness will depend on the linguistic
populations and economic activities associated with a language. Trademark confusion will differ
according to the territory where the earlier mark is protected. The European approach can also
benefit from assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language marks, as doing so focuses
the evidence on the trademarks as they are and the association between them, which allows their
distinctiveness and confusion to be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in the official
languages.

6.3

Chinese Approach
The third alternative is to consider the Chinese approach.
There is little use in looking at multilingual Hong Kong and Singapore, which do not

have difficulty adjudicating English-language and Chinese-language marks.259 This dissertation
is developing a workable model for those without any knowledge of a foreign language (such as
Chinese) in order to assess and compare such marks. This is similar to how bilingual Canada has
no difficulty adjudicating English-language and French-language marks, whereas the United
States needed the doctrine of foreign equivalents because it had no knowledge of French.
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On the other hand, China and Taiwan are monolingual like the United States and may
have case law on assessing English-language marks and comparing them to Chinese-language
marks. Such case law is of little use when both countries are civil law jurisdictions, which have
neither judicial comity with the Western countries above nor reporting databases that are freely
accessible (such as Quicklaw, Westlaw, and CanLII). It is important to remember that China
enacted its first trademark law only in 1982. 260 Despite the paucity of cases, as well as the
shortness and v\agueness of their reasoning, it can be instructive to consider the most famous and
recent trademark decisions coming out of China. While the purpose of the American doctrine of
foreign equivalent is international comity, and the purpose of the European approach is the
harmonization of its internal market, it appears from the subsections below that the purpose of
the Chinese approach comes from political pressure to affirm intellectual property rights and
develop a friendlier environment for international businesses.

6.3.1 Example of TRUMP
The first decision involved Donald Trump. Donald Trump owned multiple trademark
registrations in China for TRUMP, which was licensed on everything from steaks to universities.
Many other traders in China also registered TRUMP for different goods and services, the most
famous being toilets that conduct pregnancy tests. It was inevitable that Donald Trump would
eventually clash with the other traders: his 2006 trademark application to use TRUMP for real
estate services was denied due to another trader‟s earlier registration for construction services,
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Peter Yu, “Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System” (2013) 5 WIPOJ
1 at 8. And equally applicable to trademarks is the author‟s comment about patents at 15 (“Thus, even though
government leaders, policy makers and industry executives are often frustrated by the lack of progress in the
Chinese intellectual property system – or, for that matter, the intellectual property system in other emerging
countries – they need to think hard about what timeframe would be realistic for a country to develop a wellfunctioning patent system.”).

106

and his 2007 trademark application to use TRUMP for restaurants was also denied due to another
trader‟s earlier registration for coffee shops, restaurants and catering. Donald Trump spent a
decade losing at every administrative and judicial level to which he appealed: even though he
sent 300 pounds of materials to convince China that TRUMP was an internationally recognized
brand in 2009, and he wrote to the United States Commerce Department requesting intervention
in 2011. 261 So it was nothing short of a miracle (or mystery) when China‟s highest court
approved his registration of TRUMP for restaurants in May 2016, as well as invalidated another
trader‟s registration for constructions services.
First, China has a first-to-file system for recognizing trademark rights. So why would a
court decide that another trader‟s prior registration for coffee shops, restaurants and catering no
longer barred Donald Trump‟s later trademark application to use the same trademark for
restaurants?
Second, it is difficult to invalidate trademarks after the 5-year registration period. So why
would a court decide in November 2016 to invalidate another trader‟s pre-2006 registration for
construction services in order to approve Donald Trump‟s 2006 trademark application to use the
same trademark for real estate services?
Third, TRUMP is a common word. So why would a court reward Donald Trump with a
monopoly over an English word? The finding was based on the 300 pounds of materials that
TRUMP was an internationally recognized brand. But we need to understand – incredible as it
sounds – that China‟s administrative and judicial levels were correct to deny Donald Trump‟s
trademark applications, while China‟s highest court was incorrect to approve them. Consider
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how the Canadian test for confusion currently requires proof that the average consumer of the
product will understand the foreign-language mark, how the American doctrine of foreign
equivalents requires that the ordinary purchaser is likely to “stop and translate”, or how the
European approach requires that the relevant public will understand the non-official language.
Applying the same expectation in China would mean accepting the reality that the average
Chinese consumers of real estate services, the ordinary Chinese purchasers at restaurants, or the
relevant Chinese public cannot even read or sound out, much less understand, the foreignlanguage mark TRUMP. For every indignant protest that TRUMP should be recognized in China
anyway because it is a common word in English, let us remember that 安 娜 (ANNA) was not
recognized in Canada even though it was a common name in Chinese. And for every cynical
scoff at the idea that the Chinese public does not recognize TRUMP when Donald Trump has
appeared on television shows and magazine covers, let us remember that the Canadian public
was not expected to recognize 長 江 (YANGTZE) even though it was geographical landmark
and trademarked as early as the 1950‟s by Li Ka-Shing. As Asia‟s richest man and #23 on
Forbe‟s 2018 ranking of the world‟s billionaires, Li Ka-Shing and his corporate trademark have
received more international attention than Donald Trump (ranked at #766).
Suffice it to say, the sudden turn of events after a decade of losing litigation raised
speculation that China‟s decisions were politically motivated by Donald Trump‟s presidential
campaign at that time. The rumour mills churned even faster when China approved 38 new
trademark applications for TRUMP and its translation as 川 普 (CHUAN1 PU3) in February
2017, setting a record for the number and speed of the approvals.262
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6.3.2 Example of JORDAN
The second decision involved Michael Jordan. The standard translation that is
internationally accepted for JORDAN, whether it be the name of a person or a country, is 約 旦
(YUE1 DAN4). However, when Michael Jordan debuted on Chinese television during the 1984
Olympics, a news reporter made up the new translation 喬 丹 (QIAO2 DAN1). It is not clear
why the reporter did not use the standard translation. Perhaps the reporter thought the legendary
basketball player deserved a unique translation with an extraordinary meaning: “tall – red”
evokes a positive image because this specific Chinese character for “red” suggests sincerity and
loyalty of heart. The new translation became popular and was registered by a clothing chain in
China. Michael Jordan then spent years suing the clothing chain until he finally won an
infringement case on December 8, 2016. 263 This decision from China‟s highest court was
astounding for three reasons.
First, there is a standard translation for JORDAN. So why would a court decide that the
new translation actually identified Michael Jordan? The finding was based on evidence that the
Chinese media has identified Michael Jordan by the new translation since the 1984 Olympics.
This evidence exposes a weakness in Michael Jordan‟s case from a trademark perspective: the
new translation was neither used by Michael Jordan nor used as a trademark. The evidence
suggests that the new translation was actually used by the public and used as information.
Nevertheless, there is support for deciding that such use can enure to a specific trader in light of
Coca-Cola v Busch.264 The Coca-Cola Company advertised its products in association with the
COCA-COLA mark, which the public abbreviated as COKE. Since The Coca-Cola Company
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was not using the abbreviation, a competitor started using the variation KOKE. In order to
persuade an American court that it had a complaint for confusion, The Coca-Cola Company first
had to claim that the use by others of the COKE abbreviation should enure to it as the owner of
the COCA-COLA mark.
Second, there is nothing distinctive about the name JORDAN. So why would a court
decide that the new translation only identified Michael Jordan and did not also identify anyone
and everyone named Jordan? The decision was based on evidence that the Chinese company
accused of taking the new translation from Michael Jordan also registered other trademarks
associated specifically with Michael Jordan: an NBA silhouette that was amended to reflect
Michael Jordan‟s physique, the number 23 that used to be on Michael Jordan‟s basketball jersey,
and the Chinese names of Michael Jordan‟s children.265 This evidence could be dismissed on the
basis that none of the registrations relate to trademarks or names actually belong to Michael
Jordan: the trademarks belong to Nike, Inc.266 and the names to his children. Nevertheless, there
is support that such evidence is relevant in light of a much repeated commentary on passing off,
the common law forefather of trademark infringement: “Why should the court be astute to say
that the defendant cannot succeed in doing that which he is straining every nerve to do?”267
Third, there was at least a 10-year delay between the clothing chain in China registering
the new translation in 2000 and Michael Jordan commencing his lawsuit in 2012. Although Nike,
Inc. registered JORDAN in the 1990‟s, it did nothing with respect to filing or opposing
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trademark applications for the new translation.268 So why would a court reward Michael Jordan
for the inexcusable delay, especially when trademark registrations were supposed to be difficult
to invalidate after the 5-year registration period? During that time, the clothing chain had become
well known to the public through its large-scale activities: registering almost 500 trademarks,
investing over $10 million USD in annual advertising, establishing over 5,700 retail outlets, and
attempting to become a publicly traded company. 269 If it is wrong for one to benefit from
Michael Jordan‟s popularity, then is it not also wrong for the other to benefit from the clothing
chain‟s decade of advertising? This could be a reason behind the decision from China‟s highest
court that Michael Jordan can only claim the new translation with respect to the writing (乔 丹)
but not with respect to the pronunciation (QIAO2 DAN1). This means that although the clothing
chain can no longer use the Chinese characters, it can continue to use the PinYin letters by which
it is also known. It can also use other Chinese characters that correspond with the same PinYin
letters, which can compete with and dilute the uniqueness of the new translation that Michael
Jordan just won.
If Michael Jordan could have known that this would be the result, would he still have
commenced the lawsuits in 2012 or would he have choosen to rebrand instead? His decision was
probably pre-determined by the advice he sought. For example, an ad agency would know
nothing of litigation but be quick to advise on rebranding. The marketing experts might realize
that there is no mandatory translation for JORDAN. This meant that Michael Jordan was free to
ignore both the standard translation that was internationally accepted and the new translation

268

Industry Insights, “3 Take-aways From Michael Jordan‟s Chinese Supreme Court Trademark Victory For
Companies
Doing
Business
in
China”,
SportTechie
(15
December
2016),
online:
<http://www.sporttechie.com/2016/12/15/industryinsights/3-take-aways-from-michael-jordans-chinese-supremecourt-trademark-victory-for-companies-doing-business-in-china/>.
269
Deanna Wong & Stefaan Meuwissen, “No Trademark Slam Dunk for Michael Jordan in China”, Bloomberg Law
(2 June 2015), online: <https://bol.bna.com/no-trademark-slam-dunk-for-michael-jordan-in-china/>.

111

given to him by the Chinese media. He was free to create and register his own Chinese name, use
it in all future communications, and publicize in future interviews that any other Chinese
translations have nothing to do with him. Doing so could have neutralized the Chinese company
and publicized its illegitimacy just as effectively, and without the years and fees spent on
litigation. On the other hand, a law firm is not in the business of rebranding but would have
ample advice on litigation.
Legal experts might assume that Michael Jordan‟s situation is the same as that of Jeremy
Lin. Jeremy Lin now plays point guard for the Charlotte Hornets, the NBA team owned by
Michael Jordan. When he filed applications in China for his trademarks, including JEREMY LIN
and LINSANITY in English, he discovered that another company in China had already
registered his Chinese name. 270 His situation differs from that of Michael Jordan, however,
because he does not have the option of rebranding. His Chinese name is independent, as it is
neither a standard translation nor a media designation of his English name. His Chinese name is
also much more personal, as it what his parents have called him since birth. We must consider
whether Donald Trump and Michael Jordan deserve the same protection for their Chinese
translations as Jeremy Lin does for his Chinese name, especially in light of Professor Scassa‟s
observation that names are “the simplest, most literal and most obvious of all symbols of identify”
and surnames “can reflect one‟s cultural, ethnic, religious or familial heritage.” 271 Fortunately for
Jeremy Lin, his boss already knows how to win a trademark case in China.

270

Benjamin Kang Lim, “Jeremy Lin Trademarks Scooped Up By Chinese Company Last August”, The Huffington
Post (27 February 2012), online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/27/jeremy-lin-trademark-scoopedchinese-company_n_1303271.html>.
271
Teresa Scassa, Legislating the Mother Tongue: Language, the Individual and the State (SJD Thesis, University of
Michigan, 1995) quoting from Harold Isaacs, “Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe” in Nathan Glazer &
Daniel Moynihan, eds, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) 29 at 50 and
“Parent‟s Selection of Children‟s Surnames” (1983) 51 Geo Wash L Rev 583 respectively [Scassa].

112

It is clear from this chapter that the Chinese approach is actually the closest to assuming
linguistic knowledge out of all the countries discussed. This reveals how Canada, the United
States, and the European Union themselves are sensitive to foreign-language marks but fail to
appreciate that others can also be blinded and paralyzed with the “foreign-ness” of Englishlanguage marks. The expectation for Chinese locals to be fluent consumers regardless of whether
a trademark is in Chinese or English means that the Western countries above have failed to apply
the very approach that they expect from China.
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7 LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE
This chapter tests the solution of assuming linguistic knowldge by applying it to the
criteria for trademark registrability, as well as to the trader‟s rights against infringement, against
depreciation of goodwill, to license, and to translate. Assuming linguistic knowledge serve the
dual purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from
unfair competition, because assessing foreign-language marks in the same manner as trademarks
in the official languages stops the expansion of rights by minimizing claims that any and all
translations infringe or depreciate a registered trademark.

7.1

Registrability of Trademarks
Section 12 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act sets out a defined list of when trademarks are

registrable in order to receive statutory protection. The criteria for registrability used to mean
little for foreign-language marks. It had limited application when the test for confusion always
imagined the illiterate consumer. This was true even though it was odd and contradictory that
foreign-language marks that are not Romanized were deemed to be designs (which had no
distinctiveness issue), but still had to provide translations as if they were words (in order to
assess for distinctiveness). The inclusion of the fluent consumer now raises the question whether
registrability should be assessed based on the foreign language used in the trademark or based on
the English translation of the trademark. This is an important issue because conducting the
assessment in different languages could affect the registrability of foreign-language marks, as
demonstrated in the subsections below.
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7.1.1 Names or Surnames
Section 12(1)(a) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is
not a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has
died within the preceding thirty years.”
This is generally assessed by checking a Canadian directory to see if it has 25 entries or
more of the name or the surname. For example, the surname “McDonald” is not registrable due
to its numerous entries in the Canadian telephone directory (although the fast food restaurant
MCDONALD‟S could register its trademark after it acquired secondary meaning to overcome its
original lack of distinctiveness). The same approach meant that foreign surnames such as the
Spanish “Galanos”,272 the Japanese “Nishi”,273 and the Arabic “Abd-Ru-Shin”274 were registrable
because they were unlikely to be recognized as such or found in a telephone directory in Canada.
Would it matter if the surnames found in a telephone directory are skewed representations as a
result of segregation (such as Germany mandating Jewish names to the point of requiring all
Jewish males and females to use Israel and Sarah respectively), assimilation (such as Italy
forbidding foreign names to the point of “re-italianizing” gravestones), or nation-building (such
as Bulgari‟s name-change program in order to conceal its Turkish minority)?275
Applying the same general assessment to names and surnames in non-Roman languages
will produce different results depending on whether the assessment is based on the non-Roman
language or the English translation. For example, the surname “Goh” is registrable due to its
limited entries in the mainstream Canadian telephone directory. This assessment should not
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change due to the increased entries by considering that “Goh”, “Ng”, and “Wu” are actually
English versions of 吳 from Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and China respectively, as most
Canadians will neither know of the association nor confuse the surnames in English. They are
more likely to be confused by “Chen”, “Cheng”, and “Cheung”, even though all three come from
different Chinese characters. On the other hand, 吳 itself should not be registrable due to its
numerous entries in Chinese-Canadian telephone directories. It is one of the 100 most common
Chinese surnames listed in a classic Chinese text called Hundred Family Surnames (one of three
literary texts that children must memorize in order to learn Chinese characters). The corollary of
not equating Chinese surnames with their English translations means that the unregistrability of
“Anna” should not apply automatically to 安 娜, as there can also be different Chinese versions
of the English name. Notwithstanding this, 安 娜 is unregistrable because the numerous entries
in Chinese-Canadian telephone directories serve as evidence to prove that it is the standard
translation that is internationally accepted for “Anna”.
Now that the test for confusion considers linguistic knowledge as part of the surrounding
circumstances, should cultural differences also become a consideration when it comes to namebased trademarks? For example, Anglo-speaking countries start with the personal names and end
with surnames. Chinese-speaking countries reverse the order by starting with the surnames to
indicate the family, then following with the personal names to indicate the individual.276 This
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cultural norm can also apply to English translations of Chinese names, which means America‟s
beloved cellist would call himself MA Yo-Yo in Chinese-speaking countries. Unfortunately,
doing so causes confusion in the West, so he follows the cultural norm in Anglo-speaking
countries by calling himself Yo-Yo MA. However, not all Chinese follow the cultural norm in
Anglo-speaking countries, so Anglo-speakers are often and rightfully confused when faced with
English translations of Chinese names. Some Chinese try to minimize the confusion by
capitalizing the surname (as in MA) or by joining both components of their personal names (as in
Yo-Yo). If an English translation mirrors a Chinese name instead of following the English
cultural norm, can someone else use an English translation which reverses the order?277

7.1.2 Distinctiveness of Trademarks
Sections 12(1)(b) and (c) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act state that “a trademark is
registrable if it is not (b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the character or quality of the
goods or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions
of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin; (c) the name in any
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language of any of the goods or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to be
used.”
As previously discussed in subsection 5.1.1 on “Assessing for Distinctiveness”, the
difference between descriptive marks being barred in the English or French language versus
generic marks being barred in any language should be removed because traders should be
prohibited from doing in a foreign language what they cannot do in English or French.
On the one hand, both the Supreme Court of Canada‟s “matter of first impression and
imperfect recollection” and the Federal Court of Canada‟s “average consumer of the product”
statements are clear that the test for confusion focuses on the mind of the consumer. This may
suggest that the distinctiveness should be assessed based on the foreign language used in the
trademark, since the fluent consumer will be thinking in that foreign language. For example, the
fluent consumer will think in English when reading the English words and will think in French
when reading the French words in the sentence: “You committed a faux pas by bringing your
bouquet from the ballet into the café where we had croissants before heading to the restaurant.”
The fluent consumer will not translate the entire sentence into English in order to understand it:
“You committed a [fake step/social blunder] by bringing your [bunch of flowers] from the
[Italian dance performance] into the [coffee shop] where we had [French rolls] before heading to
the [establishment for eating].” Nor will the fluent consumer translate the entire sentence into
French.
On the other hand, such an approach would place a heavy burden on courts to familiarize
themselves with the foreign language used in the trademarks in dispute in order to access the
mind of the consumer. The fact remains that Canadian courts think only in Canada‟s official
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languages, so it is a practical necessity for them to assess distinctiveness based on the English or
French translation of the trademark.
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the test for confusion now means that the
spectrum running from strong to weak distinctiveness for trademarks will also apply to foreignlanguage marks. The subsections below will continue to review the stories of The Coca-Cola
Company and the two Chinese bakeries in Canada that originally ignored linguistic knowledge to
illustrate how conducting the assessment in different languages will result in different levels of
trademark distinctiveness.

7.1.2.1 Inherently Distinctive Marks
Inherently distinctive marks may be fanciful, coined, or arbitrary marks.
A fanciful and coined mark is an invented word that has no dictionary definition.
Therefore it has a strong distinctiveness because it has no meaning as a word and only has
meaning as a mark. This is the case with PEPSI-COLA‟s translation 百 事 可 樂, since 可 樂
was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933 and the four characters have no meaning as
a combination. The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were to have no
meaning as a combination.
An arbitrary mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, but is used arbitrarily in a
meaningless context. Therefore it also has a strong distinctiveness because its meaning as a word
is irrelevant to the arbitrary meaning of the trademark. This is the case with PEPSI-COLA‟s
translation 百 事 可 樂, since neither the literal meaning “hundred things possible happy” nor the
suggested meaning “happy with everything” has anything to do with colas. The same rationale
applies to the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 , since neither the literal meaning HOLY –
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PEACEFUL – ELEGANT nor the colloquial meaning SAINT ANNA has anything to do with
pastries.

7.1.2.2 Suggestive Marks
A suggestive mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is used to hint at the
character or quality of the product. Therefore it is less distinctive because its meaning as a word
is relevant to the hinted meaning of the trademark. This is the case with COCA-COLA‟s
translation 可 口 可 樂 being used in association with colas, since 可 口 meant “tasty”. The same
rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were used in association with baking
communion bread for Christian and Catholic churches, since both the literal meaning HOLY –
PEACEFUL – ELEGANT and the colloquial meaning SAINT ANNA are religious.

7.1.2.3 Descriptive/Misdescriptive Marks
A descriptive (or misdescriptive) mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is
used to describe (or mislead as to) the character or quality of the product. Therefore it is not
distinctive, because its meaning as a word is the same as the actual meaning of the trademark,
but it can become distinctive if it acquires secondary meaning. This would be the case if COCACOLA had been translated literally as 古 柯 (GU3 KE1 means “coca”) and 汽 水 (QI4 SHUI3
means “air water” as in a carbonated drink), unless the trademark acquired secondary meaning so
that consumers no longer associate it with any and all carbonated drinks made from coca leaves.
The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were translated as SAINT
HONORÉ (the name of the French patron saint of bakers and pastry chefs; the name of a
municipality in Québec; the name of a commune and a street in France) or SAINT ANNA (the
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name of the Virgin Mary‟s mother; Jesus‟ grandmother), unless the trademark acquired
secondary meaning so that consumers no longer associate it with the famous person or place of
the same name.

7.1.2.4 Generic Marks
A generic mark is a word that has a dictionary definition, and is used as a common word
for the product itself. Therefore it can never be distinctive because its meaning as a word is the
same as the actual meaning of the product itself. This would be the case regardless of whether
COCA-COLA is translated literally as 古 柯 汽 水 or colloquially as 可 口 可 樂. This is
because 汽 水 has always meant “air water” as in a carbonated drink, whereas 可 樂 was
distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933 but has come to mean “cola” and now lacks
distinctiveness. The same rationale applies if the Chinese characters 聖 安 娜 were translated as
CHALLAH, which is the common name for a type of Jewish bread eaten on the Sabbath.

It is important to note that the subsections above only illustrate how linguistic knowledge
can affect trademark distinctiveness: the Chinese characters remain the same, yet their trademark
distinctiveness will vary depending on their English translations. And translations have linguistic
limitations, as they may fail to capture all the linguistic possibilities of foreign languages. For
example, there is only one word in English for “cousin”, but there are multiple such words in
Chinese which immediately specify whether the cousin is male or female, older or younger, on
the paternal side or maternal side, and related by blood or marriage. The test for confusion is thus
applied to foreign-language marks within the limits of a mind that only understands English, not
within the mind of the fluent consumer open to all its cultural connotations.
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Some may find this problematic and suggest solving it by reverting to the time when all
foreign-language marks were treated by imagining the illiterate consumer. This approach was
acceptable in a national economy when each country established its own trademark system in
accordance with its own official language(s). It is no longer acceptable in today‟s global
economy where foreign languages cross national boundaries when people migrate and intermarry, corporations merge with and acquire one another, and countries trade with each other.

7.1.3 Confusion of Trademarks
Section 12(1)(d) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is
not confusing with a registered trademark.”
As previously discussed in subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing for Confusion”, foreignlanguage marks should not be compared for confusion based on their translations because the test
for confusion does not make any references to languages. The recommended solution to assume
linguistic knowledge, instead of requiring proof of it before including it in the test for confusion,
does not mean that evidence as to how consumers perceive the trademark is no longer required.
On the contrary, the courts can still leave the burden on the trademark applicant to dispute the
assumption by proving that consumers have no linguistic knowledge for any registered foreignlanguage mark that is barring the application. After all, it is the applicant who is in petitorio.278
The subsections below illustrate that the kind of evidence required for the test for confusion also
applies to linguistic knowledge: while evidence as to the existence of linguistic knowledge is not
required, evidence as to the confusion arising from linguistic knowledge remains relevant.
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The test for confusion in opposition proceedings requires the trademark applicant to prove there is no likelihood
of confusion, according to Mattel, supra note 99 at para 6. It is only infringement proceedings that require traders to
prove that there is likelihood of confusion, according to Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, supra note 99 at para 14.
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7.1.3.1 Reference Sources
The first type of evidence could be reference sources such as almanacs, biographies,
dictionaries, encyclopedias, gazetteers, thesauruses, yearbooks, etc. 279 An example is how
PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because a reference to
dictionaries established that “Cola would, therefore, appear to be a word which might
appropriately be used in association with beverages and, in particular, with that class of nonalcoholic beverages colloquially known by the description of „soft drinks‟.”280 Another example
is how DIXI-COLA was found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because scientific and
popular literature recognized Cola “as the name of a tree native to Africa” and pharmaceutical
and scientific publications suggested that “it could be used to make a beverage that would
successfully compete with tea and coffee as a refreshing and invigorating drink.”281
Although it is important to respect the territoriality of trademarks, it must be noted that
reference sources need not be restricted by national boundaries. Canada‟s Trademarks Act
prohibits generic marks that are “the name in any language of any of the goods or services in
connection with which it is used or proposed to be used.” 282 The Home Juice case accepted
evidence regarding the French word MAISON from foreign dictionaries published in France,
which contained different definitions from the domestic dictionaries published in Canada. The
court considered the meaning of the French word in France because failing to do so would enable
“a shrewd trader [to] monopolize a new French expression by registering it as a trade mark as
soon as it started being used in France or in another French-speaking country and before it could
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Donald F Duncan, Inc, v Royal Tops Manufacturing Company, Inc, and Randy Brown, 343 F (2d) 655, 144
USPQ 617 (7th Cir 1965) at paras 28, 67-68 [Royal Tops]. And see Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc, et al, v Coca-Cola
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be shown to have begun being used in Canada.”283 This rationale could also apply to foreignlanguage marks. Since the 1970 case already described English and French as international
languages with “a vocabulary that is extremely difficult to define especially in these days when
communication media are no longer confined within national boundaries,” the same logic could
apply today to Chinese (the most widely-spoken language in the world) as well as to Spanish and
Arabic (both are more widely spoken than French worldwide).284

7.1.3.2 Social Influences
A second type of evidence could be social influences ranging from contemporary (blogs,
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) to traditional (newspapers, magazines, radio,
television, film, etc.) media.285
Keeping in mind the importance of respecting the territoriality of trademark, it would
appear that social influences should be restricted by national boundaries; namely, the social
influence may originate from a foreign source, but it should not be considered unless it ends with
a local consumer. Not restricting reference sources makes sense since such evidence serves to
explain the origin and meaning of the word used in the trademark, but not the trademark itself.
Conversely, restricting social influences seems necessary because such evidence serves to prove
the knowledge and use of the trademark in association with specific goods and services. This
raises the question as to whether the territoriality of social influences will matter after Canada
abandons the use requirement for trademark applications. Re an Application by La Marquise
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Home Juice, supra note 150 at para 51.
“Summary by Language Size”, Ethnologue, Languages of the World (last accessed on 27 April 2017), online:
<http://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size>. (There are 1,302 million Chinese speakers; 427 million Spanish
speakers; 339 million English speakers; 267 million Arabic speakers; and 75.9 million French speakers worldwide.)
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Footwear 286 accepted evidence regarding the English slang OOMPH from the United States,
because failing to do so would be to ignore the influence of the American film industry in
England:
“I should perhaps add this: much argument was addressed upon the footing that,
after all, the word, in so far as it is in current use, however short and brutish a life
it may have, is American slang rather than, as we would say, part of our own
native tongue. That is a matter upon which one might have debate for hours –
whether it is the fact that the English tongue as spoken in these islands and the
English tongue as spoken in the United States or in Canada or in Australia or in
other parts of the globe is or is not one and the same language. I do not propose to
throw any light upon any possible answer to the question, save to say that where,
as here, the word is primarily employed in the film industry, and, as is well known,
are shown and seen by hundreds of thousands of people throughout the whole of
the English-speaking world, I think that it would be an affectation to say that a
word which has gained any currency as an American slang word ought to be
treated in these islands, in the absence of any evidence one way or the other, as a
foreign word.”

This rationale could also apply to foreign-language marks nowadays given that many of
Canada‟s linguistic populations have their own highly profitable and widely distributed media,
including newspaper and magazines, radio, television and movies.
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Re La Marquise Footwear, supra note 150.
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7.1.3.3 Government Documents
A third type of evidence could be government documents such as trademark registrations,
patent specifications, corporate certificates, etc.287 For example, PEPSI-COLA was found to be
not confusing with COCA-COLA due to evidence of “a series of 22 trademarks registered
Canada in during a period of 29 years, viz, from 1902 to 1930 [sic], in connection with beverages
[which showed] that the word Cola had been adopted in Canada as an item in the naming of
different beverages.”288 Conversely, The Coca-Cola Company tried unsuccessfully to use its five
trademark registrations to stop another competitor from using DIXI-COLA.289 One reason for the
failure was because a claim to the exclusive use of COCA-COLA was insufficient to monopolize
the word COLA, as the court noted that there were at least 143 registrations in the United States
using the word COLA as a suffix for competing drinks.290 Another reason for the failure was
because the company had admitted previously in affidavits that “the name in large measure [was]
descriptive of the character of the article” in order to benefit from a then-existing provision
“which permits the registration of a descriptive mark by one who has made actual and exclusive
use thereof for ten years next preceding the approval of the act.”291
Another example of “government documents” comes from the Saint Honore case, where
evidence that federal Members of Parliament and provincial Members of the Legislative
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Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 43-52, 56-57, 62-66. And see Parke, Davis & Co v Empire Laboratories Ltd,
[1964] SCR 351, 1964 CanLII 74 at 355-356 (“… there was evidence that the appellant at one time held a United
States patent on sealed capsules with similar bands from 1932 until it expire in 1949. … Then, after the patent had
expired, the appellant registered its 10 trademarks in Canada on September 19, 1950. In this way it sought to
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Company et al. … Lord Russell ((1938) D.L.R.) at p. 150 stated: „... There can be little doubt that had the plaintiff,
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Assembly who are non-Chinese now have Chinese names on their business cards and newsletters
assisted the court in taking judicial notice of a significant Chinese linguistic population in
Canada.292 Keep in mind that this is different from using the evidence to prove the confusion
arising from linguistic knowledge, which was illustrated during the United States election of
2016. The voting ballots in California translated Donald J. Trump‟s name as 唐 納 徳 J. 特 郎 普
(TANG2 NA4 DE2 J. TE4 LANG3 PU3), while the voting ballots in New York translated it as
唐 諾 得 J. 川 普 (TANG2 NUO4 DE2 J. CHUAN1 PU3). 293 Are the voting ballots evidence
that both are standard translations that are internationally accepted for the names “Donald” and
“Trump”, which means they need to acquire secondary meaning to overcome the original lack of
distinctiveness? Alternatively, are the voting ballots evidence that there are no standard
translations for the names, which means they are not barred from registration as “a word that is
primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the
preceding thirty years”?294 Foreign government documents provide conflicting evidence because
China uses the former translation, while most other Chinese jurisdictions (Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Taiwan) use the latter translation. The United States government could have created a third
translation in order to avoid the political awkwardness of choosing between the existing
translations, which would have avoided the practical confusion of having contradictory voting
ballots. Since Donald Trump used and registered the latter translation, does the former
translation remain free for others to use? Since both translations mirror Donald Trump‟s English
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Saint Honore, supra note 91 at para 27.
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name instead of following Chinese cultural norm, can someone else use Chinese trademarks
which reverse the order?295
Although it is important to respect the territoriality of trademarks, judicial willingness to
consider French references and American influences raises the possibility that the courts may
also accept the relevance of foreign trademark registrations, and even foreign court decisions.
Accepting foreign trademark registrations in keeping with the policy of international comity
discussed in Chapter 6, as well as with international trademark systems, such as the Madrid
Protocol, which extends a trademark registration in one member country to any or all of the other
member countries. And foreign court decisions could arguably be admissible as “government
documents” since courts form the judicial branch of government. Of course, foreign trademark
registrations may carry little persuasive weight when issued from countries known for trademark
squatters, just as foreign court decisions may have little precedential value.296

7.1.3.4 Corporate Materials
A fourth type of evidence could be corporate materials such as licence agreements, order
sheets, promotional materials, cease-and-desist letters, etc. 297 For example, DIXI-COLA was
found to be not confusing with COCA-COLA because “The Coca-Cola Company itself has
recognized the propriety of competitive trade names containing the word “Cola” by consenting
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Wang Lao Ji, supra note 277 discussed how the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore found no confusion
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to a number of consent decrees.” 298 As a result of weekly lawsuits against competitors from
1911-1941, the company won twenty-nine court orders in the duration of thirty years to enjoin
the use of the word “Cola” on its own. Twenty-three of them were consent decrees.299

7.1.3.5 Expert Witnesses
A fifth type of evidence could be expert witnesses such as linguists, etymologists, social
scientists, etc. A pessimist would assume that such evidence would be reduced to experts
contradicting each other on the distinctiveness of and the confusion between whatever marks are
in question, 300 but an optimist would hope that the court can separate the truth from the
contradictions. From Singapore301 to the United States,302 it is now common place for an expert
witness to study a word, express an opinion as to its origin, and explain its meaning in order to
assist the courts in assessing for distinctiveness or comparing for confusion.303

7.1.3.6 Lay Testimonies
The sixth type of evidence could be lay testimonies such as non-expert witnesses,
customer surveys, etc.304 For example, The Coca-Cola Company introduced forty-one witnesses
to testify that “when they saw goods labeled by a name containing the suffix „COLA‟, they were
led to believe, not that the goods were COCA-COLA, but that they originated with the Coca298

Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 358.
Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 359.
300
Yee Hong, supra note 70 at para 16.
301
Yomeishu Seizo Co Ltd v Sinma Medical Products (M) Sdn Bhd in NG-LOY Wee Loon, “The Meaning of
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Cola Company”. 305 Although the court found such evidence insufficient to stop a competitor
from using DIXI-COLA, since it found that a claim to the exclusive use of COCA-COLA was
insufficient to monopolize the word COLA, the court did find unfair competition on another
ground: a scheme to confuse consumers by copying the colour, the script, and the display.306 The
fact that the court finding was not based on trademark infringement, but on unfair competition,
was emphasized with its affirmation that “the product including the coloring matter is free to all
who can make it if no intrinsic deceiving element is present”307 [emphasis added]. Likewise, the
court took judicial notice of a significant Chinese linguistic community in Canada in the Saint
Honore case because 1,905 of the 2,259 customer surveys (conducted in previous years on other
issues) were filled out in Chinese instead of English.308

7.1.3.7 Translations vs Transliterations
A new type of evidence could be comparing the trademark in dispute with its foreignlanguage equivalents. Perhaps a novel argument can be made that the foreign-language
equivalents shed light on how much a trader values the sound or the meaning of a trademark. For
example, MICROSOFT is translated literally as 微 軟. Can the translation be used to oppose a
competitor from using BABY SOFT by helping to overcome arguments that MICROSOFT has
lost much – perhaps all – of its original meaning due to the combination? Consider also that the
MAVERICKS is translated literally as 小 牛 隊. Can the translation be used as evidence that
MAVERICKS only means “little cows team” and should not oppose a competing basketball
team from using RENEGADES? Conversely, COCA-COLA is transliterated phonetically as 可
305
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口 可 樂. Although the English trademark originally focused on the meaning to refer to the
product‟s ingredients, can the Chinese transliteration support a claim that it has evolved to focus
just as much on the sound? Even though the English trademark could not block a competitor
from selling PEPSI-COLA, can the Chinese transliteration help to oppose the American actress
who is popular with Asian fans from selling CUOCO COLA?
Perhaps such a novel argument would carry more (or less) weight depending on how
many (or few) other foreign-language equivalents are consistent with the Chinese-language mark
in valuing the meaning vis-à-vis the sound. Since the current judicial application of the test for
confusion requires evidence of linguistic knowledge, it would probably limit this novel argument
only to foreign-language equivalents for which there is evidence that the consumers understand
the language. However, if the test for confusion were to assume linguistic knowledge, then this
novel argument would probably expand to accepting all foreign-language equivalents as
evidence. Such an argument would be particularly interesting with the 1,073 trademark
applications in Canada that contain the typographical symbol @.309 Some languages translate @
as a variation of the English letter “a”, while other languages translate @ as a variation of the
English word “at”. Most languages, however, translate @ according to how it looks to that
culture: a little mouse, an elephant‟s trunk, a maggot, a snail, a spider monkey, a pickled fish roll,
etc.310
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7.1.4 Prohibited Marks
Section 12(1)(e) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is
not a mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10.”
An example of a prohibited mark is “any scandalous, obscene or immoral word or
device”. 311 Canada currently makes this value judgment from the perspective of the general
public.312 This is consistent with the United States denying FUKU to a Japanese restaurant trying
to transliterate “good fortune” from Japanese to English, 313 as well as the United Kingdom
denying FOOK on t-shirts.314 Although Canadians are presumably bilingual enough to know that
PHOQUE means “seal”, the word still sounds scandalous in English. This may be a reason why
the Canadian application for the French- and English-language mark PHOQUE EWE, despite the
accompanying picture of a seal and a sheep, was abandoned. 315 This would probably mean
similar denials for a Vietnamese restaurant using PHO KING, as only Vietnamese speakers or
foodies would know “pho” is a type of noodle soup pronounced like “fir/fur”.
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The question is whether this value judgment should still be from the perspective of the
general public when a trademark references a specific group. Canada kept the perspective of the
general public when it permitted a restaurant‟s registration of THE RUDE NATIVE,316 but the
United States switched to the perspective of the specific group being referenced when it
cancelled a football team‟s registration for REDSKINS317 and originally denied a Chinese band‟s
application for THE SLANTS.318 The latter approach adopted by the United States raised the
additional question of what to do if there are multiple and contradictory opinions within a
specific group. For every Chinese person who believes that racial slurs such as THE SLANTS or
CHINKED OUT can be reclaimed from their derogatory meanings, there is another Chinese
person who would rather have them disappear forever. This was illustrated when Oprah Winfrey
interviewed Jay-Z Carter about his use of the racial slur for African-Americans. Jay-Z defended
his use on the basis that his generation took the power out of the racial slur, and he even
rationalized that eliminating the racial slur will only result in others taking its place anyway.
Oprah‟s response was that the horrific history of the word was beyond redemption in light of
“the millions of people [in her generation] who heard that as their last word as they were hanging
from a tree.”319
Another question is whether either perspective should assume linguistic knowledge for a
foreign-language mark? Consider a popular brand of toothpaste in Asia that is sold with the
English word DARKIE and the Chinese characters for “black man”. The toothpaste is now sold
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in Canada as DARLIE,320 but with the same Chinese characters. The perspective of the general
public would think nothing of the Chinese characters, but assuming linguistic knowledge would
allow for a value judgment on the acceptability of “black man”. Likewise, the perspective of a
specific group would not become an issue without first assuming linguistic knowledge. Since the
registration for the Chinese characters included an explanation that they mean “black man”, it
appears that Canada does not consider the term offensive to the specific group being
referenced.321
All these questions may become moot if the prohibition on “any scandalous, obscene or
immoral word or device” becomes unconstitutional. Canada could very well follow the Supreme
Court of the United States in deciding that such a prohibition violates the constitutional right to
free speech.322 This is very likely in light of the fact that Canada prohibits both the registration
and the use of such marks, whereas the United States prohibited only the registration and
originally found that free speech was not infringed because traders could still use such marks.323
Striking down such a prohibition would open the door for anyone and everyone to register marks
that reference and offend a specific group. Perhaps there should be a distinction between those
who “draw attention to their wares and service through shock tactics”324 and those who have
suffered such references and, thus, have a legitimate interest in reclaiming them from their
derogatory meanings.
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Trademarks: DARLIE, Registered, 0627543, TMA375418; and Trademarks: DARLIE MAN Logo, Registered,
1688144, TMA948291.
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with Leigh Montville, Sting Like A Bee: Muhammad Ali vs The United States of America (New York: Doubleday,
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when he said that he had consulted an English language dictionary and found that 60 of 120 synonyms for the word
“black” were offensive. All 124 synonyms for “white” were favorable. Maybe a new word for “black” should be
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Re Simon, supra note 318.
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A second example of a prohibited mark is “any badge, crest, emblem or mark … (ii) of
any university, or (iii) adopted and used by any public authority”.325 These prohibited marks are
called official marks and are the nuclear bombs of all marks for three reasons. First, the test for
obtaining them focuses on the applicant, not on the official marks. This means that any
university or a Canadian public authority326 can obtain an unlimited number of official marks
that are descriptive, confusing with registered trademarks, and not limited by goods and services.
Second, they only need to be advertised to come into effect, as they are neither trademarks nor
registered. This means that these perpetual official marks are not subject to the usual prosecution,
opposition, expungement, or renewal proceedings. Third, the requirement for them to be
“adopted and used” is lower than that for a trademark to be “used” in association with goods and
services, just as the prohibition against anything “consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be
likely to be mistaken for” them is stronger than that against anything “confusing” with a
trademark. This means that these unlimited and perpetual official marks are easier to obtain and
to enforce than trademarks. Accordingly, it is important to limit their monopoly to what was
advertised in order to avoid their expansion automatically into translations. We must keep in
mind that official marks can still prohibit translations in the same manner that they currently
prohibit other trademarks: by proving similarity. The comment also applies to official marks in
foreign languages.327
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Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 9(1)(n) (Prohibited marks – “No person shall adopt in connection with a
business, as a trademark or otherwise, any mark consisting of, or so nearly resembling as to be likely to be mistaken
for … any badge, crest, emblem or mark (i) adopted or used by any of Her Majesty‟s Forces as defined in the
National Defence Act, (ii) of any university, or (iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an
official mark for goods or services,”).
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United States Postal Service v Canada Post Corp, 2007 FCA 10, 54 CPR (4th) 121, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 31906 (28 June 2007).
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The College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario obtained three official
marks in 2016: Trademarks: CTCMPAO & Design, Advertised, 0922204, Trademarks: CTCMPAO & Design,
Advertised, 0923578, and Trademarks: CTCMPAO & Design, Advertised, 0922205.
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7.1.5 Plant Breeders’ Rights Act
Section 12(1)(f) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is
not a denomination the adoption of which is prohibited by section 10.1.” Section 10.1 in turn
states that where “a denomination must, under the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, be used to
designate a plant variety, no person shall adopt it as a trademark in association with the plant
variety or another plant variety of the same species or use it in a way likely to mislead, nor shall
any person so adopt or so use any mark so nearly resembling that denomination as to be likely to
be mistaken therefor.”
This means that The Coca-Cola Company could only register COCA-COLA because the
hyphenated combination acquired secondary meaning to overcome the original lack of
distinctiveness in the two components.328 COCA was descriptive of the leaf extracts from the
South American plant erythroxylum coca, which had the botanical term 古 柯 (GU3 KE1). After
COCA became part of COCA-COLA, it kept the English botanical meaning but changed the
Chinese meaning to 可 口 (KE3 KOU3 meant “tasty”). COLA was descriptive of the bean
extracts from the Western African tree cola acuminata and cola nitida, which had the botanical
term 可 拉 (KE3 LA1). After COLA became part of COCA-COLA, it gained the additional
English meaning of a “soft drink, pop, soda” and also changed the Chinese meaning to 可 樂
(KE3 LE4 was distinctive in Chinese when first coined in 1933, but has come to mean “cola”
and now lacks distinctiveness).
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Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 357, 360 (“It will be perceived that in some of these earlier cases the Coca Cola
Company, in answer to the charges made against its trade-name, successfully maintained the position that the name
of the beverage was not deceptive, but was actually justified by the ingredients, while in the present case the
company is endeavoring to show that the name is purely arbitrary and fanciful, and does not truly describe the nature
of the product.”) and (“With this rule in mind, we can realize the full significance of the evidence that the word
“cola” was originally adopted in part for its descriptive properties, and has since become a generic term, used in
common by manufacturers as part of the trade-names for their products;”).
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7.1.6 Geographical Indications
Section 12(1)(g), (h), and (h.1) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is
registrable if it is not in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the
trademark is to be registered in association with [(g) a wine, (h) a spirit, or (h.1) an agricultural
product or food]329 not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication.”
This is generally assessed by checking a Canadian list of wines, spirits, and agricultural
product or food. Just like the difference between descriptive marks being barred in the English or
French language versus generic marks being barred in any language, the list of geographical
indications does not include translations for wines or spirits but only includes translations for
agricultural products and food.330
Imagine that YANGTZE is on the list as a geographical indication. Should it
automatically block subsequent applications for CHEUNG KONG or 長 江? The answer is
clearly “NO” if we consider what would happen if KENTUCKY was also on the list, as it would
not block the standard translation KEN3 TA3 JI1 (肯 塔 基) for the geographical name. The
reality is that we do not extend protection automatically from a geographical indication
KENTUCKY to its acronym KY or to its nickname BLUEGRASS STATE. So why should we
extend do it for its translation when Chapter 3 has shown that we cannot assume that a foreignlanguage mark is intended to be translated or what the translation will be?
329

While the statute currently limits geographical indications to a list of wines and spirits, the list will be expanded
due to the Canada-Europe Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The expansion may be a
welcome change for traders who have been circumventing the statute‟s limits by using certification marks as de
facto geographical indications for the products that were not on the list (e.g., beer, cheeses, meats, confectionary and
baked products).
330
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 11.12(1) (“List – There shall be kept under the supervision of the Registrar a
list of geographic indications and, in the case of geographical indications identifying an agricultural product or food,
translations of those indications.”). And see the corresponding subsections (2.1), (3.1), (4)-(5). Contrast “the
automatic protection of translations” for wines and spirits in section 11.14 with “the limited-to-the-list protection of
translations” for agricultural products or food in section 11.15.
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7.1.7 Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act
Section 12(1)(i) of Canada‟s Trademarks Act states that “a trademark is registrable if it is
not subject to subsection 3(3) and paragraph 3(4)(a) of the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, a
mark the adoption of which is prohibited by subsection 3(1) of that Act.”
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the test for confusion does not make a difference
because the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act already states that no person “shall use in
connection with a business, as a trademark or otherwise, a mark that is a translation in any
language of an Olympic or Paralympic mark.” 331 Contrast that with official marks, the
prohibition of which does not anticipate translations. The question now is whether extending the
prohibition of an Olympic or Paralympic mark to its foreign-language translation also prohibits
similar foreign-language marks. After all, the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act specifically
prohibits the adoption or use of a mark that “so nearly resembles an Olympic or Paralympic mark
as to be likely to be mistaken for it,”332 but fails to do the same for its translation. Is this poor
drafting or is this a clear sign that this prohibition supports comparing foreign-language marks
for confusion based on the English or French translations of the trademark, instead of the foreign
language used in the trademark?

7.2

Rights of (Limits/Defences to) Registration
Up to now, the solutions proposed have been tested only against the criteria for

registrability listed in section 12. It is also important to test them in the context of a trader‟s
rights against infringement in sections 19-20, against depreciation of goodwill in section 22, to

331
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Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, SC 2007, c 25, s 3(2) [Olympic Act].
Olympic Act, supra note 331, s 3(1).
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license in section 50, and to translate. After all, the introduction of this dissertation
acknowledged that their credibility depends on how well they serve the dual purposes of
trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from unfair competition.
Consumers usually have no participation in or say on a trademark, although they are used
(or mis-used) by traders as the justification supporting its litigation. It is difficult to believe that a
trader‟s rights also benefit consumers when one looks at the contradictory arguments in the case
law. For example, one trader will argue that that the trademarks are confusing while the other
trader will argue the opposite,333 just as one passenger will recline the airplane seat while the
passenger behind will object to it.334 Focusing on the resource (trademark space or seat space)
does not benefit consumers, who become schizophrenic puppets dancing at the behest of traders.
Focusing instead on the parties vying for the resource can change the answer by redefining the
question: do traders infringe while objecting to others infringing? Or, do passengers recline while
objecting to others reclining?335
Why is it that traders can engage in brand extension or cross-branding themselves in
order to access untapped markets, yet they are convinced that others will cannibalize existing
333

Beebe, supra note 7 at 2025.
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, “Who Deserves Those 4 Inches of Airplane Seat Space?”,
Slate (23 Sept 2014), online:
<http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/09/airplane_seat_reclining_can_economics_reveal
_who_deserves_the_space.html>.
335
Consider the beloved American novel “To Kill A Mockingbird”. While several law articles have lauded the
protagonist, Atticus Finch, the best praise is found in Steven Lubert, “Review: Reconstructing Atticus Finch: To Kill
a Mockingbird by Harper Lee” (1999) 97:6 Mich L Rev 1339 at 1339 (“The name of Atticus Finch has been
invoked to defend and inspire lawyers, to rebut lawyer jokes, and to justify (and fine-tune) the adversary system.
Lawyers are greedy. What about Atticus Finch? Lawyers only serve the rich. Not Atticus Finch. Professionalism is a
lost ideal. Remember Atticus Finch.”). Focusing on Atticus Finch vis-à-vis other lawyers makes him a hero: only he
had the integrity to defend a black man wrongly accused of raping a white woman, and only he had enough faith in
the justice system to encourage the black defendant to stand trial and to appeal a biased verdict instead of making a
run for freedom. Focusing instead on Atticus Finch vis-à-vis himself reveals his hypocrisy: he failed to exercise the
same level of integrity when the town‟s recluse later protects his children by killing their attacker in self-defense, as
he accepted the sheriff‟s persuasion that it would be too cruel to subject the town‟s recluse to legal scrutiny and
public attention. Only by redefining the question does the answer change as to whether Atticus Finch is a hero or a
hypocrite: the lawyer, who earlier encouraged an innocent defendant to entrust life and liberty to a racist jury, later
spared the town‟s recluse from the inconvenience of a trial that was sure to end in an acquittal.
334
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sales instead of creating new markets? An example of this hypocrisy is margarine. When
Emperor Louis Napoleon III held a competition to find an affordable butter alternative for his
military and the poor, he awarded the prize to margarine in 1869. It turned out that winning a
competition does not guarantee market success, because the French peasants turned up their
noses at margarine as a butter substitute. The former was made from vegetable oil and had a pale
white colour, while the latter was made from milk and had a sunnier complexion from happy
cows. Nevertheless, North Americans were convinced that this French invention would
cannibalize the sale of butter and lobbied for legislation to stop the anticipated confusion
between the two. The United States tried a piece-meal approach such as compulsory labelling,
manufacturing licensing, sales tax, and colour bans. The colour bans ranged from prohibiting the
margarine to be dyed yellow to look like butter (which was also dyed yellow) to requiring that
margarine be dyed pink. 336 Canada took an aggressive approach by banning margarine from
1886 to 1948, a year that marked two notable events. First, Newfoundland joined the Canadian
Confederation on the condition that “Canada agreed to constitutionally protect the manufacture
and sale of margarine in Canada, but retained its powers to prohibit and/or restrict the export of
margarine from the new province.” 337 Then, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that federal
legislation could not prohibit the manufacture or sale of margarine. Although it remained within
federal jurisdiction to prohibit the importation of margarine, that applied to foreign trade and not
336

Mitchell Okun, Fair Play in the Marketplace: The First Battle for Pure Food and Drugs (Dekalb, Ill.: Northern
Illinois University Press, 1986) at 254, 263, 266.
337
Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening our Place in Canada (St. John‟s: Office of the Queen‟s
Printer, 30 June 2003) at 17, online: <http://www.gov.nl.ca/publicat/royalcomm/section2.pdf>. I was puzzled as to
why Newfoundland would agree to have its right to sell margarine to the greater Canadian population restricted until
I fortuitously happened upon Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly (United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 2009) at 82-83 (“By 1932, interest payments alone
absorbed the lion‟s share of [Newfoundland‟s] revenues. A default seemed inevitable. Technically (and it was only
technically) Newfoundland did not default. As David Hale observes: „… The British parliament and the parliament
of a self-governing dominion agreed that democracy should be subordinate to debt. The oldest parliament in the
British Empire, after Westminster, was abolished and a dictatorship was imposed on 280,000 English-speaking
people who had known seventy-eight years of direct democracy. The British government then used its constitutional
powers to steer the country into a federation with Canada.‟”).
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to Newfoundland as part of Canada.338 There is no literature explaining why the United States
was surprisingly milder in its approach than Canada, but perhaps the American belief in free
markets restrained an outright ban and resulted in surreptitious legislation.
Another example of this hypocrisy is coffee. While we might expect that tea traders
would perceive a threat from coffee, this was not the case. Even stranger is the historical
evidence that it was actually the wine and beer traders who tried to stop competition from
coffee.339 This is puzzling until we realize that what matters is not any and all traders, but a
specific group of traders who are also producers: tea traders in Europe did not perceive a threat
because they imported tea from China, but wine traders in France and Italy tried to protect their
country‟s industry, as did beer traders in Germany. Perhaps it was a sign of the times, but these
wine and beer traders did not rely on legal prohibition as much as on moral judgment: France
translated Olearius‟ travelogue to warn against the evils of coffee, Italy would have declared
coffee as Satanic if Pope Clement VIII had not found it to be delicious, and King Frederick II
claimed that German soldiers who drank coffee were unpatriotic because they could not win
wars like beer drinkers.340
The hypocrisy becomes even more obvious when we compare traders‟ past behaviour
vis-à-vis their current lawsuits. For example, The Coca-Cola Company claimed descriptiveness
in 1905 in order to benefit from a then-existing provision “which permits the registration of a
descriptive mark by one who has made actual and exclusive use thereof for ten years next
preceding the approval of the act.” 341 After receiving its registration, it then tried to claim
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distinctiveness in order to sue competitors such as PEPSI-COLA for confusion.342 Likewise, a
trader unsuccessfully tried to claim that YO-YO was descriptive in 1931 in order to overcome a
competitor‟s registration of FLORES YO-YO. 343 After purchasing FLORES YO-YO and
registering YO-YO, it then claimed distinctiveness in order to sue competitors for confusion.344
In short, traders use the case law to litigate their claims against others in order to stop what they
perceive as unfair competition against themselves.
The subsections below discuss the growing gap between traders and consumers as a
result of dilution and licensing, and we must beware not to widen it further through foreignlanguage marks. In this regard, the solution of assuming linguistic knowledge serve the dual
purposes of trademark law in protecting the consumer from confusion and the trader from unfair
competition.

7.2.1 Right against Infringement
Trademarks have come a long way from past characterizations as a liability instead of an
asset, 345 as identifying source only instead of guaranteeing quality also, 346 and as protecting
342

Coca-Cola Company of Canada Limited v Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Limited, [1942] 1 All ER 615 [PepsiCola]. And see Dixi-Cola, supra note 279 at 357 (“It will be perceived that in some of these earlier cases the Coca
Cola Company, in answer to the charges made against its trade-name, successfully maintained the position that the
name of the beverage was not deceptive, but was actually justified by the ingredients, while in the present case the
company is endeavoring to show that the name is purely arbitrary and fanciful, and does not truly describe the nature
of its product.”).
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Sheldon Burshtein, “Trademark Licensing in Canada: The Control Regime Turns 21” (2014) 104:5 INTA
Trademark Reporter 1001 at 1005. (“In Canada, a trademark is a guarantee of origin and is only inferentially an
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consumers primarily instead of traders equally.347 The dual purposes of trademark law now are to
protect consumers from confusion and traders from unfair competition.348 This requires that a
trademark functions to identify the source (and quality) of goods and services.349
Section 19 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act prohibits using a trademark that is identical with
goods and services that are identical to a registration.350 Section 20 expands that to prohibit using
a trademark that is similar, regardless of the goods and services, to a registration.351 There is little
to say here because the solutions proposed for registrability in section 12 should be applied in
exactly the same manner to infringement in sections 19-20. The subsections below discuss three
problems that currently exist with infringement – and are exacerbated with dilution – when
deciding whether or not to expand rights even more by allowing traders to claim that a foreignlanguage mark is identical or similar to a registered trademark.

assurance of quality. Similarly, a House of Lords decision said that, in England, a trademark is not a representation
of quality. In the United States, a trademark represents a single source but has also been said to serve as an assurance
of quality.”).
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(now Chief Justice) stated at p. 196: „and it should not be forgotten that legislation concerning patents, trademarks
and the like exists primarily in the interest and for the protection of the public, so much so that it could be said that
the public is a third party to all patent or trademark litigation.‟”).
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Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 19 (Rights conferred by registration – “Subject to sections 21, 32 and 67, the
registration of a trademark in respect of any goods or services, unless shown to be invalid, gives the owner of the
trademark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trademark in respect of those goods or services.”).
351
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20(1) (Infringement – “The right of the owner of a registered trademark to its
exclusive use shall be deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who (a) sells,
distributes or advertises any goods or services in association with a confusing trademark or trade-name; (b)
manufactures, causes to be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any goods in association
with a confusing trademark or trade-name, for the purpose of their sale or distribution, (c) sells, offers for sale or
distributes any label or packaging, in any form, bearing a trademark or trade-name if … (d) manufactures, causes to
be manufactured, possesses, imports, exports or attempts to export any label or packaging, in any form, bearing a
trademark or trade-name, for the purpose of its sale or distribution or for the purpose of the sale, distribution or
advertisement of goods or services in association with it, if …”).
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7.2.1.1 Rights without End
The first problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act has 10-year terms that can be renewed
without end, unlike copyright and patents. This means that the rights are perpetual as long as the
trademark is used, however lightly.352 Giving a perpetual right to a word is one thing; giving a
perpetual right to a word, its synonyms, and its translations would be another. We must ask
ourselves what is the public interest in doing the latter when the Supreme Court of Canada –
commenting on BARBIE – observed that a novel benefit is not even required in exchange for the
monopoly: “[Mattel] has merely appropriated a common child‟s diminutive for Barbara.”353
A possible solution is to accept the fact that not every use must be valued or owned. This
will leave some uses to the public: “Thus, it should be emphasized that expressive concerns
could be equally well protected by simply cutting back on the scope of trademark law. Signaling
capacity could, for example, be fully protected by insuring exclusivity in words and symbols
only as they appear on labels. So long as the public understood that the label (as statutorily
defined) was the only place to look for a designation of source or origin, trademarks could be
made freely available for all other purposes.”354
A labour-based justification for trademark rights may accept the solution above. This
justification came from a Lockean natural rights theory that one is entitled to the fruits of one‟s
labour, on the conditions that the entitlement (1) leaves enough and as good for others, and (2) is
not wasteful.355 This entitlement suggests that traders cannot assume that they create all the value
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in their trademarks because there is scholarship to suggest that consumers also invest in
trademarks,356 especially at the encouragement of trademark owners in this day and age of social
media.357 Consider the examples where originally it was not the trader who used “its” trademark,
but a news reporter who created the Chinese translation for JORDAN or the government who
invested in Chinese translations for TRUMP. These examples are different from The Coca-Cola
Company holding an international competition to find “its” Chinese-language mark. A corollary
to the entitlement is that one should not reap where one has not sown. This can be a doubleedged sword for traders, as the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed Professor Vaver‟s
observation that “One might as well say that the well-known mark owner is reaping where it has
not sown when it stops a trader in a geographic or market field remote from the owner‟s fields
from using the same or a similar mark uncompetitively.” 358 The first condition suggests that
traders cannot assume that they are entitled to foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks.
Consider a reverse example of this assumption: subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing for Confusion”
explained how a court finding that PEPSI-COLA did not infringe COCA-COLA (because COLA
was descriptive in English) led to the incorrect conclusion that 百 事 可 樂 also did not infringe
可 口 可 樂 (even though the Chinese equivalent was descriptive when first coined in 1933).
Therefore, since a trademark claim does not automatically expand into claims for its synonyms
or homophones, subject to evidence of confusion, an English-language mark should also be
independent of its translations or transliterations. The second condition reinforces the suggestion

individual‟s labour also belongs to that individual. … The first [condition] states that labour only originates a
property right to the object to which it is joined „where there is enough, and as good left in common for others‟. The
second [condition states] … „As much as any one can make use of to the advantage of life before it spoils; so much
he may by his labour fix a Property in.‟”) [Drahos].
356
Steven Wilf, “Who Authors Trademarks?” (1999) 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 1.
357
Gerhardt, supra note 12.
358
Mattel, supra note 99 at para 22, quoting David Vaver, “Unconventional and Well-Known Trade Marks”, (2005)
Sing JLS 1 at 16.
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that traders cannot assume that they are entitled to foreign-language equivalents of their
trademarks. Locke already recognized in the 17th Century that the second condition has little use
in a society where individuals are able to store wealth (e.g., money), so just imagine the
uselessness of the second condition in a society were corporations are able to amass wealth (e.g.,
trademarks) faster and longer than individuals. In noting the inconsistency of the second
condition, which would permit the hoarding of non-perishable stocks but not the wasting of
perishable plums, Professor Drahos commented that Locke “glides over the connections between
property, wealth, political and social power and the implications of this for a theory like his
which claims that men are naturally equal and have a natural right to property.” 359 Locke could
have addressed the inconsistency by stating that the entitlement is conditional on being useful at
and continuously after the time of taking, instead of being useful before it spoils. 360 Such a
philosophical theory would align better with the trademark doctrine, as even first-to-file
trademark countries require that a trademark be used (eventually) in order to maintain a
registration.
An unjust enrichment-based justification for trademark rights will reject the solution
above. This justification came from an Aristotelian corrective justice theory that one should not
be enriched at the expense of another.361 This theory could be a reason why traders often assume
that “free riding” is a wrong that needs a remedy. Consider again the examples where originally
it was not the trader who used “its” trademark, but a news reporter who created the Chinese
359
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translation for JORDAN or the government who invested in Chinese translations for TRUMP.
But is it not unjust for these traders to enrich themselves with the translations at the expense of
society? If the rebuttal is that there is no injustice because society‟s use of the translations was
not use as a trademark, then the translations would be available to all as a potential trademark.
This means that the first “free rider” to enrich itself with the translations as trademarks did not do
so at the expense of the “rightful owner” of JORDAN or TRUMP. If the rebuttal is that the “free
rider” is co-opting some sort of association with the “rightful owner”, then corporations should
also be prohibited from co-opting social causes without compensating the charities and nonprofit organizations that started the social campaigns. This theory could also be a reason why
traders assume that there should be compensation for using what is assumed to be foreignlanguage equivalents of their trademarks. But what (if any) should the compensation be? Imagine
a poor man who has nothing to eat but plain bread on a daily basis. Asked by a neighbour if he
ever tired of his poverty, the man replied that he enjoyed each mouthful of plain bread with a
deep sniff of the fragrant cooking from the restaurant next door. Overhearing this, the restaurant
owner took the poor man to court and demanded to be paid the value of “sniffing the food”. The
wise judge agreed, grabbed the restaurant owner‟s ear and rewarded him with the value of
“hearing the coins”!
A personality-based justification for trademark rights will reject the solution above. This
justification came from a Hegelian natural rights theory that expressing one‟s will is fundamental
to exercising one‟s freedom.362 Although traders cannot assume entitlement, this theory explains
why traders may nevertheless need to claim the foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks.
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Drahos, supra note 355 at 77-78 (“The underlying reality is that „property is the first embodiment of freedom‟. …
One suggestion has been that private property is the institution which allow the exercise of subjective freedom, …
Another is that the making of property claims contributes to the development of personality. … Good for Hegel is
„freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world.‟”).
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Consider the example of Michael Jordan. What if he had political objections to the Chinese
translation created by the news reporter for JORDAN, because he feared that the meaning of “tall
– red” evoked a negative image of him standing tall for red Communism? Although it may be
objectionable for corporations to claim personality rights, Pfizer and The Coca-Cola Company
are still useful as illustrations. What if Pfizer had moral objections to the Chinese translation
given by the public to VIAGRA, because it was repulsed by the incestuous meaning of “great
brother”? Before coming up with its winning Chinese translation for COCA-COLA, what
recourse would The Coca-Cola Company have had to stop unflattering Chinese translations such
as the random “female horse stuffed with wax” or “bite the wax tadpole”?
An incentive-based justification for trademarks will reject the solution above. This
justification came from Landes‟ and Posner‟s economic theory that legal protection for reducing
search costs363 – and increasing words364 – is the incentive for doing so in the first place. (It
should be noted that Dreyfuss disagreed that traders need incentives.365) This theory explains
again why traders may need to claim the foreign-language equivalents of their trademarks.
Consider the example of The Coca-Cola Company. Allowing multiple Chinese translations such
as the random “female horse stuffed with wax” or “bite the wax tadpole” would increase search
costs; whereas, creating the winning Chinese translation for COCA-COLA benefitted consumers
looking for the product and benefitted society by enriching the Chinese language.
363

William Landes & Richard Posner, “The Economics of Trademark Law” in The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass: Bellnap Press, 2003) at 168 (“The benefits of trademark in lowering
consumer search costs presuppose legal protection … If the law does not prevent it, free riding may destroy the
information capital embodied in a trademark, and the prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to
develop a valuable trademark in the first place.”) [Landes & Posner].
364
Landes & Posner, supra note 363 at 169 (“Trademarks improve the language in three ways. They increase the
stock of names of things, thus economizing on communication and information costs in the ways suggested. They
create new generic words – words that denote entire products, not just individual brands. Trademarks further enrich
language by creating words or phrases that people value for their intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information
value, …”).
365
Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 399 (“… free ridership on the commercial aspect of marks is not a problem [with
respect to expressive uses of trademarks] and besides, there is little need to create economic incentives to encourage
businesses to develop a vocabulary with which to conduct commerce.”).
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7.2.1.2 Rights without Exceptions
The second problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act generally has no explicit
exceptions, again unlike copyright and patents. Users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens
are expected to know the internal limits to trademark rights means that there is no infringement
unless there is (1) use in association with goods and services according to section 4, and (2) use
as a trademark according to section 2. 366 Is it reasonable to expect users to understand a
limit/defence that legal experts struggle with? Consider the fact that “[m]any commentators and
courts have misunderstood the difference between use as a trademark and trademark use.”367
Even when limited exceptions are explicit,368 users are expected to keep calm and carry on with
the limited defences when served with a cease-and-desist letter threatening civil and criminal
liability. 369 Unfortunately, many trademark applicants and letter recipients lack the financial
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Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) (1996), [1997] 2 FCR 306, 71 CPR (3d) 348
(FCTD) at 360 (“The test for “use” in Section 20 requires two separate elements of proof from both Section 2 and
Section 4. In effect, the first element taken from Section 4 is: (1) did the Defendants associate their services with the
Plaintiff‟s trademarks? The second element from Section 2 is: (2) did the Defendant use the marks as a trademark
for purposes of distinguishing or identifying the Defendant‟s services in connection with the Plaintiff‟s wares or
services?”), at 364-365 (“„Use‟ is the foundation for Section 19, Section 20 and Section 22 as grounds of
infringement but the secondary elements for each ground once the primary „use‟ has been established are different.
Section 19 requires use of the identical mark for identical wares and services while Section 20 states that the mark
need only be „confusing‟ and not identical to the registered mark. Section 22 is even more open-ended since the
mark need not even be confusing as long as its use is likely to depreciate the value of the goodwill: … The grounds
for infringement move from their narrowest in Section 19 to their most expansive in Section 22 but „use‟ remains the
basic building block or linchpin for all of the grounds.”) [Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin].
367
Kelly Gill et al, Fox on Canadian Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2002)
at 7.2(d)(ii) [Gill].
368
Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 20 contains exceptions for any bona fide use at (1.1), any utilitarian feature at
(1.2), and a spirit at (2).
369
Imagine how frightened lay defendants must be by threats against themselves if even White House witnesses are
frightened by subpoenas regarding third parties according to Chris Whipple, The Gatekeepers: How the White
House Chiefs of Staff Define Every Presidency (New York: Crown, 2017) at 212 (“This was really a burden on
many [White House staff], the first time they had interacted with a prosecutor or with the criminal justice system,
and they were scared … You could always tell a member of the [White House] staff who had gotten a subpoena [for
Bill Clinton‟s impeachment hearing].”).
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resources for a legal opinion on the merits of such threats. Although such humble worries rarely
make the news, we must pay attention to their unnecessary frequency.370
It is understandable that traders with little understanding of the law may be overzealous
in frightening other trademark applicants and users. Their lawyers, however, should be the voice
of reason. Despite the fiduciary duty that lawyers owe their clients, 371 is it reasonable to expect
lawyers to self-monitor against four potential conflicts of interests? First, what if the lawyer is
tempted by the financial rewards of easy billing that comes from issuing cease-and-desist
letters?372 Second, what if the lawyer is desirous of the professional opportunities provided by
increased publicity that comes from court litigation? Third, what if the lawyer is worried about
client attrition for not creating-and-solving problems that maintain client dependency on the
prescient-and-powerful lawyer? Finally, what if the lawyer is afraid of professional liability
because what was reasonable at the time suddenly looks negligent after a problem arises?
Consider the example of Metallica, the band that sued Napster for copyright infringement and
370

Roger Hughes, “Emergent Diversity in the Common Law Relating to Intellectual Property” in Catherine Ng,
Lionel Bently & Giuseppina D‟Agostino, eds, The Common Law of Intellectual Property: Essays in Honour of
Professor David Vaver (United Kingdom: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2010) at 125 (“We are quick to recognize the
contributions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts, as well as those of reputable academics such as Professor David
Vaver, in defining and reshaping the courses of the common law. However, one must not lose sight of our „friends in
low places‟, where it all begins. Cases brought in the courts are shaped by the practice and procedures in those
courts and the remedies there afforded. The day-to-day determination of disputes goes unnoticed, leaving academia
to ponder the rare cases brought and defended by the richer and more determined of our litigants.”).
371
Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc, 2007 SCC 24 at para 1 (“A fundamental duty of a lawyer is to act in the best
interest of his or her client to the exclusion of other adverse interests, except those duly disclosed by the lawyer and
willingly accepted by the client. … Fiduciary responsibilities include the duty of loyalty, of which an element is the
avoidance of interest, …”), at para 35 (“Nonetheless, I appreciate that the legal profession has gotten away with
inherent conflicts of interest. Compare its insistence that the traditional relationship between solicitor and client
meant that the legal profession must be exempted from the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist
Financing Act, SC 2000, c 17 in order to uphold solicitor-client privilege to its surreptitious change of that same
traditional relationship by permitting limited liability partnerships without explaining to clients that the law partners
are no longer jointly and severally liable for solicitor malpractice, thereby shifting the risk to clients and insurers.
See Canada (AG) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 and Philip Slayton, Lawyers Gone Bad
(Toronto: Penguin Group (Canada), 2007) at 17-19 respectively”) [Slayton].
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Slayton, supra note 371 at 8-9 (“Over docketing is tolerated, if not encouraged, by firms that value profit above
all else and set unrealistic billing goals for their partners and associates. … Out-and-out cheating about the number
of hours worked is only the half of it. Billing by the hour, whether a lawyer is lying or not, creates bad incentives
and encourages unprofessional behavior. The longer it takes a lawyer to solve his client‟s problem, the greater his
income.”).
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threatened a Canadian cover band with a cease-and-desist warning that was 41 pages too long.373
When the warning led to a public uproar, Metallica blamed it on an overzealous lawyer who
acted without the band‟s knowledge. It is overzealous indeed for a lawyer to do so much work
without any client authority – with no likelihood of bill payment and every certainty of
professional liability.
A possible solution is to have Canada‟s Trademarks Act articulate the general principle
that trademark rights are an exception to the public use of words. This should be reinforced by
also articulating specific limits to trademark rights. 374 Defences are already legislated for
trademarks in the United States375 and already added for copyright in Canada.376 This would help
traders whose fears of genericide lead to claims of a duty to police their trademarks, as they
probably need statutory repudiation of the existence of such a duty.377 Such a general principle
and specific limits might have protected a professor collecting consumer complaints against
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Mike Masnick, “Metallica Sends 41 Page Legal Threat to Canadian Cover Band [Updated]”, Techdirt (14 Jan
2016), online: <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160113/13005233336/metallica-sends-41-page-legal-threat-tocanadian-cover-band-updated.shtml>.
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Carys Craig, “Perfume by Any Other Name May Smell as Sweet … But Who Can Say?: A Comment on L‟Oreal
v Bellure” (2010) 22 IPJ 321 at 333-334 (“In Canadian trademark law there is, for example, no exception to liability
for the fair use of a protected mark. The doctrinal limits of trademark protection (such as the need for a plaintiff to
establish confusion in the marketplace, or the inability to control non-commercial or non-trademark uses) typically
do a decent job of drawing the boundaries around the registered owner‟s rights.”) [Craig].
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Gary Locke, United States Secretary of Commerce, Report to Congress: Trademark Litigation Tactics and
Federal Government Services to Protect Trademarks and Prevent Counterfeiting, United States Patent and
Trademark Office (27 April 2011), online: <https://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf>.
Page 14 of the report perpetuates the myth that traders have a duty to police, but does not provide any statutory basis
for this even though registered trademarks are a creature of statute: (“In view of the mark owner‟s obligation to
police violations, aggressive enforcement of one‟s trademark rights does not automatically equate to abuse or
bullying.”). Page 6 of the report incorrectly claims that YOYO‟s registration was lost due to genericide, when the
registration was actually invalidated: (“Conversely, if a trademark owner does not diligently police proper use of its
mark (e.g., by competitors, the public, and the media), a term that is originally coined and thus inherently the
strongest type of trademark, can become generic and fall into the public domain. The trademark landscape is littered
with distinctive terms that were once registered as trademarks, but became generic, including „cellophane‟ for a
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spinning toy on a string.”). See Royal Tops, supra note 279 at paras 24-25, 27 (When the application YO-YO was
blocked by the registration FLORES YO-YO, the applicant argued that YO-YO was descriptive. This led the court
to comment, “Thus, not only did the applicant recognize that „Yo-Yo‟ was then in use in the Philippines as the name
applied to a toy, but also the probability that it was a generic term incapable of exclusive appropriation.”).
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United Airlines on www.untied.com, as the Federal Court of Canada ruled against him on the
basis that “parody and satire are not defences to trademark infringement”. 378 On the other hand,
the existence of such defences in the United States did not protect a satirist who poked fun at
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) with a website for People Eating Tasty
Animals on www.peta.org, where a court stringently decided that the parody needed to be
conveyed immediately via the website‟s domain name instead of being conveyed later via the
website‟s content.379
Another possible solution is to rely on a constitutional defence, such as Canada‟s freedom
of expression380 and the United States‟ freedom of speech.381 Professors Craig and Scassa have
cautioned that the many social costs of expanding trademark rights outweigh the one benefit to
traders, as constitutional rights may be harmed.382 Professor Vaver warned against burdening the
court system unnecessarily with undergoing such constitutional analysis.383 Courts themselves
seem reluctant to adjudicate such trademark matters.384 Most importantly, the public does not
understand a constitutional defence and regular Canadians cannot readily assess for themselves if
their actions are legitimate, or are ripe for liability as often claimed by trademark owners in
cease-and-desist letters.
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7.2.1.3 Rights without Responsibilities
The third problem is that Canada‟s Trademarks Act generally has no liability for
trademark abuse by traders, even though civil and criminal liability exists for trademark
infringement by users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens. Relying on injurious
falsehood is tenuous, especially for users who are not businesses. 385 Relying on vexatious
proceedings is pointless, especially with traders who issue cease-and-desist letters without
proceeding to court. 386 Both approaches increase litigation by creating counter-claims in
response to trademark abuse when what is needed are defences to discourage trademark abuse in
the first place. The result is that there is little to discourage traders from making unfounded
claims and much to encourage users to settle in order to avoid a fine or imprisonment.387
A possible solution is to have Canada‟s Trademarks Act articulate civil and criminal
liability for trademark abuse as it currently does for trademark infringement.388 After all, those
who claim the right to keep a guard dog to discourage trespassers from their property should
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Trademarks Act, supra note 19, s 7(a) (Unfair Competition and Prohibited Marks – “No person shall (a) make
a false or misleading statement tending to discredit the business, goods or services of a competitor;”). Although the
common law tort of injurious falsehood requires proving malice, such proof is not required for its statutory
equivalent according to S & S Industries Inc v Rowell, [1966] SCR 419 at 425 (“There is no express requirement that
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on “Remedy for groundless threats of infringement proceedings”, as well as the Intellectual Property (Unjustified
Threats) Act 2017 (UK), c 14.
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assume the responsibility when it bites a passerby on the adjoining sidewalk. Are trademark
rights being abused? Some courts seemed to think so:
“… in the practical world powerful traders will naturally assert their rights even in
marginal cases. … Registration will require the public to look to its defences. …
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the monopoly extends to confusingly
similar marks. In any marginal case defendants, SMEs particularly, are likely to
back off when they receive a letter before action. It is cheaper and more certain to
do that than stand and fight, even if in principle they have a defence.”389

The subsections above illustrate how trademark law is understood and used mostly by
traders and rarely by consumers. Trademark law needs re-balancing immediately. The
subsections below illustrate how the dual purposes of protecting consumers and traders390 have
become even more unbalanced as a result of dilution and licensing, and why it must not be tilted
further through foreign-language marks.

7.2.2 Right against Depreciation
As explained above, the dual purposes of protecting consumers and traders are
accomplished by requiring that a trademark distinguishes the goods and services of one trader
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Nichols Plc’s Trade Mark Application, [2003] RPC 16 at para 14, aff‟d [2005] RPC 12 (ECJ).
Cheung Kong, supra note 9 at para 72 (“Second, the purposes of paragraph 12(1)(d) include the protection of
consumers from being misled about the source of wares and services, and to enable providers and suppliers to
identify their wares and services and to protect them from unfair competition.”). And see Re Spirits International,
supra note 193 at 13 (“The purpose of the Trademark Act is two-fold: to protect business and to protect the
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from another. This makes common sense since a trademark‟s distinctiveness depends on the
goods and services to which the trademarks apply.391
Or so it did until 1953.
That was the year in which section 22 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act first prohibited
depreciation of goodwill. 392 The scope of depreciation of goodwill is unclear because the
Supreme Court of Canada has stated that it could go beyond dilution by “blurring” and
“tarnishing”,393 which means that the depreciation of goodwill could go further than American
anti-dilution law to include “free riding” or even further than European anti-dilution law to
include a fourth or fifth prohibition that has yet to be articulated. 394 For this reason, the
subsections below try to anticipate the possible limits of depreciation of goodwill – and its
potential effects on foreign-language marks – by reviewing Frank Schechter‟s 1927 article on the
rational basis of trademark protection.395
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7.2.2.1 Dilution of Trademark
The first thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of arbitrary, coined or
fanciful marks. This is clear from his repeated statements that such trademarks deserve more
protection than commonplace ones396 because they were “added to rather than withdrawn from
the human vocabulary … [otherwise] these marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace
words of the language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance,” 397 as well as
from his concluding principles:
“(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power; (2) that this
selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon
the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness
and singularity; (3) that such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired
upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the degree of its protection
depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its
owner, it is actually unique and different from others.”398 [emphasis added]

Cohen criticized Schechter‟s legal reasoning for being circular: “It purports to base legal
protection upon economic value, when as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales
device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected”399 and its opposite vicious
circle “accepts the fact that courts do protect private exploitation of a given word as a reason
why private exploitation of that word should be protected.”400 Another way to explain Cohen‟s
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criticism is his suggestion that we should not be assessing Schechter‟s legal reasoning based on
the theory it defends but based on the question it propounds. 401 This means not being distracted
by Schechter‟s emphasis on the injury done to trademarks and staying focused on Schechter‟s
assumption that “courts are not creating … but merely recognizing … a supernatural Something
that is immanent in certain trade names and symbols”.402 This also means staying focused on the
effects of Schechter‟s assumption, which range from quelling public opposition on the circular
thinking403 to redistributing wealth:
“Language is socially useful apart from law, as air is socially useful, but neither
language nor air is a source of economic wealth unless some people are prevented
from using these resources in ways that are permitted to other people.”404

The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks because Schechter‟s approach
suggests that transliterations that add to the vocabulary deserve more protection than translations
that already exist in the foreign language. This could also be stretched to make the bizarre
argument that foreign-language marks for which the courts do not recognize linguistic
knowledge, by virtue of being deemed as an inarticulate design instead of being recognized as a
word that already exists, deserve more protection than those which are understood by consumers.
In this regard, Cohen‟s approach is preferable in that its application would remain the same for
all foreign languages.
It is important to note that Schechter did not actually advocate for the right against
dilution of famous marks. After all, a trademark can be arbitrary, coined or fanciful without
401
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being famous (and vice versa). Beebe and others, however, seemed to interpret Schechter as
advocating for famous marks. Beebe noted that “Cohen correctly identified the fundamental
problem … that Schechter tried to hide from his realist readers by focusing to such an extent on
the damage to the plaintiff‟s famous mark rather than the motives of the defendant – on the harm
rather than on the misappropriation”; 405 that “Wolff expressed his sympathy with Schechter‟s
efforts to protect famous trademarks from dilution”;406 and that Schechter “spoke of the need to
protect famous marks „against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection
with which it has been used‟.”407 This interpretation could be due to Schechter‟s testimony to the
United States Congress: “I have limited that notion of mine to marks of an arbitrary or fanciful or
original nature … particularly a unique and fanciful mark such as ODOL or KODAK.”408 Both
trademarks were mentioned in Schechter‟s article and were famous marks. But bolstering
protection for distinctive marks by emphasizing their fame (and the subsequent harm) is different
from advocating protection for famous marks even if they are non-distinctive. The fact remains
that Schechter‟s concluding principles make no mention of famous marks.
The analysis above is important to foreign-language marks because Beebe et al‟s
interpretation is the current state of American anti-dilution law, which protects only trademarks
that are “famous”.409 Even though fame is determined by considering a non-exhaustive list of
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factors,410 there is scholarship to suggest that it is being applied haphazardly. Beebe conducted a
study illustrating that the dilution doctrine is unnecessary in many cases.411 Lemley explained
that the courts can be too quick to perceive or even to ignore fame based on local experiences.412
This also raises the possibility of local experiences becoming an unintentional bias when it
comes to recognizing the fame of foreign-language marks. For example, a court in the United
States would likely be unimpressed by claims to fame for 乔 丹 or QIAO2 DAN1, which it has
never heard of nor seen. But an American court would understand immediately once it is
informed that those are the respective Chinese translation and pronunciation for JORDAN.
Although it should not do so, the court will subconsciously superimpose Michael Jordan‟s fame
onto the Chinese translation and pronunciation, thus equating them with JORDAN. Another
example is how a judge in the United States would likely recognize the fame of OPRAH based
on her average television viewership of 13 million. An American judge does not have to be a talk
show fan to come across OPRAH‟s talk show while flipping American television channels or be
trademark dilution. On the other hand, the foreign trademark owner who does not use a mark in the United States
must show more than the level of recognition that is necessary in a domestic trademark infringement case.”).
Although the concurring reason goes on to adopt the same standard of 50% at paras 87-90, the fame required for
international trade agreements is still less because it is restricted to the relevant American market instead of the
general consuming public: (“I do not believe that a showing that 20 to 22 percent of the relevant market is familiar
with the foreign mark establishes that a “significant” or “substantial” percentage of that market is familiar with the
foreign mark. … I would adopt a similar standard [known to more than 50 percent of the defendant‟s potential
customers] for the exception for famous or well-known foreign marks.”).
410
Trademark Dilution Revision Act 2006, 15 USC, c 22, §1123(b)(2)(A) (“ … a mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services
of the mark‟s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may
consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising
and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume,
and geographical extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of
the mark. Whether the mark was registered ... .”).
411
Barton Beebe, “The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark
Dilution Revision Act Case Law” (2007-2008) 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 449 at 450 (“antidilution
law (in the United States) continues to have no appreciable effect on the outcomes of federal trademark cases or the
remedies issuing from those outcomes.”).
412
Lemley, supra note 405 at 1698-1699 (“But courts applying the state and federal dilution statutes have been quite
willing to conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is “famous” within the meaning of the Act.
Thus, marks such as Intermatic, Gazette, Dennison, Nailtiques, TeleTech, Wedgewood (for new homes, not china),
Papal Visit 1999, and Wawa have been declared famous. Worse, many courts seem willing to find dilution without
even inquiring into the fame of the mark.”).
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exposed to OPRAH‟s billboard ads while driving on American roads. But the same court may
not have heard of Graham Norton, the host of a 20-year-old British talk show with over 4 million
viewers in the United Kingdom. Even though Graham Norton interviews America‟s most
recognized and highest paid celebrities – Madonna, David Beckham, Justin Bieber, Emily Blunt,
George Clooney, Hugh Jackman, Will Smith, Sir Elton John and Sir Patrick Stewart – on a
weekly basis, his American counterpart in the same industry had never seen his show. This was
obvious when Stephen Colbert interviewed Graham Norton and was surprised to hear that guests
chatted over cocktails and drinks on the latter‟s show. And the same court would likely never
have heard of LUYU, a Chinese talk show host who averaged more than 10 times the number of
OPRAH viewers with 140 million viewers in China. LUYU‟s fame in the United States would
only exist amongst those who watch Chinese satellite shows or read Chinese magazines. This
helps us to understand why – incredible as it sounds – a court in China may not recognize the
fame of JORDAN or TRUMP. While Chinese basketball fans who watch NBA games and
Chinese businessmen who read FORBES magazines may recognize such fame, a Chinese judge
may actually lack the local experiences to do so. This is also why few in China recognize
America‟s most famous “Chinese” dishes: General Tso chicken, chow mein, beef broccoli
(broccoli is not even a Chinese vegetable), chop suey, and Chinese fortune cookies.413
Canada‟s depreciation of goodwill is more expansive than the American anti-dilution law
because it does not require fame and it has no limits as defences. 414 Regardless of the
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Ian Cheney, The Search for General Tso (United States: Wicked Delicate Films, 2015). Jennifer Lee, The
Fortune Cookie Chronicles: Adventures in the World of Chinese Food (New York: Hatchet Book Group USA,
2008).
414
Veuve Clicquot, supra note 99 at para 46 (“Section 22 has four elements. Firstly, that a claimant‟s registered
trademark was used by the defendant in connection with wares or service – whether or not such wares and services
are competitive with those of the claimant. Secondly, that the claimant‟s registered trademark is sufficiently well
known to have significant goodwill attached to it. Section 22 does not require the mark to be well known or famous
(in contrast to the analogous European and U.S. laws), but a defendant cannot depreciate the value of the goodwill
that does not exist. Thirdly, the claimant‟s mark was used in a manner likely to have an effect on that goodwill (i.e.
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terminology of, requirements for, and limits to this law, the inclusion of linguistic knowledge
raises the question as to “what is the actual mark that needs to preserve its uniqueness and
protect against vitiation?” 415 In other words, does the right to protect the mark JORDAN
necessarily also mean a right to protect the Chinese translation 乔 丹 or the Chinese
pronunciation QIAO2 DAN1? Although dilution does not require confusion and only assesses
distinctiveness, the general recommendation to assume linguistic knowledge should still apply to
dilution, and the specific recommendation to translate foreign-language marks into the official
language(s) of the country assessing for distinctiveness should not apply to dilution. Why? When
registrability and infringement assess for distinctiveness, their purpose is to prevent confusion by
ensuring that a trader does not monopolize common words and prohibit others from their generic
or clearly descriptive use. Contrast that with dilution, which assesses for distinctiveness with the
completely different purpose of ensuring that others do not dilute or depreciate a trader‟s
goodwill.

7.2.2.2 Dilution of Goods and Services
The second thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of goods and
services. He began with the orthodox belief that a trademark identifies the origin or ownership of
linkage) and fourthly that the likely effect would be to depreciate the value of its goodwill (i.e. damage).”). See
Craig, supra note 374 at 333-334 (“Section 22, however, threatens to offer more expansive control. In the United
States, protection against the dilution of the distinctive quality of a famous mark is limited by section 1125(4) of the
Lanham Act, which shields from liability non-commercial uses, uses in news reporting, and „fair use of a famous
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark.‟”).
415
Schechter, supra note 6 at 822, 825 (“It ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather than the
designation of source, is the primary purpose of the trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or
individuality of the trademark is of paramount importance to its owner.”) and (“It is the gradual whittling away or
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.
The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its
need for protection against vitiation or disassociation from the particular product in connection with which it has
been used.”) and (“… the preservation of the uniqueness of a mark should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection.”).
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goods, which he quickly dismissed by arguing that consumers no longer know the specific
source of a trademarked good. 416 He claimed instead that a trademark, in reality, creates and
retains goodwill. 417 The resulting consequence would be that trademark protection need no
longer be limited to specific goods, but should be expanded to non-competing goods.418 His new
basis for trademark protection is summed up in the much repeated passage:
“The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the light of what has been
said concerning the function of a trademark. It is the gradual whittling away or
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by
its use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the
deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in
connection with which it has been used.”419 [emphasis added]

Brown agreed with Schechter that trademarks have a persuasive function in that “[t]hey
not only reach over the shoulders of the retailer, they reach from a radio program on Sunday to a
416

Schechter, supra note 6 at 813-814 (“The orthodox definition of “the primary and proper function of a trade-mark”
is that given by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf:
“to identify the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed. … To what extent does the trademark of
today really function as either? Actually, not in the least! It has been repeatedly pointed out by the very courts that
insist on defining trademarks in terms of ownership or origin that, owing to the ramifications of modern trade and
the national and international distribution of goods from the manufacturer through the jobber or importer and the
retailer to the consumer, the source or origin of the goods bearing a well-known trademark is seldom known to the
consumer.”).
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Schechter, supra note 6 at 818 (“To describe a trademark merely as a symbol of good will, without recognizing in
it an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of good will, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a
trademark and that phase most in need of protection.”).
418
Schechter, supra note 6 at 822-823 (“The doctrine that the same trademark may be used on different classes of
goods [was] recently restated by the Supreme Court … But why does a limitation of the protection of trademarks to
goods of the same class logically and necessarily follow from the rule that there is no property in a trademark in
gross? … Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use on other goods, which will be
discussed later on, once a mark has come to indicate to the public a constant and uniform source of satisfaction, its
owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for the “natural expansion of his trade” to other lines or fields
of enterprise.”).
419
Schechter, supra note 6 at 825.
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compulsive purchase on Friday”,420 as he also believed that “trade symbols may serve as a bridge
between advertising and purchase, and that they may themselves be the vehicle of persuasion”.421
Notwithstanding this, Brown still disagreed that such a function should be protected, as he
maintained the traditional doctrine that only the informative function of trademarks should be
protected. One reason could be Brown‟s criticism of Schechter for exaggerating the importance
of a trademark guaranteeing satisfaction. 422 Another reason could be Brown‟s disapproval of
using trademarks for such a function.423
It is important to note that Schechter only advocated for the right against dilution by
“blurring”, 424 but did not actually advocate for the rights against dilution by “tarnishing” or “free
riding”. Notwithstanding this, his article has resulted in a spectrum running from a restrictive to
an expansive framework. In a simple and restrictive framework, the test for confusion is enough
to serve the current purpose of trademark law because “the interests of trademark owners and
consumers aligned perfectly. Trademark laws benefit both mark owners and consumers when
they stop sales of counterfeit goods.”425 This is true regardless of whether consumers see the
trademark as identifying source and giving traders a shortcut to communicate their goods and
services, or whether consumers see the trademark as guaranteeing quality and giving traders an
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Ralph Brown, “Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols” (1948) 57:7 Yale LJ
1165 at 1186 [Brown].
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Brown, supra note 420 at 1187.
422
Brown, supra note 420 at 1186, nn 82-83 (“Doubtless most sellers wish to signify to buyers reliability,
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Brown, supra note 420 at 1190 (“From what has been said earlier about the economic waste and distortion of
consumer choice growing out of large-scale persuasive advertising, it should be clear that the persuasive function of
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but it has been said that tarnishment is a subset of blurring.”).
425
Gerhardt, supra note 12 at 429-430.
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incentive to provide consistent and desirable standards. 426 Either way, trademarks lower
consumer search costs and promote market efficiency.427 Therefore, both consumers and traders
benefit from a Canadian statutory prohibition against trademark infringement. Since Schechter‟s
article, however, the trademark purpose of protecting consumers from confusion seems to have
given way to and become disconnected from that of protecting traders from unfair
competition,428 and may have even turned into a disguise for anti-competition. This has resulted
in a complex and expansive framework, where “the actual alignment often breaks apart,
especially when consumers seek to use marks as information tools. The expansion of trademark
law is resulting in trends that ignore or harm consumer interests. The harm is especially apparent
when trademark law is used to deny consumers the opportunity to use trademarks to find
information.”429 This is because consumer confusion is not required for dilution by “blurring”,
dilution by “tarnishing”, or “free riding”. Therefore, the possible consequences flowing from a
Canadian statutory prohibition against depreciation of goodwill prioritize traders over consumers.
We must ask if such a priority means trademark law is unnecessarily and incorrectly overlapping
with tort and contract law.430
426

Mattel, supra note 99 at para 21 (“The trademark owner[‟s claim rests] … on serving an important public interest
in assuring consumers that they are buying from the source from whom they think they are buying and receiving the
quality which they associate with that particular trademark. Trademarks thus operate as a kind of shortcut to get
consumers to where they want to go, and in that way perform a key function in a market economy. Trademark law
rests on principles of fair dealing. It is sometimes said to hold the balance between free competition and fair
competition.”).
427
Katz, supra note 15.
428
NG-LOY, supra note 65 at para [15.1.6] (“It has been argued that modern advertising and marketing strategies
have allowed certain trade marks to acquire another function. This relates to a special category of trade marks
known in different jurisdictions as „well-known trade marks‟ or „famous marks‟ or „marks with a reputation‟. These
special trade marks have been so successfully promoted by their trade mark proprietors that the public no longer rely
upon these trade marks merely as badges of origin and of quality. These trade marks have such a „selling power‟ that
they have become icons in their own right: people buy goods bearing these trade marks, not really because of the
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symbolise.”).
429
Gerhardt, supra note 12 at 430-431.
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Vaver, supra note 21 at 432 (“Although the tort grew up to protect the interests of traders rather than consumers,
the less it works to prevent consumer confusion, the more it becomes merely a law protecting traders from unfair
competition.”) Although the author is speaking to passing off, the comment is also true for registered trademarks.
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7.2.2.3 Dilution of Use
The third thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of use in commerce.
This is clear from his repeated statements that a trademark sells goods,431 which is why “it would
lose in selling power if everyone used it as the designation of his goods,”432 as well as from the
much quoted passage:
“The true functions of the trademark are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory
and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.” 433
[emphasis added]

Lemley disagreed with Schechter. Instead, he agreed with Brown by maintaining the
traditional doctrine that the only function of a trademark is to identify source, as treating
trademarks like property defeats the requirement that they be distinctive of the goods and
services with which they are associated.434 He even repeated Brown‟s disapproval of having a
trademark as an end in itself when consumers would be better off “with fewer brands clamoring
for [their] scarce attention.” 435 Beebe would agree with them because he documented how
Schechter‟s 1927 article on the rational basis of trademark protection – “the most cited law

And see Imperial Tobacco Co of India Ltd v Albert Bonnan, [1924] UKPC 38 (“The respondents, being unhampered
by covenant, are selling goods manufactured by the British American Company as being what they are – namely,
Will‟s Gold Flake cigarettes manufactured by that company. There is no untruth and no attempt to deceive. … There
is nothing to prevent a tradesman acquiring goods from a manufacturer and selling them in competition with him,
even in a country into which hitherto the manufacturer or his agent has been the sole importer.”).
431
Schechter, supra note 6 at 815, 819, 830, 831, 832.
432
Schechter, supra note 6 at 832.
433
Schechter, supra note 6 at 818.
434
Lemley, supra note 405 at 1695-1696 (“We give protection to trademarks for one basic reason: to enable the
public to identify easily a particular product from a particular source. … Vesting trademarks with the mantle of
property – and giving them some of the indicia of real property, such as free transferability – defeats the purpose of
linking trademarks to goods in the first place.”).
435
Lemley, supra note 405 at 1695.
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review article ever written on trademark law”436 – is actually misappropriation in disguise,437
which is why “[i]t has managed over the years to mean many different things to many different
people, all seeking some theoretical means to fill the void left in the absence of
misappropriation.”438
The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks because the approach of
Schechter‟s dissenters suggests that a claim for a foreign-language mark should not include
automatic claims for its translations. This is important because what is true for a trademark may
not be true for its foreign-language equivalents. For example, subsection 5.1.2 on “Comparing
for Confusion” explained that although PEPSI-COLA was found to be not confusing with
COCA-COLA in English,439 百 事 可 樂 would have been confusing with and should have been
stopped by the previous use of 可 口 可 樂 in Chinese. Likewise, the same explanation applied
in subsection 6.3.2 on “Example of JORDAN” for why Michael Jordan can only claim the
Chinese translation for JORDAN with respect to the writing (乔 丹) but not with respect to the
pronunciation (QIAO2 DAN1). This means that although dilution does not require confusion and
only assesses distinctiveness, the general recommendation to assume linguistic knowledge
should still apply to dilution, and the specific recommendation to translate foreign-language
marks into the official language(s) of the country assessing for distinctiveness should not apply
to dilution.
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It is important to note that Schechter did not actually advocate for the right against
dilution of other uses such as non-commercial or expressive uses. While it may seem fastidious
to say that Schechter objected to using a trademark for its “uniqueness and singularity” or with
“non-competing goods”, but not to using a trademark in a protest or a parody, the fact remains
that every case he cited was an example of use in commerce.440 Although not writing about
Schechter, Dreyfuss revealed what would happen if trader rights were expanded even more to
prohibit expressive activities without a reciprocal expansion of user rights. 441 She began by
identifying how a trademark can have a signaling function that “stimulates further purchases by
the consuming public” – as Schechter would say – and an expressive function that does not do
so.442 While the former function is now prohibited, the latter function generally is still not.443 But
this could change because hybrid uses of trademarks often invoke both functions,444 and traders
are repeatedly litigating to prohibit the latter function, such as when the United States Olympic
Committee persuaded the Supreme Court of the United States to prohibit a non-profit
440

Schechter, supra note 6 at 829 (“Should the rule, still broadly enunciated by the Supreme Court, that a trademark
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Dreyfuss, supra note 354 at 400, 401 (“The first use would be protected – and, indeed, is protected by both
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organization from raising public awareness through a sporting event called the GAY OLYMPIC
GAMES.445 Contrast that with a South African court permitting a for-profit clothing company to
parody trademark owners.446 Canadian courts might be in between because even though they
prohibited a water bottler from depreciating the goodwill of a registered trademark to spoof then
Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 447 they might have permitted labour union use of an
employer‟s trademarks. 448 Dreyfuss used such situations to reveal the inconsistency of using
competitive rights to evaluate expressive activities:
“But [the non-profit organization‟s] failure to convince the Court of the genericity
of OLYMPIC may hold the key to resolving the problem of public access to
marks in a legal regime intent on expanding proprietary rights. Thus, the
explanation for the Court‟s willingness to accept GAMES as a substitute for
OLYMPIC may lie in the fact that it compartmentalized the vocabulary into
expressive and competitive components. Since it took the genericity defense
solely in its traditional form, as a claim about the competitive vocabulary, it
evaluated the word in only the competitive context, as a word denoting athletic
tournaments, and came to the conclusion that ample synonyms were readily
available. Had it instead focused on the expressive significance of OLYMPIC,
and looked for replacements that would evoke the tenets of the ancient Greeks, it
might have reached a different result on the genericity issue.”449
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In this regard, Schechter‟s rational basis for trademark protection can only be maintained
if traditional intellectual property justifications for trademarks are kept for competitive uses, and
expanded trademark rights are accompanied by an expanded analysis for expressive uses. How
should this be done? Dreyfuss suggests “build[ing] upon the defenses that trademark has
constructed for the competitive vocabulary a parallel set of principles to protect expressive
speech.”450
The analysis above is relevant to foreign-language marks, as they can also have
expressive uses. For example, China‟s poor is reacting increasingly to the wasteful consumption
of China‟s elite by co-opting luxury brands. These expressive activities threaten social stability
because they highlight discontentment with and encourage discussion of the immense wealth gap
(presumably from government corruption) in China.451 As the West celebrates China‟s increasing
enforcement of trademark law, 452 it must beware that China‟s reasons for enforcement may
sometimes have nothing to do with trademark law or that such enforcement can have life-anddeath consequences in China. For example, China executed at least 14 infringers for
counterfeiting trademarked goods in the 1990‟s.453 The inclusion of linguistic knowledge – along
with the expansion of trademark rights – will only increase the value of Chinese-language marks
here and abroad. We must reconsider our desire to litigate such rights in light of the fact that
450
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China is “persuaded by the West to use a criminal system which is characterized by political
interference and which in practice lacks even basic procedural safeguards. … In the two cases
that have been reported in the West the defendants were sentenced under the provision of the
Criminal Code prohibiting speculation, rather than under the specific offences relating to
trademarks. … Such a sentence in China often means public humiliation or public execution,
execution to order (so that the requirements of organ donors can be met) and a host of other welldocumented abuses.”454 Bently and Maniatis commented that “while economic motives explain
such legal imperialism, the ethical dimensions of such strategies demand reflection … that the
United States‟ refusal to engage with the existing structures of Chinese administration have
caused the United States to advocate changes in China‟s law which are ethically
objectionable.”455
Ethical objections to the United States influencing China‟s law may increase if we
remember that both the United States and China started as net importers of intellectual property
which refused to sign international trade agreements recognizing foreign rights. For example, the
United States neither protected British copyright owners in the 19th Century nor joined the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works until 1988.456 Only a reversal in its
economic motives led to the United States influencing Singapore‟s copyright legislation in 1987
with the promise of trade benefits (which were terminated soon after the copyright legislation
was enacted).457 And these economic motives resulted in the United States using trade sanctions
in 1994 “to persuade more than 100 other countries that they, as net importers of technological
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and cultural information, should pay more for the importation of that information.”458 But should
intellectual property be limited to economic and international trade concerns? What of social and
human rights causes?

7.2.2.4 Dilution of Territory
The fourth thing Schechter advocated was the right against dilution of territory. He stated
his position in one long but much overlooked passage:
“An equally apparent failure of the courts to keep pace with the necessities of
trade and the functional development of trademarks, and a corollary to the
principle that „if there is no competition, there can be no unfair competition,‟ is
the rule that a trademark or trade name is only coextensive with its use and may
be used by different firms in different localities. … Furthermore, such decisions,
based upon an antiquated neighborhood theory of trade, fail to recognize the fact
that through the existence of the telephone, the automobile, the motor bus, the
high-speed interurban trolley, and the railroad, the consumer now projects his
shopping far from home … ”459 [emphasis added]

The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with Schechter. 460 The passage of time,
however, has vindicated Schechter with Dinwoodie‟s observation that the “geographic limit
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became much less significant with the advent of federal trademark registration under the Lanham
Act in 1946 because an application for federal trademark registration is, if successful, treated as
nationwide constructive use.”461
It is important to note that Schechter only advocated for the right against dilution within
the United States, but did not actually advocate for the right against dilution beyond national
borders. Does expanding trademark rights internationally include the responsibility to meet
consumer expectations that the trademark functions to identify the source (and quality) of goods
and services?462 For example, a Western consumer of KFC will be surprised to discover that its
Chinese counterpart serves smaller chicken pieces and replaces fries with corn cobs. Likewise,
an Asian consumer of 7-11 will be surprised to discover that its Canadian counterpart is not a
place to pay utility bills, order train tickets, collect mail packages, send mail and faxes, or buy
cellphones and SIM cards. We can only imagine what Schechter would think now that the
Internet, planes, and televisions have produced “a new breed of global consumer called into
existence by online shopping or international travel, or … global brands brought about by free
trade”.463 Although ignored by most other academics, Schechter‟s passage above is relevant to
foreign-language marks because of the discussions below on the right to license, the export of
products, and the policy of international comity.

trade.”) [emphasis added]. This attempt to reap beyond the geographic limit where traders sow is similar to the
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461
Dinwoodie on Domain Name, supra note 394 at 508. Although Dinwoodie notes the exception to the rule for a
good faith junior user, he repeats that the importance of geographic limit decreases as the national nature of trade
increases in Graeme Dinwoodie, “Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State”
(2004) 41:3 Hous L Rev 885 at 895 [Dinwoodie on Territory].
462
Consider how traders once used consumer expectations to “halt parallel imports, exports, or resales of genuinely
branded goods” and continue to use consumer expectations to “promote brands internationally and suggest identity
of trade source, while simultaneously claiming in national courts that the brand is in fact locally produced by a
different trade source” according to Vaver, supra note 21 at 523. Since traders are so cognizant of consumer
expectations, they should “be held responsible for clarifying a confusion of its own making” and “[t]rademark law
should not support such strategies where steps can be taken to prevent buyer confusion”.
463
Dinwoodie on Territory, supra note 461 at 900.

172

7.2.3 Right to License
Although a trademark need not be registered in order to be licensed, a registered
trademark is easier to license when there is a government certificate documenting the specifics of
(1) the trademark, (2) the goods and services, and (3) the territory – as registered trademarks are
valid throughout the entire country.
Licensing a trademark used to be prohibited because “[t]he object of the (trademarks) law
is to preserve for a trader the reputation he has made for himself, not to help him in disposing of
that reputation as of itself a marketable commodity, independent of his goodwill, to some other
trader.”464 In fact, it was so frowned upon that even a recent case remembers how it used to be
characterized as “trafficking”:
“[T]rafficking in a trade mark has from the outset been one of the cardinal sins of
trade mark law … The objection, the reason why it was a sin, was that it would, or
might, lead to deception of the public … If Rolls-Royce decided to market the
well-known Rolls-Royce badge of quality by granting licences for money to use
the mark to a wide range of independent manufacturers of e.g. lawn mowers,
motor boats, wristwatches, bicycles, transistors and other equipment, that would
plainly, in my judgment, be trafficking in the mark, and might well lead to the
confusion of the public …”465

Or so it did until 1953.
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Again, that was the year in which section 50 of Canada‟s Trademarks Act first permitted
trademark licensing with a registered user regime,466 which was replaced in 1993 with a quality
control regime:
“For the purposes of this Act, if an entity is licensed by or with the authority of
the owner of a trademark to use the trademark in a country and the owner has,
under the licence, direct or indirect control of the character or quality of the goods
or services, then the use, advertisement or display of the trademark in that country
as or in a trademark, trade name or otherwise by that entity has, and is deemed
always to have had, the same effect as such a use, advertisement or display of the
trademark in that country by the owner.”467

The concept of licensing is important because it allows traders to claim ownership over
another‟s use of a trademark, use in association with a good or services, and use in a territory.
Doing so is a quick and profitable 468 way for traders to expand their family of trademarks,
collection of goods or services, and scope of territory. The corollary of licensing is that traders
should be liable for their licensee‟s wrongdoing in connection to its trademark or – at the very
least – traders who are either ignorant of their licensee‟s activities or unaware of outsourcing to
sub-licensees should be deemed to have lost control over the trademark. 469 This idea of
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Trademarks Act, SC 1953, 1-2 Eliz II, c 49. The United States already permitted trademark licensing in 1946, as
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trademark liability is not new, as trademarks historically was a basis for punishing craftsmen for
defective work and confiscating foreign goods.470 Although Schechter would disagree, this ideal
is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada‟s current position that a trademark “allows
consumers to know, when they are considering a purchase, who stands behind those goods or
services.”471
The first question is whether the liability extends beyond the license to the benefit of
third parties. Opponents could argue that there is neither statutory nor judicial authority for this
position because “[Canada‟s Trademarks Act] does not provide for the liability of a trademark
licensor … [and] Canadian courts have not imposed an affirmative obligation on a trademark
owner in favor of a third party.”472 Supporters could counter that “[the statutory] requirement for
control by a trademark owner of the activity by a licensee in association with a licensed mark …
[and] Canadian decisions that have imposed liability on a trademark licensor for acts or
omissions of its licensee.”473 For example, Canadian and American courts held traders liable for
a consumer injured by a franchisee‟s hot soup,474 a house fire due to a lawnmower,475 a broken
nose due to an umbrella,476 and a consumer injured by a licensee‟s taxi door.477 Although Singh v
Trump478 recently contradicted the possibility of such liability, the summary judgment motions
only stated that traders are not liable for a licensee‟s egregious negligence without actually
discussing either the statutory requirement for a licensor to control or the licensor‟s duty to vet
licensees. We must ask why traders should not be liable for their licensees‟ wrongdoing in
470

Schechter, supra note 6 at 814.
Masterpiece, supra note 99 at para 1.
472
Sheldon Burshtein, “„The Donald‟ Trumps Claim for Misrepresentations by Licensee” (2016) 106:4 INTA
Trademark Reporter 783 at 785 [Burshtein].
473
Burshtein, supra note 472 at 788.
474
LaFlamme v Group TDL Ltée, 2014 QCCS 312.
475
Automobile Insurance Co of Hartford v Murray, Inc, 571 F Supp (2d) 408 (WDNY 2008).
476
Kennedy v Guess, Inc, 806 NE (2d) 776 (Ind Sup Ct 2004).
477
Fraser v U-Need-A-Cab Ltd (1983) 43 OR (2d) 389 (Ont HCJ), aff‟d (1985) 50 OR (2d) 281 (Ont CA).
478
Singh v Trump, 2015 ONSC 4461, rev‟d 2016 ONCA 747.
471

175

connection to their trademarks when a licensor can be liable for a licensee‟s wrongdoing for
infringement. 479 A couple of scholars have suggested that consumers should be able to sue
traders for false or deceptive advertising, for goods or services that fall short of the promised
quality, and not controlling licensees.480
The second question is whether the liability extends beyond defects in a product to the
employment conditions and environmental standards of its production. Opponents could argue
that there is no statutory authority for this position by contrasting section 50(1) on licensing with
section 12(1)(b) on descriptiveness. The former was limited to the character or quality “of the
goods or services” while the latter included the character or quality “of the goods or services in
association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions or the persons
employed in their production or of their place of origin”, which show that the drafters did not
intend for the term “character or quality” to include circumstances. Supporters could counter that
the employment conditions and environment standards under which the goods or services are
produced form a part of the character or quality. 481 Ask any Canadian who boycotts JOE
FRESH‟s cheap clothing for exploiting child labour, and buys CANADA GOOSE‟s expensive
coats for employing Canadians and supporting scientists (or so it did before selling its majority
shares to an American company).
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The third question is whether the liability extends beyond Canadian borders to other
countries. The statute is clear in its reference to a “country” three times that it anticipates the
licensing, use and subsequent enurement of trademark rights by the licensor in any country. This
would be consistent with the rationale of joining international trade agreements.482 There is also
American case law to support holding traders liable for an accident in China due to an elevator
bearing an American trademark,483 as well as an accident in the United Kingdom due to a car tire
bearing an American trademark. 484 Can or should this be extended to human rights abuses
involving trademarks? This question is especially relevant with respect to foreign-language
marks because traders are less likely to use every language and more likely to have licensees in
every country using the language of that country. Although he was not speaking on trademarks
(much less on vicarious liability from its licensing), then Supreme Court of Canada Justice
Binnie had given speeches and written articles stating that Canadian businesses in developing
countries must beware of human rights abuses even though they have “no body to imprison, no
soul to damn and no conscience to trouble.”485

7.2.4 Right to Translate
In his days, Schechter had no success persuading law makers486 to expand rights and his
article was challenged by prominent writers such as Cohen 487 and Brown.488 Ninety years later,

482

For example, the Madrid Protocol extends a trademark registration in one member country to other countries.
Likewise, the Paris Convention extends a trademark‟s application date in one member country to the other countries
where the same applications are filed within six months. Finally, the Paris Convention protects a famous mark in all
member countries.
483
Lou v Otis Elevator Co, 933 NE (2d) 140 (Mass App Ct 2010).
484
Torres v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 786 P (2d) 939 (Ariz Sup Ct 1990).
485
Philip Slayton, Mighty Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Runs Your Life (Toronto: Penguin Books
Ltd, 2011) at 173.
486
NG-LOY on Anti-Dilution, supra note 409 at paras 7-8 (“Schechter even appeared in 1932 before a US
congressional committee to urge the enactment of an anti-dilution law that he had drafted. … The US Congress,

177

like wine that aged well or like Mozart‟s posthumous success, Schechter is celebrated as the
Father of Anti-Dilution489 even as his article continues to be challenged by current scholars such
as Beebe490 and Lemley.491 How did this change evolve? Was it the creation of corporations and
recognition of their “human” rights?492 Was it the deregulation and privatization of basic services
that are lucrative, such as education and healthcare? 493 Was it the commercialization and
“propertization” of words?494
Regardless of how this change evolved, it is adding to the challenge of keeping trademark
law from turning into unfair competition law. Ninety years after Schechter‟s article, we are faced
now with a wide gap between traders and consumers as a result of dilution and licensing, and we
must beware not to widen it further through foreign-language marks. Recognizing foreignlanguage marks as meaningful words instead of inarticulate designs opens the door for traders to
claim that a foreign-language mark is identical or similar to a registered trademark. This must not
be allowed because the translation problems discussed in Chapter 3 – as well as the issues of
trademark distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion discussed in Chapter 5 – illustrated that the
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courts cannot assume that a foreign-language mark is intended to be translated or what the
translation will be. It is only too easy with hindsight for traders to claim that a translation
naturally would be associated with a trademark and, therefore, its use infringes or depreciates the
goodwill of a registered trademark. Such traders are like over-sensitive claimants of libel and
slander: ♫ they‟re so vain ♫ they think everything is about them ♫.
The comments above do not change the possibility of dilution applying to foreignlanguage marks in the same manner that it applies to English-language marks. Dilution used to
mean little to foreign-language marks. The spectrum running from a restrictive to an expansive
framework had limited application when the case law always imagined the illiterate consumer.
The inclusion of linguistic knowledge in the case law, however, means that foreign-language
marks can also range from restrictive to expansive. The subsections below will continue to
review the stories of The Coca-Cola Company and the two Chinese bakeries in Canada to
illustrate how imagining the fluent consumer raises the possibility that traders may use an
expansive framework to prohibit dilution by “blurring”, dilution by “tarnishing”, and “free
riding”.

7.2.4.1 Dilution by Blurring
The SAINT HONORE marks were refused registration because they were used in
association with similar products to the ANNA marks and were confusing with them. If
linguistic knowledge is included in the test for confusion, such linguistic knowledge should
eventually become relevant in other tests as well, including the test for dilution. As a result, it
may be possible to claim that the SAINT HONORE marks dilute the ANNA marks by blurring
them in the mind of the fluent consumer in two ways.
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First, the SAINT HONORE marks may dilute the ANNA marks by blurring their
meaning. The Chinese characters 安 娜 used to mean only ANNA, as arbitrarily chosen by the
owners of the ANNA marks. Then they were given the new meaning HONORE, as arbitrarily
translated by the owners of the SAINT HONORE marks. Support for this position comes from
Visa International Service Ass’n v JSL Corp.495 The word “visa” used to be only a word in the
English dictionary. The plaintiff made it famous as the VISA mark in association with credit card
and financial services. The defendant used it as the EVISA mark in association with multilingual
education and information services. Although the defendant was only doing what the plaintiff
had done by using the word for a new purpose, the plaintiff still sued and won for dilution
because the meaning of the VISA mark had been blurred:
“This multiplication of meanings is the essence of dilution by blurring. Use of the
word “visa” to refer to travel visas is permissible because it doesn‟t have this
effect; the word elicits only the standard dictionary definition. Use of the word
visa in a trademark to refer to a good or service other than a travel visa, as in this
case, undoubtedly does have this effect; the word becomes associated with two
products, rather than one. This is true even when use of the word also gestures at
the word‟s dictionary definition.”496

Second, the SAINT HONORE marks may dilute the ANNA marks by blurring their
source. The Chinese characters 安 娜 used to refer only to the bakery owned by Cheung‟s
Bakery. Then the variation 聖 安 娜 came to refer also to the bakery owned by Saint Honore
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Cake Shop. Support for this position comes from Coca-Cola v Busch.497 The plaintiff advertised
its products in association with the COCA-COLA mark, which the public abbreviated as COKE.
Since the plaintiff never used the abbreviation, the defendant started using the variation KOKE
to sell similar products. After persuading a court that use by others of the COKE abbreviation
should enure to it as the owner of the COCA-COLA mark, the plaintiff then argued that the
source of the abbreviation had been blurred by the variation.

7.2.4.2 Dilution by Tarnishing
It may also be possible to claim that the SAINT HONORE marks dilute the ANNA
marks by tarnishing them in the mind of the fluent consumer. Comparing the Chinese characters
聖 安 娜 in one party‟s marks and the same Chinese characters 安 娜 in the other party‟s marks
indicates a difference of only one Chinese character: 聖. The fluent consumer would know that
the Chinese character 聖 means “holy” and is the root word of multiple Christian and Catholic
terms in Chinese. 498 If a trader is anti-religious, or strongly religious in a faith other than
Christianity or Catholicism, then attaching the Chinese character 聖 to its trademark could be
considered tarnishing.
The same thing could easily happen to COCA-COLA‟s translation 可 口 可 樂 because
the last character for “happy” can also mean “music”. A savvy karaoke bar could use the same
four characters to suggest “happy mouth” or “music in the mouth”, or emphasize both food and
entertainment with the translation “delicious music”. The Coca-Cola Company could claim
dilution by tarnishing of its happy and wholesome reputation with evidence that karaoke bars are
497
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frequented by jilted lovers and gangster wannabes. It may also claim blurring or confusion if the
karaoke bar also sells COCA-COLA products, as such bars often do. The argument for blurring
becomes even stronger once we realize that the last Chinese character for “happy” changes its
pronunciation when it means “music”, so that COCA-COLA‟s priceless pronounciation KE3
KOU3 KE3 LE4 would become the awkwardly pronounced KE3 KOU3 KE3 YUE4.

7.2.4.3 Free Riding
American anti-dilution law is limited to blurring and tarnishing, as it does not protect
against free riding like European anti-dilution law.499 Canada‟s depreciation of goodwill is more
expansive than the American anti-dilution law because it may possibly go beyond blurring and
tarnishing, in addition to not requiring fame and not having any limits as defences. As a result, it
may also be possible to claim that a Chinese-language mark is free-riding on the Chinese
translation for COCA-COLA in the mind of the fluent consumer in three ways.
First, initial interest confusion may prohibit the savvy karaoke bar described above from
using its Chinese-language mark in order to attract Chinese clients. Although initial interest
confusion is used to catch a consumer‟s attention, the confusion is only temporary in that there is
no actual confusion by the point of purchase.500 The hybrid nature of initial-interest-confusion
but no-actual-confusion raises uncertainty as to whether this is infringement or depreciation (or
both). Although the United States accepts this to be infringement,501 Canada‟s Federal Court of
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Appeal seems to reject this as an example of infringement and left open the possibility of this
being an example of trademark depreciation.502
Second, cybersquatting may prevent users such as competitors, consumers, or citizens
from having websites that compare, comment on, or criticize COCA-COLA products. 503 The
Coca-Cola Company could claim free-riding even if there is no confusion with respect to the
Chinese equivalents of www.Coca-ColaHasMoreCaloriesThanPepsi-Cola.com, www.CocaColaSucks.com, or www.Coca-ColaViolatesLabourStandards.com. The users could counterargue that the websites are an exercise of their constitutional right to free speech. Such a defence
would be unsuccessful, however, for the owner of www.kekoukele.com. This website is not
owned by The Coca-Cola Company, and its only purpose is to redirect searchers to WeChat (the
Chinese equivalent of Facebook & WhatsApp combined).
Third, comparative advertising may prohibit a Chinese company from advertising itself
as “the Chinese alternative to 可 口 可 樂” with a chart listing its Asian-flavoured counterparts
to COCA-COLA, SPRITE, FANTA, VITAMINWATER, HONEST TEA, etc. This may sound
implausible until one remembers that Western desserts like ice-cream and snacks like KitKat
originally had limited appeal to Asian palettes. That appeal grew exponentially, however, with
new Asian flavours such as “black sesame/ ginger/ green tea/ mango/ red bean” ice-cream and
“aloe/ matcha/ taro/ sake/ wasabi” KitKats. Although the chart‟s information may be truthful and
useful to consumers, such comparative advertising would be prohibited according to Clairol Int’l
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Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.504 The plaintiff and the defendant there both sold hair
dye. The defendant used colour comparison charts to show which of its hair dye corresponded
with the plaintiff‟s hair dye. Although this was truthful information of use to consumers looking
to switch brands but afraid to risk the possibility of an unexpected change in colour, the court
still decided that such information depreciated the plaintiff‟s goodwill:
“Depreciation of that value in my opinion occurs whether it arises through
reduction of the esteem in which the mark itself is held or through the direct
persuasion and enticing of customers who could otherwise be expected to buy or
continue to buy goods bearing the trademark.”505

It is clear from this chapter that assuming linguistic knowledge for all foreign-language
marks promotes the dual purposes of trademark law, as doing so focuses the evidence on the
trademarks as they are and the association between them, which allows their distinctiveness and
confusion to be assessed in the same manner as trademarks in the official languages. This stops
the expansion of rights by minimizing claims that any and all foreign-language marks infringe or
dilute a registered trademark. In this regard, protecting both consumers and traders is impossible
nowadays without considering Canada‟s multicultural heritage. Even now, there are dissatisfied
traders who advocate successfully for more recognition of well-known marks or new recognition
of unconventional marks – such as scent, sound, colour and shape. 506 The obsession with
expanding rights for well-known marks or creating rights for unconventional marks is strange,
504
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especially when compared with the lack of attention paid to foreign-language marks that are
more numerous and have a greater impact on Canadians. Canada‟s current trademark reforms
continue to ignore foreign-language marks that are registered already or that are more significant
by number and value, even as it expands the definition of a trademark to extend rights to
unconventional marks.507 The judicial development of the test for confusion makes up for the
legislative neglect. Otherwise, other traders would be expanding their trademark rights while
foreign-language traders might not even be able to prove trademark infringement under the test
for confusion. That is why the court‟s recognition of linguistic knowledge is welcomed, not
because foreign-language traders wish to expand trademark law, but rather because multicultural
consumers are now being acknowledged as relevant members of Canadian society whose
languages and cultures matter.
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CONCLUSION
The law has developed its legal fictions for the trademark consumer. Now that the social
construct no longer ignores linguistic knowledge, the fictitious character of the newly fledged
fluent consumer raises new challenges.
These challenges are pressing matters administratively and judicially. This is clear from
my discussion of the linguistic problems that impact trademark registrations and litigation. The
problems highlighted by two Canadian case studies of Chinese-language trademarks give rise to
my solutions, the general principles of which can also be applied in other countries and to other
foreign languages. The solutions are tested through my application to the criteria for trademark
registrability, as well as to the trader‟s rights against infringement, against depreciation of
goodwill, to license, and to translate. This vertical analysis is done in a comparative setting that
horizontally canvasses the alternative approaches taken by both Western and Asian countries
with official languages that are only Romanized (the United States), both Romanized and not
Romanized (the European Union and Singapore), and only not Romanized (China).
These challenges can also be addressed legislatively. This is unlikely to happen since
such discussions were absent during and continue to be absent after the 1953 Trade Mark Law
Revision Committee. The absence is understandable in light of how little impact the linguistic
problems had on trademark registrations and litigation back then. The growing awareness of
international businesses and multicultural consumers may influence legislative members to take
action now. But should such action be limited to economic and international trade concerns?
What of social and human rights causes?

186

These challenges draw attention to why trademark law exists and, more importantly,
whom trademark law benefits. Since one of the beneficiaries – and the focus of the test for
confusion – is the consumer, this naturally involves drawing attention to social causes that are
important to Canadian consumers: Aboriginal language rights, Constitutional freedom of speech,
and safeguards against expanding trademark rights. I avoided using critical legal theory to
advance a human rights discourse on how supposedly impartial administrative practices and
judicial decisions produce preferential outcomes because I saw no point in preaching to choir
members and I had no faith in converting business leaders. This is why I focused on business
concerns that would serve as incentives for businesses to litigate or lobby for changes. Although
I protested against businesses co-opting social causes, I had no qualms about myself co-opting
business concerns because traders need consumers. The current business strategy is to invite,
encourage, and depend upon consumers to respond to, participate in, and engage with
trademarked mottos, slogans, or taglines. Having invited in the consumer, such businesses cannot
keep out consumer causes.
The answers to the new challenges may not be easy but they can affect outcomes on
distinctiveness and confusion – with implications for traders investing in businesses, consumers
awaiting recognition of their languages and cultures, and a country concerned with issues of
international trade and multicultural heritage in a global economy. It is important to develop a
workable model now for assessing the consumer in cases involving foreign-language marks to
ensure the consistency and credibility of the legal fiction of the fluent consumer.
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